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Article M's Case/Controversy Distinction and the
Dual Functions of Federal Courts
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.*
Article III of the Constitution extends federal 'judicial Power"
to (1) "all Cases" arising under federal law, concerning admiralty,
or affecting foreign ministers, and to (2) "Controversies" between
certain parties (the United States, states, foreign nations, and their
citizens) in six specified situations.' The Supreme Court has treat-
ed the words "Cases" and "Controversies" as synonymous and col-
lapsed them into a single Article III requirement of "justiciability,"
which determines whether a particular matter (invariably a federal
question case) is fit for judicial disposition.2 Justiciability includes
the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness, which limit
federal courts to adjudicating only concrete disputes between di-
rectly adverse parties.' Therefore, justiciability presupposes that a
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ticle. I would also like to thank Dave Engdahl, Bill Fisch, Willy Fletcher, Michael
Froomkin, Dan Meltzer, Walter Oberer, Jim Pfander, Christina Wells, and Jim Whitman
for their helpful suggestions. Finally, I am grateful for the generous support provided by
the Charles H. Rehm and the Donald P. Thomasson Faculty Research Fellowships
thirough the Missouri Law School Foundation and by the John M. Olin Foundation at
Yale Law School.
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cI. 1 (emphasis added). This clause provides in full:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Contro-
versies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
The foregoing provision will be referred to as the "jurisdictional catalogue" through-
out this Article.
2 See generally infra Part I.Al.
3 Standing concerns a plaintiff's ability to sue, which hinges on whether she has
suffered a concrete injury inflicted by a defendant. Ripeness bars judicial consideration of
claims that have not yet matured into full-blown disputes. Mootness precludes adjudica-
tion when intervening events have extinguished the controversy that triggered the suit. See
generally infra Part IA..(b) (analyzing standing, ripeness, and mootness). Justiciability also
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federal judge's primary function is to resolve disputes, not to de-
clare the law.
Nearly all scholars have accepted the Court's assumption that
the terms "Cases" and "Controversies" are interchangeable, and
have instead criticized the justiciability doctrines themselves as
incoherent and inconsistent with the Court's role in articulating
public values.4 Unfortunately, these commentators have replicated
the Court's narrow focus on only one of Article III's nine jurisdic-
tional grants-federal question (especially constitutional) "Cases."5
But if Article III's reference to "Cases" and "Controversies" creates
a constitutional requirement of justiciability, then doctrines like
standing, ripeness, and mootness logically should apply to all the
enumerated "Cases" and "Controversies."6
The orthodox judicial and academic- treatment of "case or
controversy" as a single standard of justiciability relevant only to
federal question "Cases" cannot be reconciled with Article III's
language, history, and structure.7 That evidence indicates that the
includes the political question and advisory opinion doctrines, which are discussed infra
Part II.E.
4 See generally infra Part I.A.2. A few commentators have identified possible distinc-
tions between "Cases" and "Controversies," hut dismissed them as relatively trivial. See infra
Part I.B:
5 See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
6 All the Supreme Court's major justiciability cases have involved federal questions.
See infra Part, I.A.1. Although lower federal courts may sometimes dismiss actions based
on other heads of Article III jurisdiction on justiciability grounds, the development of
standing, ripeness, and moomess has occurred exclusively in the context of federal
question "Cases.'
7 In this Article, I rely extensively on Article III's text, structure, and history. I
employ such an interpretivist methodology primarily because most jurists and scholars do
likewise in debating the role of federal courts. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Feder-
alist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205,
207-08 n.7 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist] (justifying interpretivism on this
ground and many others).
Such an approach sometimes leads to the charge that the author has a literalistic
concept of the meaning of words and is manipulating the historical evidence to fit mod-
em theories of what the Framers should have done, rather than what they actually did.
See, e.g., Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice". Politics, The Judiciay Act of 1789, and the Inven-
tion of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1520. While I do not claim to have
achieved perfect historical detachment, I am content to let the sources I have presented
speak for themselves. Moreover, historical evidence should not be discounted simply be-
cause it is consistent with a theory (for example, the case/controversy distinction) that
can also be supported on current policy grounds. Indeed, such modern usefulness would
appear to enhance the value of historical study. "We too easily read our history to vali-
date familiar practices we lack sufficient imagination to improve. We should rather ex-
plore it to discover whether and how we have misplaced alternatives that might more
happily serve us even now." David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's Jeffersonian" Concept of Judi-
cial Review. 42 DuKE LJ. 279, 333 (1992) [hereinafter Engdahl, John Marshall].
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Framers used "case" and "controversy" as distinct terms to convey
.different meanings.' Textually, the traditional presumption that
variations in constitutional language are intentional9 applies with
peculiar force to Article III because of its repetition of the word
"Cases" three times to introduce those jurisdictional grants defined
by legal subject matter, followed by its subsequent shift to (and
reiteration of) the term "Controversies" to denote the six party-
defined jurisdictional classes. Historical evidence reveals a criti-
cal-and overlooked-difference between the two words related to
judicial functions. This distinction clarifies the usage of "Cases"
and "Controversies" in Article III and highlights the structural
division of its jurisdictional catalogue into two discrete categories.
In the eighteenth century, "case" referred to a cause of action
requesting a remedy for the claimed violation of a legal right, in
which a judge's primary role was to answer the legal question
presented through "exposition"-the process of ascertaining, apply-
ing, and interpreting the law in light of precedent and the facts
presented. ° A dispute between parties was a usual-but not nec-
essary-ingredient of a "case," and resolving any such disagree-
ment was less important than legal exposition." Thus, Article III
contemplated that the federal courts' main function in federal
question, admiralty, and foreign minister "Cases" would be to
declare the law in matters of national and international importance. 2
8 See generally infra Part II. This Article uses the phrase "the Framers" to refer pri-
marily to the leading Federalists. I recognize the impossibility of discerning a single "orig-
inal intent," shared by all those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, as to any of
its particular provisions-including those relating to the federal judiciary. My limited pur-
pose is to pinpoint the most plausible meaning of "Cases" and "Controversies" as used in
Article III. I am aware that some scholars consider such textual and historical studies to
be misguided and/or irrelevant to modem constitutional law. I disagree with that view,
for reasons that have been set forth by others. See, e.g., Amar, Neo-Federalls supra note 7,
at 207-08 n.7.
9 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334 (1816).
10 See generally infra Part II.B.2.(a).
11 See generally infra Part II.B.2.(a)(ii).
12 See generally infra Part II.C.2.(a) and Part II.D.1. I do not mean to imply that the
Framers endorsed (or even anticipated) modem Supreme Court law declaration in "Cas-
es," particularly those arising under the Constitution. The 18th century concept of judi-
cial exposition limited courts to finding and pronouncing the existing law, rather than
making new law. See infra note 150. The Founders apparently foresaw neither the magni-
tude of difficulty involved in adapting that classic "law-finding" function to a written con-
stitution nor the element of political will that would influence decisions on constitutional
questions. See generally Engdahl, John Marhall supra note 7, at 289-97.
Nonetheless, the line between declaring and making the law was blurry even two
centuries ago. See infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text. The Marshall Court arguably
19941
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By contrast, "controversy" meant a bilateral dispute wherein a
judge served principally as a neutral umpire whose decision bound
only the immediate parties.13 Hence, the Framers expected feder-
al courts to act chiefly as independent arbitrators in resolving
Article III "Controversies," with any legal exposition incidental. 4
This case/controversy distinction warrants a new, bifurcated
approach to justiciability. The word "controversy" supplies a textual
basis for application of current justiciability doctrines, which con-
cern judicial resolution of bilateral disputes, to Article III "Contro-
versies.""'5 However, the term "case" provides no constitutional
support for application of standing, ripeness, or mootness to Arti-
cle III "Cases," because those doctrines ignore the key judicial
function of exposition. Therefore, as to federal question, admi-
ralty, and foreign minister "Cases," the justiciability doctrines
should be reformulated to focus on judicial law declaration. 6
This functional case/controversy distinction will be explained
in a three-part analysis. Part I summarizes current approaches to
"Cases" and "Controversies." Part II discusses the historical mean-
ing of those terms. Part III reexamines justiciability and the func-
tions of federal courts in light of the case/controversy bifurcation.
I. CURRENT APPROACHES TO "CASES" AND "CONTROVERSIES"
A. The "Unitary" View
The perception that "Cases" and "Controversies" form a single
standard of justiciability derives from relatively recent Supreme
Court opinions that generally have been accepted at face value by
crossed that line on several occasions. See infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)) and infra note 270 (describing
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)).
13 See generally infra Part II.B.2.(b).
14 See generally infra Part II.C.2.(b) and Part II.D.2. The proffered case/controversy
distinction concerns primary and secondary--rather than exclusive-judicial functions. I
readily acknowledge that federal courts always have settled disputes in "Cases" and ap-
plied law in "Controversies;" the issue is the relative importance of these roles in each
category. In an Article III "Controversy," a federal judge's main function is to resolve a
dispute impartially, with a secondary task of declaring the law-usually state law, on
which the court's pronouncements are not binding except as to the immediate litigants.
By contrast, what is paramount in an Article III "Case" is judicial exposition, especially by
the Supreme Court-the only tribunal mandated by the Constitution. A dispute is not
necessary and, even where one exists, should not be the Court's central concern.
15 See generally infra Part IIIA.
16 See generally infra Part III.B.
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scholars. The following summary traces the evolution of this "uni-
tary" approach and describes its essential features.
1. The Supreme Court's "Case or Controversy" Requirement
(a) Historical Development.-During the past half century,
the Supreme Court has developed the idea that "case" and "con-
troversy" are equivalent terms that constitutionally restrict federal
jurisdiction to live disputes involving an injured party. This mod-
em concept of justiciability has little linguistic or historical basis:
From the founding of the republic to the New Deal, the Court
never mentioned that Article III's reference to "Cases" and "Con-
troversies" imposed any threshold jurisdictional requirement.
In fact, as late as 1936, justiciability was treated not as a con-
stitutional jurisdictional mandate, but rather as a doctrine of dis-
cretion and self-restraint. That year, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority,t8 the Court recognized the standing of stockholders to
challenge the United States' constitutional authority to enter a
contract under a federal statute, 9 but upheld the government's
action." In his famous concurrence, Justice Brandeis argued that
plaintiffs did not have standing.2' Brandeis viewed standing as en-
tirely prudential: "The Court [has] developed, for its own governance
in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under
which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitu-
tional questions pressed .upon it for decision"'22-- for instance, the
ban on collusive suits' and the refusal to consider "the validity of
17 See generally infra Part II.D. and Part II.E. Indeed, the most ardent defender of
justiciability, Justice Scalia, has conceded that no 19th century opinion mentions any Arti-
cle III textual basis for these doctrines. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 339-40 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). He asserts that "[t]he explanation for this ellipsis is that the
courts simply chose to refer directly to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon the
powers of common law courts, rather than referring to Art. III which in turn adopts
those limitations through terms ('The judicial Power'; 'Cases'; 'Controversies') that have
virtually no meaning except by reference to that tradition." Id. at 340. Justice Scalia's
"explanation" begs the question-what was the traditional common law meaning of each
of those terms? The answer is that "Cases" and "Controversies" were not historically
viewed as limitations, but rather as affirmative grants of power to perform specific roles.
See generally infra Part I.
18 297 U.S. 288 (1936).-
19 Id. at 315-25.
20 Id. at 338-40.
21 Justice Brandeis acknowledged that "[the obstacle is not procedural It inheres in
the substantive law, in well settled rules of equity, and in the practice in cases involving
the constitutionality of legislation." Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
22 Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
23 Id. Other prudential principles included reaching constitutional questions only
19941
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a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is in-
jured by its operation." 4 Such self-discipline had become increas-
ingly urgent as federal dockets burgeoned because of expanded
federal question jurisdiction and the growth of administrative
law.2
5
To further reduce the workload of the federal judiciary, the
Court began to maintain that justiciability was a constitutional bar-
rier, seizing on "Cases" and "Controversies" as textual support. In
a 1939 dissent joined by three other Justices, Justice Frankfurter
declared:
The Constitution ... explicitly indicated the limited area [of
judicial action] . . . by extending 'Judicial Power" only to "Cas-
es" and "Controversies."..... [T]he framers ... [intended] that
j]udicial power could come into play only in matters that were
the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if
they arose in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted
"Cases" or "Controversies.""
One constitutional limit on jurisdiction 27 was the "preliminary
question[] of legal standing to sue,"28 which required "a concrete,
living contest between adversaries"29  with an "individualized
when necessary to decide the case, avoiding constitutional issues if another ground of
decision was available, construing statutes to avoid constitutional questions, and narrowly
formulating constitutional rules. Id. at 346-48.
24 Id. at 347. As authority, Brandeis cited Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), underscoring that Mellon's denial of taxpayer standing was based on equitable
considerations, not the Constitution, as has been commonly assumed. See Steven L. Win-
ter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1446-48 (1988). Winter provides a superb analysis of the transformation of standing from
a prudential to a constitutional doctrine. See id. at 1417-57.
25 See id. at 1452-53 (discussing Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, which extended
general federal question jurisdiction to lower federal courts and expanded removal juris-
diction); id. at 1453 (stressing that growth of modern administrative state in early 20th
century increased federal court workload and frequency of government intrusions with cit-
izens). See also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224-28
(1988) [hereinafter Fletcher, Structure].
26 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). A plu-
rality of the Court concluded that state legislators had standing to challenge voting pro-
cedures in the ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment, but declined to
reach the merits because a political question had been presented. Id. at 437-56.
27 Id. at 464 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In the familiar language of jurisdic-
tion. . . . [plaintiffs] must have standing.") (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 468.
29 Id. at 460.
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stake"" in the outcome, as evidenced by "private damage.""1 Jus-
tice Frankfurter refined his Article III standing analysis in a 1951
concurrence, 32 and the full Court adopted this theory the follow-
ing year." The Court extended the "case or controversy" inquiry
to mootness in 1964s4 and to ripeness in 1974."
(b) Justiciability and Dispute Resolution.-The "case or contro-
versy" standard limits federal court access to plaintiffs who can
demonstrate the existence of a live, concrete dispute against an
adverse party. 6  Hence, the justiciability doctrines-standing,
mootness, and ripeness-necessarily rest on a dispute resolution
model of adjudication. 7
(i) Standing.-Standing concerns a particular plaintiff's
right to sue in federal court. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,'
Justice Scalia declared:
30 Id. at 467; see also id. at 464 (Parties must have "some specialized interest of their
own to vindicate.").
31 Id. at 469-70.
32 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-60 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33 See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Justice Frankfurter's justicia-
bility theories (and his underlying vision of federal jurisdiction) gained such rapid and
widespread acceptance in part because they were championed by the foremost federal
courts scholars of his era (e.g., Henry Hart, Herbert Wechsler, Paul Mishkin, and Paul
Freund); their disciples have preserved the Frankfurtian vision. See generally Akhil Reed
Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691-93, 696-707, 712, 719 (1989) [hereinafter
Amar, Law Stoy] (describing relationship between Frankfurter and his academic follow-
ers).
34 See Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964).
35 See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458 (1974) (The threshold issue is "wheth-
er petitioner presents an 'actual controversy,' a requirement imposed by Art. III of the
Constitution."). The progression of justiciability from prudential to constitutional was not
linear, however. As late as 1961, the Court suggested that "the restriction of our jurisdic-
tion to cases and controversies within the meaning of Article III" was distinct from jus-
ticiability, which concerned Ashwander-type prudential considerations. See Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1961).
36 See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1986); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION 40, 45 (1989).
37 See supra notes 29-30, 36 and accompanying text; infra notes 39-44, 47-53 and ac-
companying text. See also PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 82 (3d ed." 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]
(noting Court's adherence to dispute resolution model).
38 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). For critical evaluations of Ltjan, see Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141 (1993); Cass IL
Sunstein, What's Standing Afier Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 11I, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163 (1992).
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NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
One of th[e] landmarks, setting apart the "Cases" and "Contro-
versies" that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article
III--"serv[ing] to identify those disputes which are appropriately
resolved through the judicial process"-is the doctrine of stand-
ing. Though some of its elements express merely prudential
considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the
core component of standing is an essential and unchanging
part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.
Lujan reiterated the Frankfurtian gospel that standing limits adju-
dication to actual "cases and controversies" between adverse
parties.' Standing focuses on whether the plaintiff has a "person-
al stake in the outcome of a controversy" sufficient to ensure that
she will vigorously represent her interests,4" as evidenced by an
"injury in fact" '42 caused by the defendant's assertedly illegal con-
duct that is "'likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."'43
The requirement of direct, concrete injury assures a traditional ad-
39 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia argued that
the judiciary was described by "landmarks" like standing that were more certain and nar-
row than those of the political branches. Id. at 2136 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at
256 (James Madison) (Carey & McClellan eds.. 1990)). Contrary to Justice Scalia's im-
plication, Madison there does not say that the words "Cases" and "Controversies" are
"landmarks" that narrow federal jurisdiction and support standing.
40 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 US. 490, 498-502, 517-18 (1975); Schlesinger
v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215, 218 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
94-95, 96-97, 101, 109, 120 (1968). See also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (asserting that limi-
tation of federal judiciary to resolving disputes in "the last resort" prevents conversion of
courts into "college debating forums").
41 See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1986) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) ("Article III of the Constitution limits the power of federal courts
to deciding 'cases' and 'controversies.' This requirement ensures the presence of the
'concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.'").
42 This term originated in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 152 (1970). The "injury" consists of "an invasion of a legally-protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) 'actual or imminent', not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted). The
plaintiff must show an individual injury, not "a generally available grievance about govern-
ment." Id. at 2143; see also id. at 2144-45 (Neither courts nor Congress can ignore the
concrete injury requirement without "discarding a principle fundamental to the separate
and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of the essential elements that
identifies those 'Cases' and 'Controversies' that are the business of the courts rather than
of the political branches."). See generally Sunstein, supra note 38, at 184-86 (criticizing
"injury in fact" requirement).
43 Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
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versarial form in which the Court can function as a dispute resolv-
er.
44
(ii) Ripeness.-Ripeness bars premature claims. Tradition-
ally, the Court viewed ripeness as an entirely discretionary doctrine
that weighed two major factors-"the fitness of the issues for judi-
cial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration. 45I In the mid-1970s, however, the Court started to assert that
ripeness was based on Article III's "Cases and Controversies" lan-
guage,46 and incorporated into ripeness doctrine terminology bor-
44 See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-72; see also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220-21 ("Con-
crete injury ... is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it
in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution."); Whitmor 495 U.S. at 155
("[S]tanding serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through
the judicial process."); Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989) ("[T]his dispute
now presents a justiciable case or controversy for resolution here."). Surprisingly, liberal
Justices have agreed that standing rests on Article III's "Cases and Controversies" lan-
guage and its underlying dispute resolution model. For example, in Fast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968), Chief Justice Warren emphasized that "those two words [Cases and Con-
troversies] have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged
complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government." Id. at
94. Rather than developing the crucial insight that "Case" and "Controversy" have mean-
ings more complicated than generally supposed, however, Warren simply reiterated that
these words are "limitations" that restrict courts to a traditional adversary format and
protect separation of powers, and that they support the concept of justiciability. Id. at 95.
The Chief Justice failed to consider that "Cases" and "Controversies" might not be limita-
tions but rather broad affirmative grants. Cf Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 82 (1907)
(Article III, § 2 "is not a limitation . . . . It is a definite declaration, a provision that the
judicial power shall extend to . . . the several matters particularly mentioned, leaving
unrestricted the general grant of the entire judicial power.").
Like Chief Justice Warren, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that "cases and controver-
sies" are a "limitation" and that standing involves "judicial resolution of a dispute." Dia-
mond, 476 U.S. at 61-62. Similarly, Justice Brennan concluded that "[o]ne could hardly
dispute the proposition that Art. III of the Constitution, by limiting the judicial power to
'Cases' or 'Controversies,'" promotes separation of powers. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Elsewhere, Justice Brennan accepted the "settled
doctrine" of Article III, but argued that the "case and controversy" limitation "overrides
no other provision of the Constitution." Valley Forg, 454 U.S. at 491-93 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Disagreeing with the Court's holding that taxpayers lacked standing to mount
an Establishment Clause challenge to a grant of federal property to a religious college,
Justice Brennan stressed that, instead of analyzing the legal rights and interests at stake
,
the Court clouded those issues with a threshold standing inquiry. Id. at 490-91; see also
Fletcher, Structure, supra note 25, at 267-72 (arguing that taxpayer standing cases should
focus on whether purpose of constitutional provision like Establishment Clause would be
served by allowing suit).
45 See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). The Court has consistently
followed this prudential test, despite its later claim that ripeness has a constitutional com-
ponent.
46 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 153, 162-
1994]
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rowed from standing analysis-for example, the requirement that a
plaintiff has suffered (or certainly will suffer) a cognizable "inju-
ry.''47 Like standing, ripeness assumes that federal courts exist
mainly to resolve disputes: The determination that a matter is un-
ripe means it has not yet matured into a full-blown dispute.
(iii) Mootness.-Mootness precludes adjudication when the
live controversy that triggered the suit has ceased. The judicial
focus is on whether the plaintiff has a personal stake in the out-
come 48 under the dispute resolution paradigm.49
In 1964, the Court asserted for the first time that its "lack of
jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the requirement of
Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial
power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy."50
The constitutional root of mootness and its dispute resolution
foundation have been consistently reaffirmed,51 as in the recent
case of Honig v. Doe5
Under Article III of the Constitution this Court may only adju-
dicate actual, ongoing controversies .... That the dispute be-
tween the parties was very much alive when suit was filed ...
cannot substitute for the actual case or controversy that an
exercise of this Court's jurisdiction requires.53
64 (1987) [hereinafter Nichol, Ripeness]; id. at 163 n.66 (identifyring Babbitt v. Farm
Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979), as first time all ripeness doctrine brought within
Article III). Again, all the Justices acquiesced to this constitutionalization, even if they dis-
agreed with its specific application. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 509 (1974)
(Douglas, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (rejecting holding of
unripeness because allegations "clearly state a case or controversy in the Art. III sense").
47 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81
(1978). Predictably, the result has been analytical confusion. See Jonathan D. Varat,
Variable Justiciability and the Duke Power Case, 58 TEx. L. REv. 273, 298 (1980) (Collapsing
ripeness analysis into standing inquiry shifts the focus of ripeness from legal issues to
plaintiff's injury.).
48 See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).
49 See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)
("[P]ersonal stake" aspect of mootness "assur[es] that federal courts are presented with
disputes they are capable of resolving."); id. at 403 ("The imperatives of a dispute capa-
ble of judicial resolition are sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting and
self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions.").
50 See Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964).
51 See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (The Court
"may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies."); County of Los Angeles v.
Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 4i6 U.S. 312, 316-20 (1974) (per curi-
am).
52 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
53 Id. at 317 (emphasis added). Plaintiff claimed a school district had violated his
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In a surprising concurrence in Honig, Chief Justice Rehnquist
examined the history of mootness and concluded that it had at
best "an attenuated connection" to "the case or controversy re-
quirement" and could therefore be overridden for policy rea-
sons.54 He deemed it "very doubtful that the earliest case...
discussing mootness. . was premised on constitutional con-
straints ... [because it] nowhere mentions Art. III.""
With the exception of Chief Justice Rehnquist's Honig concur-
rence, no Justice has challenged the proposition that the phrase
"case or controversy" supports the justiciability doctrines. The only
judicial debate is how strictly they should be applied.
2. Scholarship on "Cases and Controversies"
Scholars generally have accepted the Court's premise that the
terms case and controversy "can be used interchangeably,"" and
they have employed this phrase to frame their analysis of justicia-
bility. 7 The voluminous literature on "cases and controversies"
usually addresses policy issues and assails the complexity, incoher-
ence, and malleability of the justiciability doctrines."
federal statutory rights by expelling him for misconduct related to his emotional disabili-
ties. Although the plaintiff had moved to a different district and had not attempted to
enroll in school, the Court found his claims were not moot because of the "reasonable
likelihood" he would again suffer the statutory violations that gave rise to his initial suit.
Id. at 317-23. Thus, while the original dispute had abated, his claim was "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 318.
54 Id. at 331 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
55 Id. at 330 (citing Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895)). Justice Scalia denied that
mootness was based on prudence rather than a historical understanding of Article III's
"cases and controversies" language. Id. at 332-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He suggested that
mootness rested on either the words "cases and controversies" (id. at 332-33, 337) or on
something "inherent in the understood nature of 'The judicial Power.'" Id. at 341.
56 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 53 (4th ed. 1983).
57 Id. at 53-84 (repeating "Case or Controversy" title four times to introduce discus-
sion of justiciability doctrines). Other major casebooks and treatises follow suit. See, e.g.,
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 65 (designating Chapter II on justiciability "The
Nature of the Federal Judicial Function: Cases and Controversies"); CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 3-77 (9th ed. 1992) (en-
titling Chapter 1 "'Judicial Power' Over 'Cases and Controversies'"); PETER W. LOW &
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 13-112
(2d ed. 1989) (entitling discussion of justiciability doctrines "Case ,or Controversy");
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 38 (introducing Chapter 2 on justiciability by summarizing
Court's "Cases and Controversies" jurisprudence).
58 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 68 n.3
(1984) (listing sources criticizing standing). There are a few exceptions to this negative
approach. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986)
(endorsing manipulation of justiciability doctrines-the "passive virtues"-where deciding
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A few commentators have examined the history of justiciabili-
ty. For example, Professors Jaffe, Berger, Winter, and Sunstein
have argued that the Framers could not have intended Article III
to have the meaning suggested by modem standing law because in
the eighteenth century citizens who had suffered no personal
injury could sue to vindicate public rights. 9 Similarly, Dean
Nichol has concluded that ripeness and mootness have little basis
in Article III's history or policy and should be returned to their
prudential status.' None of these scholars, however, have ques-
tioned the functional equivalence of "case" and "controversy."6
Finally, justiciability has been cited as an example of the Su-
preme Court's broader failure to acknowledge that its role is not
merely dispute resolution62 but rather is "to give concrete mean-
case capable of judicial resolution would threaten Court's authority); Lea Brilmayer, The
Jurisprudence of Article Il" Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 297 (1979) (comparing requirement to class action and arguing that standing fur-
thers policies of restraint, representation, and self-determination).
59 Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1265, 1267-75 (1961); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It A Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 YALE LJ. 816 (1969); Winter, supra note 24, at 1394-1409; Sunstein, supra
note 38, at 168-79. See also JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 20-23, 55 (1978).
60 See, e.g., Nichol, Ripeness, supra note 46; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Moot Cases, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, and the Supreme Court, 22 CONN. L. REv. 703 (1990). See also Evan Tsen
Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603
(1992).
61 See, e.g., Nichol, Ripeness, supra note 46, at 153 n.4 (collapsing terms); Lee, supra
note 60, at 636-37, 639-41 (concluding that "cases" and "controversies" have no clear his-
torical meaning); Winter, supra note 24, at 1374 ("1 am not so heretical as to suggest
that there is no such thing as an article III 'case or controversy' requirement that limits
the judicial power to actual disputes.").
Others have recognized that "case" and "controversy" provide a flimsy linguistic basis
for justiciability. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363, 1364 (1973) (The extension of judicial power to "cases and
controversies" has "little necessary meaning" and "bear[s] several interpretations."); Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurispru-
dence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984).
62 Under the dispute resolution model, a passive, impartial judge settles a self-con-
tained contested transaction between two private parties-a plaintiff seeking redress for
an injury inflicted by a directly adverse defendant. The discrete violation of the plaintiff's
rights is then remedied retrospectively, thereby satisfying the parties and restoring the
status quo. Any law declaration is a mere byproduct of resolving the dispute. See, e.g.,
Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-5
(1982); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1281-84 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role]; Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 17-29 (1979). See also MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COmPARA-
TIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1981) (emphasizing universality of dispute resolution
model); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978)
(Popular consent to dispute resolution supports judicial legitimacy, which is threatened by
judges tackling non-legal, "polycentric" tasks outside their area of competence.).
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ing and application to our constitutional values,"'3 as Owen
Fiss, 4  Abram Chayes,'s and others6  have maintained. These
scholars properly emphasize the expository function of the Court
in constitutional cases, 7 but they ignore other categories of Arti-
cle III "Cases," such as admiralty. Moreover, because Fiss and his
followers associate both "Cases" and "Controversies" with dispute
resolution and wholly reject this model of adjudication for federal
judges,'e they fail to consider whether dispute resolution might
retain some utility in deciding other Article III matters-namely,
the six "Controversies."
63 Fms, supra note 62, at 9.
64 Fiss argues that the function of adjudication remains constant-giving legal values
concrete meaning-but that the form evolves to fulfill changing social needs. He asserts
that huge modem bureaucracies pose the greatest threat to constitutional values, and
that therefore the federal judiciary must restructure such organizations to protect consti-
tutional rights. Such "structural reform" requires large public actions rather than piece-
meal private suits. See id. at 1-6, 43-44. Litigation thus increases in complexity. Party struc-
ture features not an individual plaintiff and defendant, but rather social groups and insti-
tutions requiring multiple outside spokespeople, who are usually pitted against large gov-
ernment defendants. Id. at 18-21.
Fuss notes the problems of reconciling justiciability (and its dispute resolution basis)
with structural reform. Id. at 4 n.13, 20 nn.42-43.
65 Chayes uses justiciability to illustrate his thesis that the private dispute resolution
paradigm is inapplicable to modem public law actions, which concern multiple parties
and complex legal and policy issues. Chayes, Roe, supra note 62, at 1288-96, 1304-07.
66 Professor Bandes "use[s] the term 'case' as shorthand for the phrase 'case or
controversy'." Susan Bahdes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 227 n.2 (1990).
Bandes' thorough analysis of justiciability (id. at 230-34, 245-50, 254-70, 279-301, 308-11)
illuminates her theme that the Court should define an Article III "case" to fulfill its
primary role as guardian of public constitutional values, rather than perpetuating the
fiction that constitutional adjudication is a byproduct of the resolution of private disputes.
Id. at 281-82. See also Girardeau A. Spann, Expositoiy Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1983)
(maintaining that proper adjudicatory model for federal courts should not be dispute
resolution but "expository justice"-the identification, exposition, and implementation of
basic moral/legal values); Lee, supra note 60, at 608-09, 654-56 (advancing thesis that
courts should decide moot cases if doing so would help give meaning to our public
values). See generally HART & WECHSLER. supra note 37, at 79-81 (summarizing scholarship
in this area).
67 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 66, at 281-82; Fiss, supra note 62, at 1-5, 9-17, 34-36,
44, 52-53, 57-58.
68 Fiss, supra note 62, at 30-31. One reason for this rejection is the conclusion that
"[t]here is nothing in the text of Article III-in the rather incidental use of the words
'cases' or 'controversies'-that constitutionally constricts the federal courts to dispute
resolution." Id. at 36. Another is historical: Even common law judges did not follow a
simple dispute resolution model. Id. at 9-17, 35-39. See also Bandes, supra note 66, at 283
& n.386 (summarizing scholarship on common law adjudication); id. at 282-89 (claiming
that private rights model of individualized dispute resolution is irrelevant to modem
Supreme Court adjudication, which should explicitly adopt public rights approach).
1994]
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B. Possible Case/Controversy Distinctions
Recently, a few scholars have challenged the unitary view of
"Cases" and "Controversies" by suggesting two possible distinctions
between these terms, neither of which addresses judicial functions.
1. The Civil/Criminal Distinction
Professors Fletcher, Meltzer, and Pfander have concluded that
"Cases" encompass civil and criminal actions, whereas "Controver-
sies" include civil suits only.69 While this theory has some histori-
cal foundation, it has several flaws. First, had the Framers intend-
ed this meaning, they simply could have used "civil cases" instead
of "Controversies."70 Second, neither eighteenth century legal lexi-
cons71 nor the Convention and Ratification records mention any
civil/criminal distinction.72 Conversely, many contemporary legal
authorities spoke of criminal "controversies ''T S most notably
James Wilson, the principal draftsman of Article III, 4 who re-
ferred to the courts' "readiness to determine every controversy,
criminal and civil."7' Finally, the Judiciary Act of 178976 under-
69 See William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adju-
dication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 263, 265-67 (1990) [hereinafter Fletcher, Case
or Controversy]; William A. Fletcher, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
131, 133 (1990) [hereinafter Fletcher, Exchange]; Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and
Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1575 (1990); James E. Pfander, Rethinking
the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. Part V.B.1.
(forthcoming 1994).
70 See Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1651, 1656-57 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Reports]. Indeed, the Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, does exactly that by referring to "civil cases."
71 See infra note 104 (listing law dictionaries and abridgements).
72 Professor Meltzer's lone citation is the Antifederalist "Letter of Agrippa to the
Massachusetts Convention," reprinted in 4 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDER-
AuST 96-97 (1981) [hereinafter ANTI-FEDERALIST]. See Meltzer, supra note 69, at 1575 n.19.
This letter, however, simply refers to "civil causes" in diversity. It does not consider the
other five types of "Controversies," nor does Agrippa ever suggest that "Cases" include
both civil and criminal matters. See Amar, Reports, supra note 70, at 1664 n.54.
73 See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER & A STUDENT OF
THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 78 Uoseph Cropsey ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971)
(1681) (describing "divers [sic] sorts of Controversies," including "Crimes punishable
divers wayes [sic]"); GILES JACOB, LEX CONSTITUTIONIS 38 (Garland Pub., 1979) (1719)
(discussing "several Courts of Judicature, for Trial of Criminals, and deciding all Matters
of Controversy . . ."); ARCHER POLSON, THE LAW OF NATIONS 797 (1845) (referring to
.criminal controversies").
74 See infra Part II.C.l.(b).
75 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 451 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinaf-
ter WILSON'S WORKS]. Although Wilson was referring to the English royal courts, his
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cuts the civil/criminal distinction, as Professor Meltzer himself con-
cedes.7
The historical basis for the civil/criminal distinction derives
largely from Justice James Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia.78
Iredell argued that section 13 of the Judiciary Act, which gave the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over "all controversies of a civ-
il nature ... between a state and citizens of other states,"'79 could
not be applied where a state was a defendants without violating
sovereign immunity." Iredell's lengthy opinion contained a brief
statement clearly shows he did not consider the word "controversies" as' inherently limited
to civil matters. Elsewhere, Wilson distinguished criminal "offences" from "civil causes" or
cases. Id. at 278.
76 Ch. 20, 1.Stat. 73.
77 Meltzer admits that three of the statute's sections concerning "controversies" could
include criminal matters. Meltzer, supra note 69, at 1576 n.23 (citing ambiguities in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 12, 1 Stat. 73, 76-81). Indeed, Congress' explicit
restriction of Supreme Court jurisdiction in § 13 to "controversies of a civil nature, where
a state is a party" and Circuit Court jurisdiction in § 11 to "suits of a civil nature ...
[where] the United States are plaintiffs" (another grant Article III deems a "Controver-
sy") would have been redundant if "controversies" were inherently civil. See WILFRED J.
RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDIcIARY ACT OF 1789 at 92 (Wythe Holt & L.H.
LaRue eds., 1990).
In any event, the Act is not authoritative in determining the meaning of Article III
because many key Federalists, including Wilson, Morris, and Hamilton, were absent from
the first Congress. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1540 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Two-Tiered]; Meltzer, supra
note 69, at 1611 (noting that congressmen mixed constitutional interpretation with politi-
cal arguments). Indeed, the Act was drafted primarily by small-states' advocates like
Ellsworth and Paterson and was more pleasing to the Constitution's opponents than to its
supporters. See Holt, supra note 7, at 1423, 1478-79, 1481-84. For example, Madison found
the Act "defective both in its general structure, and many of its particular regulations."
Id. at 1516-17 (citing source). Similarly, Attorney General Edmund Randolph, a key
draftsman of Article III, see infra notes 191 and 202-03, criticized the statute for departing
from the constitutional language and proposed numerous revisions. See Report of the
Attorney-General to the House of Representatives (Dec. 31, 1790), reprinted in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 at 127
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) [hereinafter Randolph's Report]. Professor Holt argues that Con-
gress did not worry abofit the Act's nonconformity with Article III because it. was a politi-
cal compromise with pro-debtor forces. Holt, supra note 7, at 1477-1517.
Despite its problems, the Act is considered a valuable interpretive source by most
legal historians, and therefore I have examined and cited it. Because of the statute's
possible unreliability in determining the intended meaning of Article III's provisions,
however, I have based my arguments primarily on other sources.
78 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431-32 (1793) (separate opinion of Iredell, J.), cited in
Meltzer, supra note 69, at 1575 n.20, and Fletcher, Case or Controversy, supra note 69, at
266.
79 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 431 (citing statute).
80 The Chisholm majority held that states could be sued as defendants. See infra note
301 and accompanying text (analyzing majority opinions in Chisholm).
81 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429-50.
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discussion of "controversies." He noted that (1) the 'judicial power
of the United States" was limited to the nine gran listed in Arti-
cle III, section 2, clause 1;82 and (2) in the jurisdictional catego-
ries defined by party, the only clue as to subject matter was the
term "Controversies.""3 Iredell then described the Judiciary Act's
construction of Article III, section 2, clause 2 on original jurisdic-
tion. 4 He asserted that Congress, in modifying Article III's refer-
ence to "Controversies" with the word "civil," intended to restrict
the Court's jurisdiction to non-criminal matters," thereby promot-
ing federalism. More broadly, Iredell's reluctance to interpret
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as including the power
to apply state criminal law reflected the established principle that
one sovereign (the United States) could not enforce the criminal
laws of another (a state).87
82 Id. at 430-31.
83 Id. at 431 ("The constitution is particular in expressing the parties who may be
the objects of the jurisdiction in any of these cases, but in respect to the subject-matter
upon which such jurisdiction is to be exercised, used the word 'controversies' only.").
Iredell employed careless language in explaining the configurations giving rise to the
Court's original jurisdiction. The Constitution does not "use the word 'controversies' only"
to describe all situations when the Court's original jurisdiction may be exercised; in one
area-matters "affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls"-the Framers
chose the term "Cases."
84 Id.
85 "The act of congress more particularly mentions civil controversies, a qualification
of the general word in the constitution, which I do not doubt every reasonable man will
think well warranted, for it cannot be presumed that the general word 'controversies' was
intended to include any proceedings that relate to criminal cases, which ... are uni-
formly considered of a local nature . . . .The word 'controversy' indeed, would not nat-
urally justify any such construction, but nevertheless it was perhaps a proper instance of
caution in congress to guard against the possibility of it." Id. at 431-32. Iredell violated a
basic canon of interpretation by assuming that Congress used redundant language. See
infra note 129.
86 Confining "controversies" to the civil sphere would prevent federal court interfer-
ence with the general jurisdiction of state courts over criminal law, which is "of a local
nature." Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 432.
87 Id. at 431-32. See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)
(stating that federal courts cannot assert original jurisdiction over state criminal law mat-
ters); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 403 (3d ed. 1836) (Criminal laws
can be enforced only by "the sovereign whose courts sit in judgment upon the offend-
er."). This principle led many state courts to decline to exercise concurrent federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction. See, e.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 229 (P.H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) (1825). See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816) (declaring that federal criminal jurisdiction cannot be
delegated to state courts); but see Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 7, at 212-14 (demon-
strating that state courts could hear federal criminal law matters concurrently with federal
courts).
Thanks to Professors Amar, Engdahl, and Plunder for providing many of the in-
sights contained in this footnote.
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Thus, Iredell did not differentiate "Cases" from "Controver-
sies," as those terms were used by the Framers in Article III, section
2, clause 1. Rather, he merely placed a limiting construction on
the word "controversy" as used by Congress in the Judiciary Act of
1789 when it interpreted clause 2 ;ss he did not explore possible
meanings embedded in the term "Cases." 9 Presumably, Iredell's
"federalism" rationale would have applied with equal force to the
Framers' use of "Cases," which likewise was not intended to en-
croach upon state jurisdiction over criminal matters.90
Similarly misplaced is the scholarly reliance on St. George
Tucker,91 an Antifederalist who used the civil/criminal distinction
to bolster his extreme states-rights position that contradicted the
views of the Framers.92
88 Admittedly, Iredell's construction of the statutory term "controversies" illuminates
his understanding of the identical word in Article III.
89 Professor Fletcher has noted that Iredell construed only the term "controversies."
Fletcher, Case or Controvery, supra note 69, at 266 n.13 and accompanying text. Other
scholars and courts have not been as careful. For example, William R. Casto, An Orthodox
View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COM-
mENTrARY 89, 90 n.4 (1990), cites Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239
(1937), which in turn relied upon Justice Iredell for the proposition that "[tihe term
'controversies,' if distinguishable at all from 'cases,' is so in that it is less comprehensive
than the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature." Haworth cites three opinions: In
re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C. Cal. 1887); Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911); and Old Colony Trust v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 723-24 (1929).
Tracing backwards through this string-cite, the apparently wide judicial notice of this
distinction is seen to be illusory. For example, Old Colony, 279 U.S. at 723-24, refers to
Muskra4 Pacific Railway, and Chisholm. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 356-57, cites the latter two
decisions. Pacific Railway, 32 F. at 255, is supported by Chisholm alone. Thus, present
understanding of the "civil v. criminal" distinction hinges largely on a circuit court's in-
terpretation of Chisholm
90 Except in the limited instances where conduct was deemed criminal by either the
Constitution (e.g., treason, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cI. 1) or by an act of Congress.
See PETER S. DUPONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE JURISDIC-
TMON OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 2-9 (Arno Press, 1972) (1824) (arguing that
federal question jurisdiction must extend to enforcement of criminal statutes).
91 See Meltzer, supra note 69, at 1575 n.18 (citing Fletcher, Exchange, supra note 69,
at 133). Both Meltzer and Fletcher cite 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMEN-
TARIES app. E at 420-21 (H. Tucker ed., 1803). Like Iredell, Tucker asserted that "Con-
troversies" related only to civil disputes, but provided no supporting authority-and, sig-
nificantly, cited nothing in the COMMENTARIES he was purporting to analyze. As Professor
Meltzer concedes, Story mentioned Tucker's civil/criminal distinction but did not endorse
it. Meltzer, supra note 69, at 1575 (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1634, 1667-68 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833)).
Indeed, Story apparently rejected it. See id. § 1668, at 537 (U.S.-party controversies al-
lowed the national government to sue in federal court to "compel[] the performance,
either civilly or criminally, of public duties on the part of the citizens.").
92 See Amar, Reports, supra note 70, at 1666 n.67; see also Fletcher, Case or Controversy,
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Concededly, however, Professors Fletcher, Meltzer, and
Pfander have shown that some contemporary figures believed that
one purpose of Article III's language was to differentiate civil and
criminal "Cases" from civil "Controversies." But this civil/criminal
distinction complements, rather than contradicts, my thesis that
"Controversies" involve dispute resolution and "Cases" entail legal
exposition. The dispute resolution model assumes a civil rather
than criminal suit,93 so that limitation of "Controversies" to civil
matters would have assured that federal courts would act like pri-
vate umpires. Moreover, criminal law is quintessentially public law
that requires definitive interpretation by courts in "cases."
In sum, the civil/criminal differentiation between Article III
"Cases" and "Controversies" apparently arose in the 1790s as a
pragmatic construction designed to avoid federal court interfer-
ence in state criminal law. The existence of this distinction does
not foreclose the possibility that others existed-especially those
based on common eighteenth century legal usage rather than on
practical problems of federalism.
2. The Structural Distinction Affecting Congressional Power to
Control Federal Jurisdiction
Akhil Amar has argued that Article III contains two "tiers" of
jurisdiction, primarily because the word "all" is repeated before
each of the first three jurisdictional grants (the "mandatory" tier
of cases to which the federal judicial power "shall extend"), but is
omitted before the last six party-defined categories (the "permis-
sive" tier which Congress may restrict at its discretion). 94 In con-
sidering the case/controversy terminology, Amar concludes that
"the different wording simply represents yet another way-in addi-
tion to the selective usage of 'all' and the distinction between
party-defined and subject matter-defined jurisdiction-in which the
supra note 69, at 266 (Tucker "argued vigorously against the exercise of national power
through the federal courts.").
93 See supra note 62.
94 Amar, Neo-Federalis supra note 7, at 244 n.128; see also Amar, Two-Tiered, supra
note 77, at 1504-14. Amar revives and refines arguments that appear in several Marshall
and Taney Court opinions that he cites, particularly Justice Story's in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Further support for Amar's thesis is found in
more recent cases that he omits, such as The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 428-
29 (1866) and Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165, 167 (1904).
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first three jurisdictional categories were set off as structurally dif-
ferent from the last six."95-
However, Amar presents no evidence that "case" and "contro-
versy," in eighteenth century legal parlance, had meanings related
to mandatory or permissive jurisdiction. That explains why he dis-
counts the importance of the case/controversy language (terms he
deems "legally synonymous"),96 and instead premises his textual
argument on the word "all." Indeed, Amar admits that any
case/controversy distinction is "irrelevant" to his argument, which
focuses on Congress' power to control federal jurisdiction," not
on the court's role once it has obtained jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
Professor Amar has usefully highlighted Article III's major structur-
al division between "all Cases" and "Controversies."
Overall, the Fletcher/Meltzer/Pfander and Amar theses are
helpful in challenging the orthodoxy that "case" and "controversy"
are synonymous and in suggesting- that these words may have been
used to express several distinctions. 8 However, these commenta-
tors have overlooked a critical historical difference between the
terms related to the discrete judicial functions of exposition and
dispute resolution.9
II. THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF "CASE" AND "CONTROVERSY"
Determining the purpose and meaning of Article III's shift
from "Cases" to "Controversies" is difficult because it was never di-
rectly explained.' 0 Nevertheless, the Framers' intent can be illu-
95 Amar, Neo-Federalist supra note 7, at 244 n.128.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Amar, Reports, supra note 70, at 1657; see also id. at 1663-64.
98 Certain other differences perceived by contemporary observers seem mistaken. For
example, Federalist Congressman Abraham Nott claimed that Article III gave federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over "all Cases," but concurrent jurisdiction with state courts
over "Controversies." See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 894 (1801). Although the historical evi-
dence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Nott's view was incorrect, the fact that he noted
a distinction between "all Cases" and "Controversies" is itself significant.
99 A few scholars have speculated that the Framers may have intended the term
"Cases" to trigger federal jurisdiction because federal law was likely to be construed,
whereas the status of adverse parties would create the federal interest in "Controversies."
See, e.g., Spann, supra note 66, at 607-08 n.83; Rrrz, supra note 77, at 90 (stating same
"hypothesis"); id. at 89 ("Whether in the eighteenth century a distinction was drawn be-
tween a case and a controversy so as to explain the choice of language in Article III,
section 2 is not known. Not enough research has been done on the subject."). This
Article fills that void.
100 This silence could suggest that the Framers shared, and therefore left unarticu-
lated, an understanding about the meaning of "case" and "controversy." Cf Bandes, supra
1994]
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minated by applying venerable principles of constitutional inter-
pretation to Article III.
First, following Madison's dictum that such interpretation
requires an understanding of the "the evils and defects" that the
Constitution sought to remedy,'' I will analyze Article III in light
of the weak pre-constitutional judiciaries.
Second, because the Framers placed paramount interpretive
importance on the Constitution's text, Article III's language will be
examined from an eighteenth century perspective. As the Framers
were educated in the British legal tradition,02 their understand-
ing of legal words and concepts of adjudication can be discerned
by consulting contemporaneous English03 legal dictionaries and
abridgements, 104 treatises,'Os and judicial opinions. °'0
note 66, at 232.
101 Letter from James Madison to M. L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 372 (G. Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter MADISON'S WRITINGS]; see also
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416-17 (1821) (opining that Article III
should be expounded in light of its purpose of strengthening national judiciary).
102 See 11 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 132 (Little, Brown &
Co. 1938); 12 id. at 712; THEODORE F. PLUCKNEITr, A CONCISE HISTOiY OF THE COMMON
LAW 287 (5th ed. 1956).
103 See Berger, supra note 59, at 816 (The Constitution used "familiar English
terms .... (and] it is hardly to be doubted that the Framers contemplated resort to
English practice for elucidation, and so the Supreme Court has often held."). See also
RAqE, supra note 87, at 267, 360 ("[T]he common law of England was kept in
view . .. by the Framers" and therefore supplies the meaning of common law terms in
the Constitution.); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391-92, 396-97 (1798) (examining
English common law to determine meaning of Constitution's reference to ex post facto
laws).
104 The most popular law dictionaries were THOMAS CUNNINGHAM, NEW AND COM-
PLETE LAW DICTIONARY (1764), GILES JABOB. NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1729), and WILLIAM
MARRIOTr, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1797). Earlier dictionaries still in widespread use
included THOMAS BLOUNT, A LAw-DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY (3d ed. 1717), JOHN
COWELL, THE INTERPRETER (1708), WILLIAM RASTELL, TERMES DE LA LEY (1721), and HEN-
RY SPELMAN, GLOSSARIUM ARCHAIOLOGICUM (1626). See 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102,
at 175-78; 5 id. at 21-22, 401-02 (discussing law dictionaries).
Abridgements were hybrids of dictionaries and treatises. The most popular was MAT-
THEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW (3d ed. 1768), which succeeded CHARLES
VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY (1741). See also JOHN COMYNS, A
DIGEST OF THE LAWIS OF ENGLAND (3d ed. 1785). See 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at
162-75 (discussing abridgements and digests); see also Julius Goebel, Jr., Ex Parte Clio, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 450, 455 (1954) ("[A] lot of American law came out of Bacon's and
Viner's Abridgements.").
Of particular value to the present study is DANIEL WILLIMAN, LEGAL TERMINOLOGY:
AN HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE TECHNICAL LANGUAGE OF LAW (1986). THE OXFORD ENG-
LISH DICTIONARY (1933, reprint 1961) [hereinafter OED] is similarly helpful because it
traces etymology and includes historical references. Moreover, the common usage of
"case" and "controversy" is relevant if the Framers of the Constitution are deemed to
include "We the People" who ratified it.
105 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND (1757) were the first sys-
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Of course, the Framers broke with English legal principles in
significant ways. Thus, a third set of interpretive documents to be
explored are American materials discussing Article III. Madison
emphasized two such sources: (1) "the comments prevailing at the
time [the Constitution] was adopted,""°7 including the records of
the Constitutional Convention' ° and the Ratification Debates; o
tematic treatment of English law in five centuries, 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 3,
and the first comprehensive historical analysis. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS
SCIENCE OF THE LAW 35 (1941). The COMMENTARIES "became the bible of American law-
yers," had a great influence on the Framers, and remained the most important legal
source in America for a century. Id. at 1-2. They were cited extensively by Federalists. See,
e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 165, 168, 169 (1803).
Other major English sources included EDWARD COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE OF THE
LAWs OF ENGLAND (1641) (discussing court history and jurisdiction), MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (4th ed. 1779) (1713), and THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Garland Pub., 1979) (3d ed. 1724).
106 Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of King's Bench from 1756-1788, was "the greatest
legal genius of the eighteenth century." 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 20; see also
DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED 99, 121 (1989). Marshall
repeatedly praised Mansfield. See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61, 89 (1809); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168 (1803). Wilson
called Mansfield "[t]he great luminary." 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 103 (1911). The leading 18th century Chancery judge was Lord Hardwicke,
who developed modem equity principles during his tenure from 1736-1756. See 12
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 253-85; LIEBERMAN, supra, at 81-82.
An example of the Supreme Court's reliance on British sources is found in Joseph
Story's two seminal admiralty law opinions, which extensively cite English law dictionaries
and abridgements (by Cowell, Spelman, Bacon, Viner, and Comyns), commehtators
(Bracton, Coke, Hale, and Blackstone), and judges (Mansfield and Hardwicke). See Town
of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 364-69 (1815); DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
107 9 MADISON'S WRITINGS, supra note 101, at 372; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821) ("Great weight has always been attached . . . to contempora-
neous exposition" of the Constitution.).
108 See FARRAND, supra note 106. The Convention decided to keep its proceedings
secret to encourage frank discussion; the Convention Journal and Papers were not pub-
lished until 1819. See 1 id. at xi-xii; see also id. at xv (Madison's notes at Convention"
published in 1840). This secrecy made Madison ambivalent about the use of Convention
materials. In congressional debates over the national bank, Madison invoked the
Convention's understanding and asserted that "the meaning of the parties to the instru-
ment . . . is a proper guide." 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944, 1946 (1791). Later, however, he
deemed Convention records not "authoritative" in explicating the Constitution. See Letter
from James Madiion to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), rprinted in 3 FARRAND, supra
note 106, at 447 [hereinafter Ritchie Letter]. Nonetheless, soon after the records were
published, the Court began to rely on them to aid constitutional interpretation. See, e.g.,
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838).
From a historian's perspective, the records are invaluable because they reveal how
the judiciary article evolved and because their very secrecy resulted in reasoned discus-
sion-unlike the Ratification debates, which often featured partisan political speeches that
were unfaithful to Article III's language and purpose.
109 See generally JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
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and (2) the "early, deliberate & continued practice under the
Constitution."" ° Also pertinent are early American legal treatis-
es,"' especially the lengthy work by James Wilson," 2 who ranks
with Madison as the foremost Framer."
3
A. The Defective Pre-Constitutional Judiciaries
Article III rectified a glaring defect of America's prior govern-
ments-weak judiciaries."' Limited national jurisdiction had
gradually evolved over admiralty cases and interstate controver-
sies."' England's Privy Council settled disputes between colo-
nies,"6 and its Courts of Vice-Admiralty exercised power over
maritime cases."' Similarly, the Continental Congress (1775-
1781) had power to resolve interstate quarrels"' and established
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1901).
110 9 MADISON'S WRITINGS, supra note 101, at 372. The earliest Justices were also key
Framers-Wilson, Randolph, Rutledge, Ellsworth, Paterson, Blair, and Jay. See generally
JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECED-
ENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971). By contrast, John Marshall played no role in draft-
ing the Constitution. Thus, his federal jurisdiction opinions relied primarily on textual
arguments.
111 See, e.g., STORY, supra note 91; RAWLE, supra note 87; KENT, supra note 87.
112 Wilson, the nition's first law professor, prepared a series of lectures in 1791, later
published as WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75. Wilson was considered "the most learned
and profound legal scholar of his generation." Id. at 2 (editor's comment); id. at 6 (cit-
ing authorities to similar effect).
113 See, e.g., MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 197 (1913); GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 179 (1978); WILSON'S WORKS, supra
note 75, at 2, 6, 24 (editor's comments). Wilson and Madison formed a strong alliance
in Congress in 1783 which continued at the Convention. See CHARLES P. SMITH, JAMES
WILSON, FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798 at 177, 219 (1956).
114 See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (The Constitution was needed to cure the previous "want of a judiciary power.").
115 See Thomas Sergeant, A Brief Sketch of the National Judiciay Powers Exercised in the
United States, From the First Settlement of the Colonies to the Time of the Adoption of the Present
Federal Constitution, in DUPONCEAU, supra note 90, at 133-67.
116 See, e.g., 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1675, at 544-45 ("[C]ontroversies between the
colonies, concerning the extent of their rights of soil, territory, jurisdiction, and bound-
ary . . . were heard and determined before the king in council"--for example, a 1679
dispute between Massachusetts and New Hampshire and a 1764 dispute between New
Hampshire and New York.); 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 98 (The Council "by
arbitration" settled disputes between Virginia and South Carolina, Rhode Island and Con-
necticut, Maryland and Pennsylvania, and New York and New Jersey.). The Privy Council
could also nullify colonial legislation and review American judicial decisions. See id. at 69-
71, 94-95; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *231. See generally JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, AP-
PEALS TO THE PIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950).
117 See 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 60-61; DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 442
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776) (Story, J.).
118 Congress, not courts, arbitrated disputes between Virginia and Pennsylvania, New
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a "Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture" in 1780 to hear appeals
from state admiralty courts."9 Finally, the Articles of Confedera-
tion gave Congress exclusive authority to appoint tribunals with
limited jurisdiction over certain admiralty cases 2' and interstate
disputes."' Confederation tribunals failed because they were de-
pendent, advisory organs. To enforce national laws, the govern-
ment relied on state courts,1 2 2 which were usually under. legisla-
tive control.
23
York, New Hampshire and Massachusetts, and Virginia and New Jersey. See Sergeant, supra
note 115, at 147-49.
119 See 17 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 457-59 (Library of Cong., 1910)
[hereinafter JOURNALS]. See also HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT 116-
19 (1977); Sergeant, supra note 115, at 146-47. Originally, Congress recommended that
states empower tribunals to adjudicate cases involving captured English vessels, with a
congressional committee appointed in January 1777 to consider appeals. See 3 JOURNALS,
supra, at 371-75; BOURGUIGNON, supra, at 44-78; Holt, supra note 7, at 1427 (mentioning
that 10 of 13 states established admiralty courts). However, this committee lacked en-
forcement power, and states defied it. See, e.g., BOURGUIGNON, supra, at 317-18; 3 STORY,
supra note 91, at § 1662.
120 Article IX, § 1 authorized Congress to set up tribunals "for the trial of piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas" and "for receiving and determining finally
appeals in all cases of captures." Congress did so and continued the "Captures" appeals
court. However, the jurisdiction of this court was narrowed by questionable state court
construction of Article IX, and it was powerless to prevent such usurpation. See Sergeant,
supra note 115, at 151-53.
121 Under Article of Confederation IX, § 2, Congress acted as "the last resort on ap-
peal in all disputes and differences ...between two or more States," with the power to
appoint temporary "commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and deter-
mining the matter in question . . . ." These judge/commissioners were selected through
an unwieldy process: States chose seven judges by mutual consent; failing agreement,
Congress would designate three prospective candidates from each state, with the contend-
ing states alternately striking names. Id. These commissioners had no power to enforce
their decisions, but simply reported to Congress. Id.; see also 3 STORY, supra note 91, §
1674, at 544 (Commissioners determined several "irritating and vexatious controversies"
between states, but conflict persisted.).
122 See'THE FEDERALST No. 21, at 129, 130 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (noting "striking absurdity" of "a government destitute even of the shadow of
constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws"). Reliance on state courts
extended even to such delicate issues as violations of international law. See, e.g., HAMPTON
L CARSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 83-86 (1902);
Sergeant, supra note 115, at 155-58; 1 FARRAND, supra note 106. at 18-19, 24-26
(Randolph's comments).
123 The oppression of colonial governors and judges convinced states to vest most
power in the legislature. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUB-
Lic, 1776-1787 at 154-61 (1969). See generally THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, CO'
LONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Ben Poore 2d ed.,
1878). This structural defect is illustrated in the Pennsylvania and Vermont constitutions,
which confer "supreme legislative power" and "supreme executive power" (see PA. CONST. of
1776, §§ 2-3; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, §§ II-IIl), but merely create "Courts of Justice"
with no supremacy. See PA. CONST., § 4; VT. CONST., ch. II, § IV.
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This experience resulted in a suspicion of legislatures and a
commitment to bolster the executive and the judiciary. 24 Thus,
in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution vest-
ed "the judicial Power" in federal courts as a co-equal branch of
government,"' with final authority to declare the law (including
the Constitution)126 in "Cases" of national importance and to re-
solve certain "Controversies."
B. The Meaning of "Case" and "Controversy"
1. The Text of Article III
The text of Article III is the most reliable indicator of its
drafters' intent. The decision to keep the Convention proceedings
State judges were dependent on the political branches for appointment, tenure, and
salary. See WOOD, supra, at 160-61, 407-08, 451-54. Madison emphasized that "the State
Tribunals ... are more or less dependt. [sic] on the Legislatures. In Georgia they are
appointed annually by the Legislature. In R. Island the Judges who refused to execute an
unconstitutional law were displaced . . ." 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 27-28. Similarly
servile were courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. See PA. CONST., § 23 (Assembly may
remove judges at any time.); id. § 26 (empowering legislature to set judges' salaries); N.J.
CONST. of 1776, XII (specifying 5-7 year tenure with reappointment at legislative discre-
tion). Often, appeals courts were composed of members of the political branches. See,
e.g., id., IX; DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 17; N.Y. CONsT. of 1777, art. XXXII.
124 See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 108 (Madison) (America's prior govern-
ment experience shows the need to check the legislature with a strong judiciary and
executive.); 2 id. at 74 (Madison) (same); id. at 76 (Morris) (same); THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (characterizing federal
courts as "bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachment").
As sovereignty became identified with "the people," courts were seen as guardians of
the public against legislative excesses. See WOOD, supra note 123, at 344-89, 430-63, 547-53.
In England, Parliament was the "sovereign and uncontrollable authority." See 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *160; id. at *44-52, *147-55, *160-62, *185-86. The Found-
ers shifted the locus of sovereignty from the legislature to the people. A leading theorist
was Wilson, who strove to create a system of government based on the "vital principle"
of the sovereignty of the people, whose consent was the basis of all legal obligation. See
WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 73, 77-82, 103, 120-21. He argued that the people
could distribute their sovereignty among their representatives in all branches of govern-
ment-including courts. Id. at 73 ("[E]very citizen . . . takes a personal share in the
executive and judicial parts of the nation."); see also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 423-24
(Wilson) (noting absence of this principle of representation in Britain).
125 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cI. 1.
126 See infra notes 224-25 (discussing Convention acceptance of judicial review). Judi-
cial review flowed from the idea that courts represented the people. It did not make
judicial power superior to legislative, but "confer[red] upon it, in particular instances,
and for particular purposes, the power of declaring and enforcing the superiour power of
the Constitution-the supreme law of the land." See WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at
330. Wilson was an ardent and consistent defender of judicial review. See, e.g., id. at 186,
300. 328-31, 455-56, 770; infra note 224 (Wilson's comments at Convention); 2 ELLIOT,
supra note 109, at 445-46, 489 (Wilson's remarks during Ratification).
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secret 27  meant that ratification depended primarily on the
Constitution's ability to speak for itself.2 Not surprisingly, lead-
ing Federalists placed principal interpretive stress on the
Constitution's language."
On its face, Article III, section 2 extends "the Judicial pow-
er"i'3  to "all Cases" (a phrase repeated three times) and, in an
127 See supra note 108.
128 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 903, 948 (1985) (The Framers expected "that the Constitution, like any other
legal document, would be interpreted in accord with its express language" and with other
accepted principles of construction, not according to the Framers' own intent.). See also
Martin H. Redish & Karen L Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role
of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15-33 (1987) (summarizing scholarship on
textualism).
Even with the benefit of Convention records, constitutional language remains critical
because the records "cast very little light on the special purposes of particular clauses."
See FARRAND, supra note 113, at 13; see also id. at 152 (The records reveal "surprisingly
little" about the judiciary.).
129 See, e.g., Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 22, 1814), re-
printed in 3 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 419-20 ("Interpreting [the Constitution's] provi-
sions . ..must be done by comparing the plain import of the words, with [its] general
tenor and object. . . ."); 2 id. at 137 (Randolph) (The goal in drafting the Constitution
was "[t]o use simple and precise language."); Letter from James Madison to Martin Van
Buren (July 5, 1830), reprinted in 9 MADISON'S WRITINGS, supra note 101, at 89 ("[T]he
document must speak for itself."); Ritchie Letter, supra note 108, at 447 (Madison) ("[T]he
legitimate meaning of the [Constitution] must be derived from the text itself."). Of
course, Madison recognized that language was imperfect and that constitutional meaning
would ultimately be worked out through practice. See, e.g., id.; THE FEDERAuST No. 37, at
236-37 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
For further statements of the importance of text in constitutional interpretation, see
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 202 (1824) (The Framers "must be under-
stood . . . to have intended what they said."); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 423 (1821) (Questions about Article III "must depend on the words themselves.");
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816) (The Constitution must
be given a "reasonable construction, according to the import of its terms . . . . The
words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution
is intended to be without effect."); RAWI.E, supra note 87, at 254 (to similar effect).
Justice Frankfurter shared "the assumption that, in dealing with a subject as techni-
cal as the jurisdiction of the courts, the Framers, predominantly lawyers, used precise, dif-
ferentiating and not redundant language." Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 364 (1959). Unfortunately, he did not apply this insight to his analysis
of "Cases" and "Controversies." See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
130 Wilson defined "judicial power" as authority "to administer justice according to
the law of the land." See WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 329; see also DUPONCEAU,
supra note 90, at 21 (same). Judicial power includes not simply declaring legal rights, but
also compelling obedience to the court's judgment. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824) ("All governments ...must possess, within
themselves, the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws [through
courts].").
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abrupt shift, to six "Controversies." The basic rule of constitutional
interpretation that such variations in language are presumptively
intentional13 1 must be our starting point, not the orthodox view
that the use of "Cases" and "Controversies" was accidental and that
these terms are interchangeable.
1 3 2
One clue as to the meaning of this shift is that "Cases" intro-
duced jurisdictional categories defined by legal subject (e.g., feder-
al question and admiralty law), suggesting that the judicial power
to be exercised in such cases primarily involved rendering opin-
ions about that law. By contrast, matters labeled "Controversies"
were defined solely by party status (e.g., state v. state), indicating
that the courts' main focus would be on resolving the designated
dispute. This textual reading is supported by in-depth linguistic
and historical analysis.
2. The Historical Understanding of "Case" and "Controversy"
(a) Case.-As used in Article 111,133 "case" most likely re-
ferred to a formal cause of action demanding a remedy for the
claimed violation of a legal right, wherein a court determined
131 Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 334 ("From this difference of phraseology [the shift
from "all Cases" to "Controversies"], perhaps a difference of constitutional intention may,
with propriety, be inferred. It is hardly to be presumed that the variation in the lan-
guage could have been accidental. It must have been the result of some determinate rea-
son.").
132 See supra Part lA. If a "case" were a "controversy," the Framers presumably would
have streamlined Article III, section 2 by beginning with the term "Cases," then listing all
nine heads of jurisdiction.
133 "Case" had several possible legal meanings unrelated to its usage in Article III.
First, "case" derives from the Latin casus (chance, occurrence), see 2 OED, supra note
104, at 144-46, and originally referred to hypothetical legal problems: Medieval law was
taught in the context of "cases'-i.e., events that might come before a court. See, e.g.,
WILLIMAN, supra note 104, at 51. Another meaning of "case" was legal arguments. See,
e.g., JOHN BARBOUR, 1 THE BRUCE 52 (Matthew P. McDiarmid & James A. C. Stevenson
eds., The Scottish Text Society, Edinburgh 1985) (1375) (describing "case" as grounds of
a claim before a court); 2 OED, supra note 104, at 145 (same); JOHN BURKE, Jomi-r's
DICrIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 291 (2d ed. 1977) (defining "case" as party's summary of
facts, evidence, and argument). Finally, "case" was shorthand for "action on the
case"--new writs created to permit a plaintiff to sue to remedy injuries not recognized by
any of the established forms of action such as trespass. See, e.g., 1 COMYNS, supra note
104, at 128-29; COWELL, supra note 104, at AC-AD; 1 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 104.
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legal questions."M A "case" featured three distinct but interrelat-
ed components.
First, a "case" arose only if a plaintiff's claim fit within a rec-
ognized form of action and the parties complied with procedural
rules: "When the subject is submitted ... by a party who asserts
his rights in the form prescribed by law[,] [i]t then becomes a
case."'35 Because procedural rules underwent frequent adapta-
tion, the term "case" was correspondingly flexible, as recognized in
both England... and America."7
134 See, e.g., Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819 (describing "case" as a legal question
presented in proper procedural form).
A "cause of action" accrued the moment a legal injury occurred, and gave a plain-
tiff the legal right to sue a defendant within a certain time. See, e.g., I COMYNS, supra
note 104, at 102 ("An Action is a lawful demand of a Man's right."); id. at 105 (stating
that acfion lies after cause of action accrues); JACOB, supra note 73, at 42; see also GILES
JACOB, THE STUDENT'S COMPANION 1 (Garland Pub., 1978) (1725) ("An Action is defined
to be the Form of a Suit given by Law for Recovery of that which is a Man's due.");
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 104 (defining "action" as "a legal demand of one's right" which
"implies a recovery of, or restitution to something"); COwiELL, supra note 104, at AC-AD
(same); RASTELL, supra note 104, at 16 (same); BURKE, supra note 133, at 297; 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *23 ("[W]here there is a legal right there is also a legal
remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 408 (1821) (citing Blackstone for proposition that suits include "all
cases where the party suing claims to obtain something to which he has a right"). See
generally 1 VINER, supra note 104, at 197-599; 2 id. at 1-77 (analyzing cases involving many
types of actions).
"Cause of action" was often shortened to "cause" or "action." See, e.g., WOOD, supra
note 105, at 585. "Action" is a more modem term for "cause." Robert W. Millar, The Lin-
eage of Some Procedural Words, 25 A.B.A. J. 1023, 1024 (1939); see also BURKE, supra note
133, at 297; JOHN BOVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914) (1839) (equating "case" with
"cause" and "suit or action").
An action had "two parts, the suit and the judgment." EDMUND WINGATE, THE BODY
OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 38 (Garland Pub., 1979) (1655). After the judgment,
the matter was always known as a "case." See 1 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 104; 2 OED,
supra note 104, at 145 (defining "case" as "a cause which has been decided").
135 Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at "819; see also id. (explaining that "suit" becomes
"case" when submitted according to proper forms and court takes jurisdiction).
136 "From the first the [English] courts of law and equity had been free to fashion
their own rules of procedure, and to add to or vary them to meet the needs of litigants
and the development of legal principles." 10 HOLDSVORTH, supra note 102, at 221. By
the mid-18th century, procedure had become needlessly technical, id., prompting reform
by Mansfield. 12 id. at 493-95, 498-500.
137 See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 7-9, 25 (1825) (stressing
that equity and admiralty rules of procedure remained largely within a federal judge's
discretion, although "modes of process" in execution of legal actions had to conform to
pre-1789 state practice where possible); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11
(1799) ("[N]or are [federal circuit court] proceedings subject to the scrutiny of those
narrow rules, which the caution or jealousy of the courts at Westminster long applied to
courts of that denomination . . . ."); Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 414 (1792)
("The Court considers the practice of the courts of King's Bench and Chancery in Eng-
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Second, the substance of a "case" was a legal "question" that
had to be answered by a court' through exposition-the pro-
cess of determining, construing, and applying legal rules."' Echo-
ing English jurists,"4 John Marshall declared:
land, as affording the outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, from
time to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances may render necessary."). See
also Nashville, Chatt., & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) ("'[T]he Con-
stitution does not require that the case or controversy should be presented by traditional
forms of procedure . . . . The judiciary clause of the Constitution defined and limited
judicial power, not the particular method by which that power might be invoked. It did
not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the only possible means for
presenting a case or controversy . . . ."). Such precedent contradicts Justice Frankfurter's
assertion that the Framers used "cases and controversies" to freeze the "rigid" 18th centu-
ry English practice rules into American jurisprudence. See supra Part IA.l(a).
Some scholars have recognized the historical understanding of "case" as tied to
dynamic procedural rules, albeit outside the justiciability context. See, e.g., Richard A.
Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case:- Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs
Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1478-90 (1983).
138 See, e.g., BOUVIER, supra note 134, at 425 (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (defining "case" as "[a] question contested before a court of
justice")); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405 (1821) ("'[A] case in law and
equity,' [is one] in which a right, under [the] law, is asserted in a Court of justice. If
the question cannot be brought into a Court, then there is no case . . . ."); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169 (1803) ("[A] case . . . [is] the assertion, by an
individual, of his legal claims in a court of justice . . ").
Wilson contrasted the determination of a pure "question of law . . . belong[ing]
exclusively to the judges" with a situation raising "no question concerning the law" where
"the controversy between the parties depends entirely upon a matter of fact"-a jury
matter. See WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 540.
139 See, e.g., Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) ("[W]e must so
expound the terms of the law, as to meet the case . . . ."); Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
at 340 (Courts "pronounce the law applicable to the case in judgment."); Cohens, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) at 388 (The Framers "confer[red] on the judicial department the power of
construing the constitution and laws of the Union in every case."); THE FEDERALIST No.
22, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("Laws are a dead letter
without courts to expound their true meaning and operation."); RAMt.E, supra note 87, at
199 (The courts' role is to "expound and apply" the law.).
Judicial exposition in "Cases" presupposes that a court has "jurisdiction," a word
that literally means "speaking the law." See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 551 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Each government branch has final jurisdiction
(i.e., authority to declare and enforce the law) in certain situations. Judicial jurisdiction
may be exercised in the context of a "case."
140 Matthew Hale, the 17th century Chief Justice of King's Bench, stressed that judges
in cases "have a great Weight and Authority in Expounding, Declaring, and Publishing
what the Law of this Kingdom is . . . ." HALE, supra note 105, at 68; see also id. at 24-25,
30, 37 (emphasizing judge's function as expositor of statutes and common law); see also 5
HOLDSORTH, supra note 102, at 502-04 (reprinting Hale's statement that "[t]he Ex-
pounder must looke [sic] further than the present Instance, and whether such an Exposi-
tion may not introduce a greater inconvenience than it remedyes [sic]"); 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 105, at *2 (A court's role is "expounding and enforcing those laws, by which
rights are defined, and wrongs prohibited."). See also FRANCIS BACON, EXAMPLES OF A
TREATISE OF UNIVERSAL JUSTICE 103 (Garland Pub., 1978) (1727) (describing "methods of
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[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule.1
41
Likewise, at the Convention Madison explained that "cases" that
were "of a Judiciary Nature" gave a judge "[t]he right of expound-
ing" the law.42
Finally, exposition was closely connected with the idea of
"case" as precedent.4 4 The concept of stare decsi--decided cases
as legal authority binding on lower courts 44-- had become sub-
expounding law" as including, most importantly, "[j]udgments delivered in the Supreme
and Principal Courts on important cases, especially if they be doubtful and contain some
difficulty or novelty").
141 MarbuUy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (emphasis added). Even Antifederalists held a
similar view. See Essays of Brutus No. XIII, 2.9.159, in ANTI-FDERALIST, supra note 72
("The proper province of the judicial power, in any government, is . . . to declare what
is the law of the land.").
142 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 430.
143 See, e.g., HALE, supra note 105, at 68 (Judicial exposition is especially authoritative
when "consonan[t) ... with ... decisions of former times."); EDWARD COKE, SECOND
INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND pref. (1641) ("Our Expositions . . . are the resolu-
tions of Judges in Courts of Justice in judicial courses of proceeding" collected in case
reports.).
144 Since the 13th century, courts had relied on prior cases to guide decisions in
similar cases. See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 242-44; 4 id. at 287. Fourteenth cen-
tury Year Books show "that a considered decision was regarded as laying down a general
rule for the future." 2 id. at 541.
In the 16th century, the advent of precise written pleadings based on forms of
action led reporters to record only the court's decision on the exact point of law at
issue, not (as previously) the parties' pleadings and arguments in framing that issue. This
resulted in the logical development of the law from case to case. See 5 id. at 371-73; 9
id. at 330-35; 12 id. at 146-49. See also RICHARD HULOET, ABECEDARIUM ANGLICO-LATIUM
s.v. (Scolar Press, 1970) (1552) (referring to "ruled cases and matters of the lawe [sic]").
Edmund Plowden, "the most learned lawyer" of the 16th century, 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 102, at 372, prefaced his reports with the statement that "[a]ll the cases here re-
ported . . . are upon points of law . . . [which] the judges ... studied and consid-
ered . . . . and after great and mature Deliberation gave Judgment . . . ." Id. Similarly,
Coke described his reports as recording "cases* judicially argued, debated, resolved, or
adjudged in any of the king's courts of justice . . . ." Id.; see also EDWARD COKE, FIRST
INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 245(a) (1628) ("[O]ur Booke [sic] cases are the
best proofes [sic] what the Law is . . . Book-cases are principally to be cited for deciding
of cases in question . . ").
By the 17th century, resort to precedent was common. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 102, at 275-76 (citing cases from 1604, 1626, 1649, and 1650). See also JOHN
COWELL, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES [Sic] OF ENGLAND 5 (Garland Pub., 1978 (1651)
("[C]ases arise which are neither provided for, by customes [sic] or Statutes sufficiently.
And there the Judges do decide by like reasons, proceeding according to former Prece-
dents."); BACON, supra note 140, at 90 ("[T]he rule of law is to be drawn from cases
similar to them .... "). By the end of the 17th century, "the authority of decided cases"
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stantially established by the late 1700s.145
(i) The Judicial Function in "Cases.'"'6-In England, ex-
tensive exposition in "cases" was necessary because Parliament,
though sovereign, exercised its lawmaking power ineffectively. 14 7
Vast legal subject matter was left to the courts of law, equity, and
admiralty,"' whose decisions were rarely overturned. Further-
more, when Parliament did act, it drafted statutes poorly, thereby
requiring substantial judicial construction.4 . which often subvert-
ed the axiom that a judge's role was merely to "expound"-not
had become "almost as well recognized in the court of Chancery as in the courts of
common law." See 7 HOLDSwoRTH, supra note 102, at 387. Hardwicke embraced the idea
that "authorities established are so many laws ... " Ellis v. Smith, 30 Eng. Rep. 205,
208 (Ch. 1754).
145 See 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 146; LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 79-80.
Others contend that stare decisis did not become established until the first part of the
19th century, at least in America. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 770 n.267 (1988) (citing sources).
146 This section provides a bare summary, because a full account of 18th century
English judicial history and theory would require several volumes. Interested readers
should consult HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, especially volumes 10-12. Perhaps the best
recent treatment of this topic is LIEBERMAN, supra note 106.
147 See supra note 124; infra notes 149-52. Only Parliament could "make" law, which
consisted of statutes and, to a lesser extent, royal orders. See 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
102, at 412-14.
148 See 12 id. at 3.
149 Shoddy legislation led to complicated rules of construction. See LIEBERMAN, supra
note 106, at 18-19 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *87-92). One venerable rule
gave courts equitable power to interpret statutes according to their reason and spirit. See
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *62 ("[S]ince in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or
expressed, it is necessary, that when the general decrees of the law come to be applied
to particular cases, there should be somewhere a power vested of defining those circum-
stances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself would have expressed.");
see also 3 id. at *430-31 (same); LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 74 (citing statements of
this axiom by Bacon, Hale, and others). Blackstone, however, cautioned that "the liberty
of considering all cases in an equitable light must not be indulged too far, lest thereby
we destroy all law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the
judge." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *62. In America, Blackstone's rule of equitable
construction was widely cited. See, e.g., WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 478, 486; Essays
of Brutus, in ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 72, XI at 2.9.137-138, XII at 2.9.153-154, XV at
2.9.193. Jeremy Bentham challenged Blackstone and argued that judicial rules of interpre-
tation would be unnecessary if statutes were reformed and clarified. See LIEBERMAN, supra
note 106, at 244-45 (citing sources).
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"make"-the law.' Overall, case law was superior in quality to
legislation' and had greater practical significance.5 '
The preeminence of the independent judiciary5 ' led
Blackstone to characterize "the judges in the several courts" as
"the depositories of the laws; the living oracles."" The judge's
task was to ascertain the true "principles and axioms of law, which
are general propositions, flowing from abstracted reason." 55 De-
150 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *69; 3 id. at *327. Courts could not frus-
trate the sovereign legislature's will through creative statutory construction. See, e.g.,
DAINES BARRINGTON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORE ANCIENT STATUTES 116 (3d ed. 1769)
("[L]et the inconveniences of a statute be what they may, no judge . . . can constitu-
tionally dispose with them; their office is jus dicere and not js dare."); Foone v. Blount,
98 Eng. Rep. 1188 (1776) (Mansfield, LJ.) (Statutes had to be construed "according to
their true intent and meaning," regardless of their soundness.); LIEBERMAN, supra note
106, at 54, 98, 123 (discussing this axiom, but noting that Mansfield often disregarded
it).
America adopted this rule. See, e.g., WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 502
("[E]very prudent and cautious judge ...will remember, that his duty and his business
is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it."); Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 411, 414 (1799) ("[I]t is the duty of judges to declare, and not to make the
law."); Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (Ellsworth, C.J.) (same); 2
FARRAND, supra note 106, at 75 (Strong) ("[T]he power of making ought to be kept dis-
tinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was better established. The Judges in
exercising the function of expositors" cannot participate in framing the laws.). See generally
Engdahl, John Marshall, supra note 7, at 294-96 (America endorsed the concept that judg-
es pronounce existing law rather than make new law.).
151 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 71-72, 179; id. at 162-66 (summarizing Lord
Kames' argument that common law was superior to legislation because it gradually arrived
at a general rule by induction from many particular cases). Cf. 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 102, at 155 (describing historical understanding that "the determination of. . . [a]
case .. . [by] the House of Lords ... affords evidence of common law, or the exposi-
tion of an Act of Parliament, in no way inferior, in point of authenticity, to the express
positive text of an Act of Parliament itself").
152 See 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 519 ("[E]ighteenth-century legislation
upon various branches of the law and legal doctrine, though not negligible in bulk, cov-
er[ed] very little ground."); WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 182 (concluding that
common law, not statutes, was principal source of law).
153 See 1 BLACESTONE, supra note 105, at *268 (citing George III) ("[T]he indepen-
dence and uprightness of the judges [were] ... essential to the impartial administration
of justice .... "). The Act of Settlement (1701) had given judges secure tenure, thereby
promoting government stability by grounding authority in laws that applied equally to ev-
eryone, creating respect for the law, and ensuring impartiality in defining and regulating
government powers. See 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 134, 644-50.
154 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *69.
155 3 id. at *379. These principles reflected the divinely-ordained natural law. 1 id. at
*40-41. The judge's role was to discover the just, ancient Saxon rule, founded on reason,
which had become obscured because of the imperfection of human practice and the
needless complexity introduced by the Normans. See id. at *10, 66-67, 70; 2 id. at *11,
44, 52, 58, 334; 3 id. at *60, 325f, 328, 431; 4 id. at *408-18; see also BOORSTIN, supra
note 105, at 40-42. These authentic legal principles "should be deposited in the breasts
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spite this lofty judicial role, law was not simply "the private opin-
ions of the judges."156 Rather, courts were constrained by prece-
dent'57 to ensure continuity and certainty.15
Nonetheless, judges retained discretion because cases did not
make law (as did statutes), but were merely the best evidence of
what the law was.'59 Thus, precedent could be disregarded in cer-
tain circumstances, t ° thereby allowing the common law to adapt
to changing social needs, 6' as Lord Mansfield stressed. 6  This
of the judges, to be occasionally applied to such facts as come properly ascertained be-
fore them. For here partiality can have little scope: the law is well known, and is the
same for all ranks and degrees; it follows as a regular conclusion from the premises of
fact pre-established." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *380.
156 4 id. at *377f ("[I]f judgments were to be the private opinions of the judge, men
would then be slaves to their magistrates."); see also I id. at *71 (same); 3 id. at *396
("The judgment, though pronounced . . . by the judges, is not their determination or
sentence, but [that] of the law.").
157 Adherence to judicial decisions was "essential" because the English judge was "on-
ly to declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model the law .. . ." See id. at *327.
158 Courts had to "abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in
litigation" because "the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined ...
[has] now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent
judge to alter or vary ...he being sworn to determine, not according to his own pri-
vate judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land .. . ." 1 id. at
*69; see also THOMAS WOOD, A NEW INSTITUTE OF THE IMPERIAL OR CMVL LAW pref.
(1704) ("[A]djudg'd cases have been preserved for many ages, to direct in the determina-
tion of most points; so that an arbitrary judge has less room to exert himself here than
in any other Law.").
159 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *71 ("[Tlhe decisions of courts of justice are
the evidence of what is common law."). See also HALE, supra note 105, at 68 (Courts "do
not make a Law properly so called, (for that only the King and Parliament can do); ...
[judicial] Decisions are less than a Law, yet they are a greater Evidence thereof, than the
Opinion of any private Persons . . ").
160 Blackstone construed these narrowly to include only decisions "contrary to reason
• [or] the divine law." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *69-70; see also id. at *70-71
(acknowledging that precedent could be disregarded if "flatly absurd or unjust"); 3 id. at
*268; 4 id. at *442.
161 Blackstone stressed that the common law was continually evolving and improving,
and he approved judicial use of fictions to adapt the common law to new circumstances.
See 3 id. at *267-68. See generally LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 71-98.
162 "The law does not consist in particular cases; but in general principles, which run
through the cases, and govern the decision of them." Rust v. Cooper, 98 Eng. Rep. 1277,
1279 (1777); see also Rex v. Bembridge, 99 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (1783); Rex v. Clark, 98
Eng. Rep. 1267, 1268 (1777); James v. Price. 98 Eng. Rep. 619, 620 (1773); Fisher v.
Prince, 97 Eng. Rep. 876, 876 (1762). Hardwicke also recognized that "law or equity does
not depend on the particular cases, but on the general reason running through them."
Aston v. Aston, 27 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1023 (Ch. 1749).
Mansfield appealed to principles to justify revolutionizing the law to meet the rapid
social and economic changes of the 18th century, and he disregarded older cases whose
rationale he felt was no longer relevant. See, e.g., Jones v. Randall, 98 Eng. Rep. 706, 707
(1774) ("The law would be a strange science if it rested solely upon cases; and if after
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distinctively English method of developing law through "cases"163
combined legal stability with flexibility,' and it was generally
adopted in America."
so large an increase of commerce, arts and circumstances accruing, we must go to the
time of Rich. I to find a case, and see what is law. Precedent indeed may serve to fix
principles, which for certainty's sake are not suffered to be shaken, whatever might ,be
the weight of the principle, independent of precedent. But precedent, though it be evi-
dence of law, is not law itself; much less the whole of the law."); Barwell v. Brooks, 99
Eng. Rep. 702, 703 (1784) ('[A]s the usages of society alter, the law must adapt itself to
the various situations of mankind."); Hamilton v. Mendes, 97 Eng. Rep. 787, 795 (1761);
Taylor v. Horde, 97 Eng. Rep. 190, 216-17, 220-21 (1757). For Mansfield's legal contribu-
tions, see LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 88-143; 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 463,
477-78, 493-560.
But even Mansfield acknowledged the value of precedent. and he often followed
prior cases he found distasteful. See, e.g., Roe v. Griffits, 98 Eng. Rep. 17, 21 (1766) (The
estate law rule "being now established, must be adhered to: although it is not founded
upon truly rational grounds and principles . . . ."); Tinder v. Watson, 97 Eng. Rep. 984,
985 (1764) ("[W]e must not depart from settled determinations."). See also Bishop of
London v. Fytch, 99 Eng. Rep. 581, 583 (1782); Hodgson v. Ambrose, 99 Eng. Rep. 216
(1780); Doe v. Watton, 98 Eng. Rep. 1037, 1038 (1774); O'Neil v. Marson, 98 Eng. Rep.
477. 478 (1771); Burgess v. Wheate, 28 Eng. Rep. 652, 672-73 (1757-59).
163 See 4 HOLBSWORTH, supra note 102, at 220.
164 See 9 id. at 331-34; 10 id. at 249-51; 12 id. at 157-60; see also LIEBERMAN, supra
note 106, at 71-72, 122-23.
165 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). Unlike state courts, federal courts derived their authority solely from the Con-
stitution and had no residual common law jurisdiction. See, e.g., RAWLE, supra note 87, at
360; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (ruling that
Court lacked jurisdiction over claim of libel, a common law matter); Worrall's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798) (similar holding as to bribery). Nonetheless, federal judges
employed the traditional form of adjudication based on precedent.
Even James Wilson, who rejected Blackstone's principle of unreviewable legislative
sovereignty, see supra note 124, praised his conception of adjudication. See WILSON'S
WORKS, supra note 75, at 502 ("[11n the cases-of others," precedent must "be considered
as strong evidence of the law."). Because common law was founded on custom and
hence consent, it was particularly appropriate for an American legal system based on
popular sovereignty, the common law simply had to be adapted to reflect American cus-
toms. Id. at 183-84; see also id. at 334-68 (summarizing English common law incorporation
into America). Furthermore, the common law's ability to accommodate changing social
conditions would be ideal for America, which was entering an era of change. See id. at 4,
102, 121-22.
Although it is impossible to determine the exact contours of the American view of
precedent (either historically or currently), American courts have never adopted the tradi-
tional English view that precedent has the same binding force as a statute. See
Monaghan, supra note 145, at 756-58. Just how flexible the American approach to prece-
dent was in the late 18th and early 19th century is difficult to establish, particularly in
constitutional cases. For example, Professor Engdahl recognizes that certain Federalists
(like Story) championed stare deciis in constitutional cases, but laments "the insinuation
into constitutional jurisprudence of the common law lawyers' habit of stare decisis," which
he finds unwarranted. See David, E. Engdahl, What's In A Name? The Constitutionality of
Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 IND. LJ. 457, 502 (1991).
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(ii) "Cases" and Disputes.-Although a private law case
often involved a bilateral dispute,"6 its distinguishing feature was
a legal question that transcended the interests of the immediate
litigants,'67 as Mansfield suggested in Robinson v. Bland:
Th[e] difference is very small, in the present case, and scarce
worth litigating between these parties. But I am glad of the
opportunity which this case offers, of discussing the question,
and settling the point [on calculation of debt interest], to be a
rule for all cases of the same nature that may hereafter
arise."is
Nor did mootness trouble Mansfield. For example, Perrin v.
Blake,'69 a major case concerning will construction, was decided
after the parties had settled their dispute.'
In public law cases, a controversy was not required.' A citi-
zen who had suffered no individualized injury could challenge
Regardless of whether prior cases were viewed as stare decisis or simply as an impor-
tant guide, however, the key point is that the word "case," when used in a judicial con-
text (including Article III), imports some notion of precedent. See supra notes 143-45 and
accompanying text. By contrast, "controversy" does not. See infra notes 182-83 and accom-
panying text.
166 A cause of action arose when the plaintiff claimed-and the defendant de-
nied-that the latter had violated some legal duty. See supra note 134; see also Fletcher,
Structure, supra note 25, at 236. The basic principle was that "every right when withheld
must have a remedy, and every injury it's [sic] proper redress." See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 105, at *109; 1 id. at *244; 2 id. at *86, 115; 3 id. at *123, 265-66, 422. This max-
im implied that the defendant disputed that he had inflicted a legal injury on the plain-
tiff.
167 By the 16th century it was recognized that "cases . . . turned, not on an issue of
fact, but upon an issue of law." See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 372.
168 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 722 (1760); see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 117 (citing
Mansfield's characterization of his early maritime decisions "not as particular rulings on
individual disputes, but as systematic formulations of 'the large principles of the Marine
Law'"). Mansfield's procedural reforms allowed courts to decide more cases. See supra
note 136. For example, instead of leaving cases to the jury's general verdict, he urged
counsel to state a special case on doubtful points of law and then decided the case. See,
e.g., 12 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 495-97 (citing, e.g., Luke v. Lyde, 97 Eng. Rep.
614, 617 (1759) (The "case . . . [would] settle the point more deliberately, solemnly, and
notoriously . . . .")). See also LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 116-17 (citing Peacock v.
Rhodes, 99 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (1781) ("I am glad this question was saved, not from any
difficulty there is in the case, but because it is important that general commercial points
should be publicly decided.")).
169 99 Eng. Rep. 355, (1770).
170 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 133. But see Sidney A. Diamond, Federal Jurisdic-
tion to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 125 (1946) (describing English anteced-
ents of mootness doctrine).
171 This did not mean that anyone could sue for any reason. Rather, the claim had
to fit within the existing writ system or be authorized by statute. See infra notes 172-75.
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unlawful government action in a variety of ways, most commonly
through prerogative writ procedure. 72 Similarly, criminal and
regulatory statutes often permitted an informer with no special
interest in the case to sue.' Likewise, "relator" actions autho-
rized citizens with no personal stake in a matter of public interest
to prosecute as private attorneys general. 4  In Hardwicke's
words, "any persons, though the most remote in the contempla-
tion of the [defendant], may be relators in these cases." 75
Finally, "by 1770 the power of English judges to give advisory
opinions was well recognized."7 6 American courts rendered advi-
sory opinions,77 and many Convention delegates endorsed this
172 King's Bench issued prerogative writs (prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, and
mandamus) on behalf of the Crown as part of its general power to superintend lower
courts and governmental units. The writs enabled King's Bench to define governmental
spheres of power and control the exercise of jurisdiction, especially in administrative law
matters. The court fixed the boundaries between the central and local government, be-
tween the units of local government, between local government and the people, and
between the executive and subjects. See 10 HOLDSwORTH, supra note 102, at 243-46, 644-
45; Jaffe, supra note 59, at 1269-75; Berger, supra note 59, at 819-27; Winter, supra note
24, at 1396-98. Issuance of prerogative writs was left to the court's "exercise [of] a sound
discretion." Rex v. Wardroper, 98 Eng. Rep. 23 (1766) (Mansfield, LJ.) (quo warranto);
see also 4 BACON, supra note 104 ("Prohibition") (Courts can "exercise a legal Discretion"
in "refusing Prohibitions, where in such like cases they have been granted .... "). See
generally Berger, supra noie 59, at 837-39.
In contrast to the sovereign prerogative of King's Bench to issue writs, American
federal courts had authority to use prerogative writs only to the extent permitted by
Congress. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (All Writs Act); see
generaly Winter, supra note 24, at 1405-06.
173 See id. at 1406-09 (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *437; 3 id. at *160-62);
Sunstein, supra note 38, at 172, 174-75 (discussing informer and qui tam actions); Berger,
supra note 59, at 825-26; 4 HOrnswoRTH, supra note 102, at 356-57. Informers' statutes
were used extensively in the American colonies and in early state and federal practice.
See Winter, supra note 24, at 1406-08.
174 Where the Attorney General could sue in the King's name, a private party could
seek a writ in his own name and then prosecute the case. See id. at 1398-99; id. at 1401-
03 (describing relator actions in American state courts in 19th century); Jaffe, supra note
59, at 1275-82 (same). See also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *264; 4 id. at *308.
175 Attorney General v. Bucknall, 26 Eng. Rep. 600 (Ch. 1741).
176 WRIGHT, supra note 56, at 57; see also Lee, supra note 60, at 639 n.204 ("[T]he
advisory opinions practice seems fairly well *established as of the early seventeenth centu-
ry."); but see Lord Sackville's Case, 28 Eng. Rep. 940, 941 (1760) (Mansfield, LJ.) (noting
examples of courts giving advice, but declining to answer question regarding court-martial
because matter might later come before court). However, Lord Sackville's Case may have
reflected the judiciary's traditional reluctance to interfere with the military. See 10
HOLDsWoRTH, supra note 102, at 384-86.
177 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. III, art. II (directing judges to render
advisory opinions on request of political branches); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at
70 (citing similar provisions in New Hampshire and Rhode Island constitutions). See also
Fletcher, Case or Controversy, supra note 69, at 267-68 (describing early state advisory opin-
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practice. 78  Indeed, Anglo-American judges exercised multiple
executive and legislative functions. 9
In sum, a "case" did not necessarily require any controversy.
The absence of a dispute requirement in public law cases is espe-
cially critical because the most important Article III "Cases"
(namely, those raising federal questions) dealt with public law mat-
ters.
(b) Controversy.-In the eighteenth century, "controversy"
meant a dispute' 8 -- for example, a quarrel that adverse parties
voluntarily submitted to a neutral "arbitrator" or "umpire" for a
final decision 8' binding on those parties alone.8 2 In the judi-
ion practice, but concluding that such opinions were not considered "judicial" actions).
178 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 334, 341 (discussing Pinckney's proposal
that Legislature or Executive "shall have authority to require the opinions of the supreme
Judicial Court upon important questions of law"); id. at 73 (Gorham) ("[Ilt would be
best to . . . authorize him [the President] to call on Judges for their opinions . . ").
Madison and Wilson championed a Council of Revision as a forum for federal judges to
give legal advice to Congress. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
179 In England, functional overlap was inherent because the House of Lords was "'a
law-maker by two different methods-by the process of passing bills . . . and also by the
process of interpreting the laws, as the supreme law court of the land.'" See 10
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 611 (citation omitted); id. at 720-21 (describing English
combination of governmental functions). See also Berger, supra note 59, at 821-23 (English
courts performed "'multifarious governmental functions'" such as licensing and administer-
ing the Poor Laws.) (citation omitted); Spann, supra note 66, at 633-35 (same). Similarly,
colonial courts "'performed innumerable executive, administrative, and even legislative
tasks.'" MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS 14 (2d ed. 1989) (citation omitted). While
functions gradually began to separate, id., by the 1780s "departmental duties were jum-
bled as never before" in America. See WOOD, supra note 123, at 154-61.
This overlap explains the Framers' flexible view of "judicial" functions. For example,
Morris rejected other delegates' assertions that English practice was "that Expositors of
laws [i.e.. courts] ought to have no hand in making them," and pointed out that "the
Judges in England had a great share in ye Legislation. They are consulted in difficult &
doubtful cases. They may be . . . members of the Legislature. They . . . may be mem-
bers of the privy Council, and can there advise the Executive . . . ." See 2 FARRAND, su-
pra note 106, at 75-76. Madison agreed. See id. at 77; 1 id. at 139.
180 See, e.g., 2 OED, supra note 104, at 929 (explaining that "controversy" derives
from Latin "controversia," meaning "disputed"); 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *327
(equating "controversy" with "dispute"); 4 STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 2225 (John S.
James ed., 4th ed., Street & Maxwell 1974) (1890) (citing Altham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
701, 706 (1611) ("Quarrels, controversies, and debates, are synonima.")).
181 See, e.g., MATTHEW HALE, THE ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 145 (Garland Pub., 1978)
(1713) (contrasting private consent to "arbitrament" or "umpirage" with "Remedies as the
Law provides in the Courts of Justice, settled by Law"); JACOB, supra note 73, at 38
(same); WOOD, supra note 105, at 530 (same). "Umpirage" referred to a decision by one
umpire; "arbitrament" to a panel. Id. at 531-32. The procedure required a factual dispute
between adverse parties, the "[s]ubmission of the Controversy to Arbitrators"-"private
Extraordinary Judges chosen by the Parties to give Judgment between them to end the
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cial context, a "controversy" was an adversarial proceeding in
which resolution of the dispute between the parties-not the law
involved-was critical.I" A paradigmatic "controversy" was a dis-
pute between governments.TM Wilson extensively analyzed the set-
tlement of such controversies throughout history" by both
republics'86 and confederations,"' and he argued that Article
Debate," and a decree that was "Certain and Final, and make[s] an End of all Controver-
sies submitted . . ." Id.
182 Arbitrators had "Power to pronounce a Sentence betwixt the Parties," which
bound only the parties, with no precedential effect. Id. at 531.
183 See, e.g., BOUvIER, supra note 134, at 667. In ancient times, controversies were re-
solved according to spiritual, not legal, principles. See e.g., S.F.C. MILSOM, HisTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW at x (1969) ("Early law-suits ... put the unanalysed
[sic] dispute to supernatural decision. The blank result settles the dispute, but can make
no law."); Henry Spelman, Of The Ancient Government of England, in THE ENGLISH WORKS
OF SIR HENRY SPELMAN a74 (1723) (Ancient Britons "judged all Controversies by their
Priests the Druides [sic] . . . once a Year."); WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 274
(Druids were "umpires between nations at war ... ."); HALE, supra note 105, at 169.
This tradition continued in English equity courts, where "the Chancellor adjudicat[ed]
disputes according to 'Conscience'" rather than law even in the 18th century. See
LIEBERMAN, supra note 106, at 76; see generally id. at 75-83. Cf. 3 BLAcESTONE, supra note
105, at *326-27 (Some American Indian tribes "refer[red] all disputes to the next man
[they met] upon the road, and so put a short end to every controversy.").
A "controversy" resembled a "case" in that it had to be brought according to prop-
er judicial procedure, see supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text, but differed funda-
mentally in that the court's focus was on the parties' factual dispute, not on legal issues.
See supra notes 180-82; infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
184 See, e.g., COKE, supra note 105, at 71 (contrasting King's Bench's power to correct
legal errors in judicial proceedings with its jurisdiction over "errors and misdemeanours
extrajudiciall [sic] tending to the ... raising of faction, controversy, debate, or any other
manner of misgovernment ... ."); 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 644 (Courts are
"impartial umpires between many different governmental authorities and the subject.").
Sometimes the phrase "constitutional controversies" was used to describe fundamental
constitutional battles over either inter-governmental relations (e.g., between England and
her colonies) or individual rights. See, e.g., 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 116-24; 1
STORY, supra note 91, at 344.
185 Certain nations had "determine[d] controversies" by a three-step process: (1)
negotiated agreement; (2) impartial mediation; and (3) entrusting the "matter in dispute
to the award of arbitrators." See WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 273. This procedure,
however, was "precarious" because it required consent and raised enforcement problems.
Id. at 280. Therefore, Wilson proposed an international tribunal to resolve such "disputes
and differences" according to the law of nations. Id. at 280-81; see also id. at 281-82 (urg-
ing application of similar law to alienage and interstate disputes).
186 In Athens, for example, arbitrators were either "drawn by lot to determine contro-
versies" or chosen by the parties. Id. at 470; accord id. at 274 ("[U]mpires were chosen to
settle their contested claims."). Similarly, the Italian states "submitted their controversies
to the Romans." Id.
187 See, e.g., id. at 251 ("When a dispute happens among the [Swiss] cantons, ....
the parties to that dispute . . . each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who,
in case of disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality,
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III had perfected the peaceful resolution of government-related
controversies by impartial judges."
The discussion of umpiring "controversies" by Wilson and
other leading Federalists,"9 and their recognition of a judicial
law declaration function in "cases," suggests the deliberate use of
these terms in Article III.
C. The Convention's Understanding of the Functional
Case/Controversy Distinction
1. The Evolution of the Judiciary Article
The Framers' intent in choosing the case/controversy lan-
guage can be deduced by tracing the evolution of Article III's
jurisdictional catalogue at the Convention."'
(a) The Judiciary Articles in the Convention Plans.-Edmund
Randolph's nationalistic plan 9' and William Paterson's decen-
tralizing plan'92 described federal judicial authority to "hear and
pronounces definitive sentence."); id. at 252 (Netherlands magistrate "has power to settle
disputes between the provinces."); id. at 250 (Germanic body had tribunals "possessed of
supreme jurisdiction in controversies" among its members.).
188 See, e.g., id. at 278 ("In Switzerland, controversies depending between citizens of
different states must be decided by the magistrates of a state, of which one party, but
not the other, is a citizen. But, in the United States, for controversies depending be-
tween citizens of two different states, a tribunal is formed and established, impartial, and
equally independent of both."); id. at 281-83 (Article III establishes independent courts to
resolve controversies involving sovereigns.).
189 See, e.g., 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1673 (citing THE FEDERALisT No. 80 (Alexan-
der Hamilton)) (describing history of controversies in confederations); Randolph's Report,
supra note 77, at 130 (Article III "establish[es] a common arbiter in the federal judiciary"
to resolve state-party controversies.).
190 An excellent description of the drafting of the judiciary article is found in Robert
N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original
Understanding of Article I1, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 754-98 (1984). Clinton's thesis is that
the Framers intended to require Congress to allocate to the federal judiciary every type
of case and controversy listed in Article III, except for trivial matters. See id. at 749-50.
Cf Amar, Neo-Federalis supra note 7 (concluding that Congress must vest in federal
courts jurisdiction over "all Cases," but not all "Controversies").
191 Randolph's Virginia Plan was submitted on May 29. See 1 FARRAND, supra note
106, at 16, 20-23; 3 id. at 593-94 app. C (reprinting full text of Plan). Randolph pro-
posed "that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear and determine in
the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier
resort, all piracies and felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy, cases in which
foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or
which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National
officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony." 1 id. at 22.
192 Paterson's New Jersey Plan was submitted on June 15. See id. at 242-45; 3 id.' ai'
611-16 app. E (reprinting full text of Plan). Paterson proposed that the national judiciary
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determine" certain matters not designated by any clear
case/controversy terminology."-' The plans agreed that federal
courts should be independent194  and that their jurisdiction
should extend to maritime captures, piracies, and felonies;195 for-
eign ministers;9" foreigners;197  treaties;198  and certain revenue
"shall have authority to hear & determine in the first instance on all impeachments of
federal officers, & by way of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights
of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies & felo-
nies on the high seas, in all cases in, which foreigners may be interested, in the construc-
tion of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of
trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue ... ." 1 id. at 244. Paterson's Plan em-
phasized federal judicial power in international affairs and may fairly be read to restrict
federal jurisdiction over treaties and trade/revenue to "cases in which foreigners may be
interested," thereby limiting domestic jurisdiction to impeachments. Moreover, except for
impeachments, federal jurisdiction was by appeal from state courts. See id. at 243-44 (pro-
viding for suits to commence in state judiciaries).
Although the Convention discussed only the Virginia and New Jersey Plans, two
others deserve mention. First, on May 29, Charles Pinckney submitted a plan, id. at 16,
23, an outline of which was found among James Wilson's papers. 2 id. at 134-37. Al-
though there are no extant copies of the Pinckney Plan, 1 id. at xxii, historians have
pieced together its likely provisions. See 3 id. at 595-609 app. D. Second, Hamilton on
June 18 orally made a governmental proposal. See 1 id. at 291-93. Hamilton later drafted
a more elaborate plan, but he did not give it to Madison until the close of the Conven-
tion. See id. at 291 n.7; 3 id. at 617-30 app. F (reprinting full text of Plan).
193 Randolph mentioned "piracies," "felonies," "captures," and "impeachments;" then
'cases" involving foreigners and out-or-state citizens; then "questions" involving "national
peace and harmony." 1 id. at 22. Paterson referred to "impeachments," then repeated the
phrase "all cases" to denote other jurisdictional bases. Id. at 244.
194 The judiciary's guarantees of independence remained constant from the time they
were proposed in the Virginia Plan. See 1 id. at 21-22 (providing federal judges with
tenure during "good behavior" and undiminished salary); see also id. at 116 (noting
Convention's approval of this provision without dissent); see also id. at 226, 230 (Conven-
tion resolution accepting basic guarantees of independence); id. at 244 (Paterson Plan)
(duplicating provisions ensuring judicial independence); 2 id. at 132 (Convention resolu-
tion given to Committee of Detail); id. at 660-61 (final Article III).
195 1 id. at 22 (Randolph); id. at 244 (Paterson). These provisions duplicated Article
IX of the Articles of Confederation. Pinckney proposed a broader provision closer to the
final words of Article III. See 2 id. at 136 (authorizing Congress to institute "a Court of
Admiralty... for all maritime Causes").
196 Paterson predicted Article Im's language by recommending jurisdiction "in all
cases touching the rights of Ambassadors." 1 id. at 244. This protection was implicit in
Randolph's "national peace and harmony" clause, id. at 22, as his opening remarks to
the Convention made clear. See id. at 18-19.
197 Both plans conferred jurisdiction in "cases in which foreigners may be interested."
Id. at 244 (Paterson) (emphasis added); see also id. at 22 (citing Randolph's near identi-
cal language).
198 In both plans, jurisdiction apparently was limited to the treaty rights of foreigners.
See id. at 244 (Paterson) (granting federal court authority "in all cases in which foreign-
ers may be interested, in the construction of any treaty"); id. at 238 (Randolph) (empha-
sizing that one of his major objectives was to secure treaty rights of foreigners, implying
that such jurisdiction was included in his "national peace and harmony" provision, id. at
1994]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
laws." After debate,2" the Convention resolved that federal ju-
risdiction "shall extend to all cases arising under the Natl. laws:
And to such other questions as may involve the Natl. peace &
harmony."20
1
22); see also 2 id. at 136 (Pinckney) (granting federal jurisdiction "in all Causes wherein
Questions shall arise on the Construction of Treaties").
199 See 1 id. at 22 (Randolph) (limiting jurisdiction to revenue laws, although "na-
tional peace and harmony" implied broader federal question jurisdiction); id. at 244 (Pat-
erson) (restricting jurisdiction to trade regulation and revenue collection involving for-
eigners); 2 id. at 136 (Pinckney) (same).
200 The Convention delegates agreed with the provision contained in all of the plans
that the judicial power be vested in a Supreme Court. See 1 id. at 21 (Randolph); id. at
244 (Paterson); 2 id. at 136 (Pinckney).
Debate centered on inferior tribunals. The Committee of the Whole initially ap-
proved Randolph's resolution creating mandatory lower courts. See 1 id. at 104-05.
Rutledge urged striking this provision, arguing that inferior tribunals encroached on state
jurisdiction. Id. at 119, 124. Sherman stressed the added cost. Id. at 125. Madison re-
sponded that lower courts "with final jurisdiction in many cases" were necessary to avoid
flooding the Supreme Court with appeals, and that such appeals might be inadequate
because of the harm inflicted by "improper Verdicts in State tribunals under the biassed
[sic] directions of a dependent Judge." Id. at 124.
Wiison and Madison successfully suggested a compromise-granting the national
legislature discretion over establishing such tribunals. Id. at 125. When Butler and Martin
revived the argument that Congress should have no power to appoint inferior tribunals, 2
id. at 45-46, Randolph ended the discussion by arguing that "[c]ourts of the States can
not be trusted with the administration of the National laws." Id. at 46.-Had the Framers
wanted state courts to adjudicate Article III matters definitively, they would not have
given Congress discretion to create inferior courts, which most delegates assumed would
inevitably be established (e.g., in admiralty). See infra note 273. The Constitution reflects
the Madisonian compromise. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (Federal judicial power shall be
vested "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish."); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
Many jurists and scholars have claimed that Article III required Congress to estab-
lish some lower federal courts. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 328-31 (1816); GOEBEL, supra note 110, at 247. For the opposing (and more persua-
sive) view, see MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER 29 (2d ed. 1990). In any event, the first Congress did create inferior
federal courts. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 73-74. Failure to do so
would have forced all litigants to travel to the capital, thereby centralizing the federal
judiciary and overwhelming the Supreme Court. See 3 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 552-53
(Marshall). See also SEED, supra note 113, at 72 ("Wilson and Madison were certain that
the logic of circumstances would oblige the legislature to create the inferior tribunals
they regarded as essential. The stratagem worked; a potentially dangerous issue was by-
passed in the convention, and the objective achieved by other means.").
201 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 46 (Madison's Journal). See also id. at 39 (Conven-
tion Journal); id. at 132-33 (resolution given to Committee of Detail). The Committee of
the Whole had earlier resolved "[tihat the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall
extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of
any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony." 1 id.
at 223-24; see also id. at 231, 232, 237, 238 (same provision, recorded in various delegates'
journals and other Convention records).
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(b) Committee of Detail.-The Committee of Detail gradually
fleshed out this resolution until it had reached near-final Article
HI form.20 2 Textual changes in the Committee's drafts are critical
because Convention records reveal nothing about its deliberations.
The first draft, prepared by Edmund Randolph, revised his
own proposed judiciary article, with editing by John Rutledge (in
brackets):
5. The Judiciary
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
1. to all cases, arising under laws passed by the general
<Legislature>
2. to impeachments of officers, and
3. to such other cases, as the national legislature may as-
sign, as involving the national peace and harmony
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes between the citizens of different states
<in disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens
of another State>
in disputes between different states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other
countries are concerned
<& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn>
Rutledge's notations' are particularly significant After Randolph
had used the term "disputes" four times in succession, Rutledge
added the phrase "Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn." A difference emerg-
es between "cases" arising under national law, involving the nation-
al peace, or concerning admiralty, and "disputes" between parties
(states, state citizens, and foreigners).*2 Wilson's subsequent
202 See id. at 238 (Randolph) ("[I]t will be the business of a sub-committee to detail"
the Convention's one-sentence resolution, which merely established the principle of en-
suring security to foreigners and preserving harmony among states and citizens.); 2 id. at
85-87, 95-97, 117-18, 128 (Convention entrusting matters to Committee of Detail). See also
Holt, supranote 7, at 1464 ("Wilson and Randolph had strong convictions and apparently
matured ideas concerning the judiciary, and with Rutledge's aid they filled out the
Convention's resolution in amazing detail.").
203 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 146-47.
204 Wilson's transformation of Randolph's phrase "cases... involving the national
peace and harmony... in disputes" (id. at 147) into the single word "Controversies"
(id. at 173) suggests that a "controversy" is a particular type of "case-one defined by
the dispute involved.
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draft (with Rutledge's emendations) more precisely carved the
scope of federal jurisdiction:
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme (National) Court shall
extend to all Cases arising under Laws passed by the Legisla-
ture of the United States; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors
(and other) <other> public Ministers <& Consuls>, to the Trial
of Impeachments of Officers of the United States; to all Cases
of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies be-
tween <States-except those wh. regard Jurisdn or Territo-
ry,-betwn> a State and a Citizen or Citizens of another State,
between Citizens of different States and between <a State or
the> Citizens (of any of the States) <thereof> and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.s
Wilson preserved Randolph's basic two-tiered structure but reorga-
nized the jurisdictional heads under the rubrics "all Cases" and
"Controversies."20' Wilson's repetition of these terms-and
Rutledge's decision to leave them intact despite numerous other
editorial corrections-suggests a deliberate phraseology," 7 which
is confirmed by Wilson's and Randolph's later care in differenti-
ating "Cases" from "Controversies."2"'
(c) Final Revisions of the Judiciary Article.-The case/controversy
language remained in the final version of Article III despite sev-
205 Id. at 172-73. In the cited passage, Rutledge's corrections are in brackets; words
in parentheses were crossed out by Wilson. Id. at 163 n.17.
206 See also id. at 186-87 (Wilson's final draft of judiciary article reported out of Com-
mittee of Detail). Wilson changed the word "Cases" to "Controversies" in several instanc-
es. For example, Randolph's Plan and his initial draft refer to some diversity "cases." See
1 id. at 22 (listing jurisdiction over "cases in which ... citizens of other states applying
to such jurisdictions may be interested"); 2 id. at 14647 (referring to "cases" involving
"disputes" between citizens of different states). See also supra notes 191-92, 197 (major
Convention Plans mentioning "cases in which foreigners may be interested"); 2 FARRAND,
supra note 106, at 146-47 (Randolph/Rutledge draft referring to various "cases involving
disputes").
These drafts are also critical to Amar's mandatory/permissive distinction, as evi-
denced by the selective use of "all" in the Wilson draft. See generally Amar, Neo-FederaliSt
supra note 7, at 242-45.
207 Wilson was "a concise thinker not given to tautological expressions" who would
not have used two different words unless he intended to convey distinct meanings. See
SEED, supra note 113, at 95.
208 See WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 454; see also 2 ELLOT, supra note 109, at
486-94 (reprinting Wilson's speech at Pennsylvania ratifying convention). He had one
lapse. See id. at 489. As Attorney General, Randolph lamented the nonconformity of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 with Article III, and his critique of that statute precisely distin-
guished "Cases" from "Controversies" every time he referred to Article III's jurisdictional
catalogue. See Randolph's Report, supra note 77, at 127, 129, 140-41, 148.
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eral other changes. The Convention agreed to expand the list of
"Cases" to include all cases arising under the Constitution and
treaties,2" jurisdiction previously considered implicit.21 ° Under
the "Controversies" heading, Pinckney successfully moved to insert
"United States-party" disputes."' Wilson then persuaded the Con-
'vention to add two jurisdictional heads: (1) interstate controversies
involving territory or jurisdiction;"' and (2) land grant contro-
versies between citizens of the same state.218
In polishing the judiciary article, the Committee of
Style-which'included such masterful writers as Madison, Ham-
ilton, and Morris2 4-- retained the case/controversy bifurca-
tion.
2 15
2. The Convention's Understanding of Judicial Functions in
"Cases" and "Controversies"
Several Convention delegates perceived that federal judges
would perform different functions in "Cases" than in "Controver-
sies."
(a) Exposition of the Law in "Cases."--The role of courts as
expositors of the law in "Cases" is illustrated in the only explicit
discussion of that term at the Convention:
Docr. [William] Johnson moved to insert the words "this
Constitution and the" before the word "laws" [in Article III,
section 2, clause 1.]
Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to
extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising
209 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 423-24, 431-32.
210 Long before express jurisdiction over constitutional cases was added, Convention
delegates had unanimously expressed their understanding that federal courts had this
power. See supra note 126; infra notes 224-25. Similarly clear was treaty jurisdiction. See 1
FARRAND, supra note 106, at 238 (Randolph); see also supra note 198 (describing Conven-
tion plans proposing treaty jurisdiction).
211 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 340 n.4, 342 (Madison's notes); see also id. at
335 (Convention Journal); id. at 367 (citing subcommittee's recommendation that such
jurisdiction be approved); id. at 423-25, 430 (approval by Convention). Pinckney's was the
only plan that expressly included jurisdiction over United States-party suits. Id. at 136.
Significantly, Pinckney's language--"all Causes ... wherein U.S. shall be a Party"-was
changed to "Controversies."
212 See id. at 400-01, 425, 431-32.
213 See id. at 431-32.
214 The Committee of Style also included Johnson and King. Id. at 554, 590 n.8.
215 See id. at 575-76, 600.01.
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Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be limited
to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the
Constitution in cases not of this nature ought not to be given
to that Department.
The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it
being generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was con-
structively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature-- -216
Although this passage has often been cited erroneously as a consti-
tutional basis for justiciability,2 1 one of its obvious (and over-
looked) meanings is that those "cases" that were "of a Judiciary
Nature" gave a judge "[t]he right of expounding the law."21
Similarly, debates over a Council of Revision, a judicial-execu-
tive panel that would review all legislation,"9 focused on the ef-
216 Id. at 430.
217 See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 8; Clinton, supra note 190, at 788-92; Bandes, supra note 66,
at 231, 279. This conclusion assumes that modern justiciability doctrines correspond to
the Framers' understanding of "cases of a judiciary nature," contrary to abundant evi-
dence showing that 18th century courts performed a variety of functions that would be
barred under current justiciability rules. See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text; cf
Berger, supra note 59, at 829, 832-36 (arguing that reference to "cases of a judiciary na-
ture" cannot be interpreted as abandonment of established judicial remedies (such as
prerogative writs) to curb unconstitutional legislative usurpation, a critical concern of
Framers). Indeed, Madison himself vigorously argued that the Constitution should provide
for a Council of Revision, composed of federal judges and executive officials, to negate
or revise legislative bills. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 97-104, 138-40; 2 id. at 27-34,
73-80, 299-300. Madison believed that "[t]he Judicial ought to be introduced in the busi-
ness of Legislation." 1 id. at 108. See generally infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
Neither Madison's statement to Johnson nor any other evidence at the Convention
refers to justiciability doctrines. Rather, Madison was expressly focusing on "cases arising
under the Constitution." Recognizing the delicacy of judicial review, Madison urged that
it be explicitly restricted to cases of a "judiciary" nature, as opposed to cases of a "hypo-
thetical" nature-which Madison presumably knew was one meaning (indeed, the original
legal meaning) of the word "case." See supra note 133. Similarly, when Johnson became a
Justice, he declared that the Court could not "decide on a mere hypothetical case." See
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 370 (1816) (separate opinion of John-
son, J.).
Professor Engdahl interprets Madison's statement differently, as meaning that the
judiciary sometimes has the last word on a constitutional question because of its fortu-
itous occurrence in a form contemplated by Article III, not because of the character of
the legal question. See Engdahl, John Marshal supra note 7, at 302-03; see also infra note
267 (discussing Engdahl's theory).
218 Madison's language indicates that some "cases" are judicial in nature, and some
are not. While Madison did not offer criteria for determining when a case became "judi-
cial," he obviously viewed judicial "cases" as vehicles for expounding the law. See 2
FARRAND, supra note 106, at 430.
219 See supra note 217. This idea originated in the Randolph Plan. See 1 FARRAND,
supra note 106, at 21. Madison and Wilson argued that a Council of Revision was neces-
sary to help the judiciary defend itself against legislative encroachments and to protect
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fect participation in the Council would have on judges' legal expo-
sition-which both proponents2 " and opponents 21 agreed was
the core judicial function. The proposal was eventually rejected on
two related separation of powers grounds: (1) Courts should not
weaken their expository function by teaming with the executive to
engage in policy-making;' and (2) Judges could not impartially
construe laws they had helped frame.ss
the public from bad laws. For Madison's arguments, see id. at 108, 138-39; 2 id. at 74,
298. Wilson wanted "to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative." 1 id.
at 98. He felt a Council of Revision was needed because the judicial expository power
"did not go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be'
destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give
them effect." 2 id. at 73; see also id. at 78 (Mason) (same). See also Letter from James
Madison to James Monroe (Dec. 27, 1817), in 8 MADIsON'S WRrITNGS, supra note 101, at
406-07 (describing Convention attempts to create judicial negative to give "greater stability
& system to the rules of expounding the [Constitution]" and to preclude judicial "annul-
ment of Legislative Act?'). Other proposals for judicial/political organs included a Council
of State to recommend statutory revisions, see 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 342 (Morris),
and an advisory Privy Council. See id. at 328-29 (Ellsworth).
220 1 id. at 232-33 (Madison) (referring to judge as "an expositor of the laws"); 2 id.
at 79 (Gorham) (describing judicial "exposition of the laws"); id. at 73 (Wilson) (refer-
ring to "Judges, as expositors of the Laws").
221 See, e.g., 1 id. at 97 ("Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a
part of [the Council of Revision], as they will have a sufficient check... agst. encroach-
ments on their own department by their exposition of the laws . . . ."); 2 id. at 75
(Gerry) (describing judges as "Expositors of the Laws"); 1 id. at 98 (King) (observing
that "Judges ought to be able to expound the law"); 2 id. at 75 (Strong) (referring to
"[tihe Judges in exercising the function of expositors" and "the power of... expound-
ing[ ] the laws").
222 John Dickinson opposed "blending the national Judicial with the Executive, be-
cause the one is the expounder, and the other the Executor of the Laws." 1 id. at 110.
Dickinson further argued that "the Judges must interpret the Laws they ought not be
legislators." Id. at 108. Likewise, Gerry denounced the Council as an "improper coalition
between the Executive & Judiciary departments ... .It was making the Expositors of the
Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be done." 2 id. at 75. See also 1 id. at 97-98
(Gerry) (to similar effect); 2 id. at 76 (Martin) (rejecting "association of the Judges with
the Executive"); id. at 300 (Sherman) (disapproving of "Judges meddling in politics and
parties"); id. at 73 (Gorham) (observing that "Judges . . are not to be presumed to
possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures").
223 See, e.g., 1 id. at 98 (King) ("Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it
should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation."); 2
id. at 75 (Strong) ("The Judges in exercising the function of expositors might be influ-
enced by the part they had taken, in framing the laws."); id. at 79 (Gorham) ("[Tihe
Judges ought to carry into the exposition of the laws no prepossessions with regard to
them."); id. at 80 (Rutledge) ("Judges of all men [are] the most unfit to be concerned
in the revisionary Council."); id. at 298 (Pinckney "opposed the interference of the Judg-
es in the Legislative business: it will involve them in parties, and give a previous tincture
to their opinions."). See also THE FEDERALST No. 73, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("[T]he Judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might
receive an improper bias, from having given a previous opinion in their revisionary ca-
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Thus, the Convention denied political authority to courts
precisely to strengthen their exercise of judicial power, which in-
cluded the right to declare laws unconstitutional-as recognized by
both Federalists224 and Antifederalists. The federal courts' ex-
pository function was also critical in cases involving foreign min-
isters, treaties, and admiralty, which implicated the law of
nations.26
To ensure proper judicial exposition in "Cases," Article III
guaranteed all federal judges independence by virtue of their life
tenure2t7 and fixed salary,221 while other constitutional provi-
pacities.").
224 See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 109 (King) ("[Tihe Judges will have the
expounding of those Laws when they come before them; and they will no doubt stop
the operation of such as shall appear repugnant to the constitution."); 2 id. at 73 (Wil-
son) ("Judges, as expositors of the Laws would have an opportunity of defending their
constitutional rights."); id. at 93 (Madison) ("A law violating a constitution . . . would be
considered by the Judges as null & void."); id. at 74 (Madison) (same); id. at 28 (Mor-
ris) ("A law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt."); id.
at 299 (Morris) (same); id. at 298 (Pinckney) (opposing "interference of the Judges in
the Legislative business"). Gerry and Mason, who were "on the dividing line between
acceptance and rejection of the Constitution," see Holt, supra note 7, at 1463 n.159, also
endorsed judicial review. See 1 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 97 (Gerry) (The judiciary's
"exposition of the laws . . . involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality."); 2
id. at 78 (Mason) (Judges "could declare an unconstitutional law void."). See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (Courts
have the duty "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution
void.").
225 Luther Martin stated that "as to the Constitutionality of laws, that point will come
before the Judges in their proper official character. In this character they have a negative
on the laws." 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 76; see also id. (judicial review obviates the
need for a Council of Revision.). The main challenge to judicial review at the Conven-
tion-Mercer's "[disapproval] of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Consti-
tution should have authority to declare a law void," id. at 298-was refuted by Morris so
forcefully that it ended any further discussion: A federal judge could hardly "be bound
to say that a direct violation of the Constitution was law." Id. at 299. See generally
Engdahl, John Marshall supra note 7, at 282-85 (describing general understanding that
courts could disregard unconstitutional statutes, based on Convention and Ratification
statements and established state court practice).
226 See infra notes 237, 246, 248, 271, 276-77, 280 and accompanying text (summariz-
ing international law aspects of foreign minister, treaty, and admiralty jurisdiction).
227 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour ... ."). Madison explicitly con-
nected independence to law declaration: He argued that separation of powers demanded
the independence of each branch, and that making judges dependent on the legislature
for reappointment would "render the Legislature the virtual expositor, as well the maker
of the laws." 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 34; see also id. at 56 (Madison) (stressing
"fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers
should be separately exercised; it is equally so that they be independently exercised"); id. at
77 (same). Likewise, key Framers such as Wilson, Randolph, Morris, and Rutledge de-
nounced Dickinson's suggestion to make judges removable by the executive on petition
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sions assured their quality, integrity, and prestige.'
(b) Umpiring "Controversies. "--The dispute resolution function
in "Controversies" was mentioned only twice at the Convention.
During debates over the Committee of Detail's draft judiciary
article, Pinckney stressed that independent, qualified judges would
"be the Umpires" in United States-party and interstate disputes.'
Pinckney echoed Gerry's earlier emphasis on the need for "an
Umpire to decide controversies." "
The scant mention of umpiring, contrasted with the repeated
discussion of exposition, suggests that' the delegates considered
dispute resolution a secondary judicial function. Indeed, they un-
derstood that umpiring need not be done by courts. For example,
two of Article III's six Controversies (interstate and land grant)
were nearly entrusted to legislative resolution. 2 This scheme was
from Congress. See id. at 428-29; id. at 429 (Wilson) ("The Judges would be in a bad
situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in the two
branches of our Govt.").
228 See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1 ("[Judges] shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Of-
fice."). See generaly 1 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 121; 2 id. at 44-45, 428-30.
229 See id. at 37-45. For example, the Convention agreed on executive appointment of
judges with Senate "Advice and Consent"-a selective process designed to enhance pres-
tige and thus attract qualified candidates. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See also 1 FARRAND,
supra note 106, at 233; THE FEDERAuST No. 78, at 529-30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961). To ensure that judges would be morally sound and accountable,
impeachment for misconduct was included. See U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 5; id. cl. 6-7.
See generally Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 7, at 235-38. Cf 12 HoLDswoRTH, supra note
102, at 158 (England had "an independent bench of judges, sufficiently well paid to
secure [their ability] . . . [and with] security of tenure."). Article III's guarantees of inde-
pendence contrasted with its silence about state judges. Madison argued that "confidence
[cannot] be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and inter-
ests" because they were at the mercy of their legislatures. 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at
27-28; see also 1 id. at 317 (Madison); id. at 125 (Wilson).
230 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 248.
231 1 id. at 515. Pinckney and Gerry's use of the "Umpire" metaphor contrasts with
their other statements that judges should engage in the "exposition of the laws" in cases.
*See id. at 97 (Gerry); 2 id. at 75 (Gerry); id. at 298 (Pinckney).
232 See, e.g., 1 id. at 243 (reaffirming Congressional powers vested by Articles of Con-
federation); 2 id. at 135 (Pinckney Plan outline) (Congress "shall be the last Resort on
Appeal in Disputes between two or more States."); id. at 144 (Randolph-Rutledge draft in
Committee of Detail); id. at 170 (Wilson's final draft) ("In all Disputds and Controver-
sies ... between two or more States [and those involving land grants]," the legislature
would select a panel of "Commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine the Con-
troversy."); id. at 183-84 (Committee of Detail draft presented to Convention) (same).
Thus, Gerry's comment about umpiring (see supra note 231) was made at a time when
the Convention assumed that the legislature would resolve many disputes (e.g., interstate
and land grant). See supra note 121; infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
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modeled on the Articles of Confederation, ss which made Con-
gress "the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences"
between States and in "[a]ll controversies concerning the private
right of soil claimed under different grants of two or more States,"
and allowed Congress to appoint temporary "commissioners or
judges" for assistance." Only towards the end of the Convention
did Wilson and Rutledge successfully move such jurisdiction to the
judiciary article on the ground that independent federal courts
would be better equipped to resolve such disputes.'
In sum, Convention records indicate that the federal
judiciary's primary role was to be exposition in "Cases," with a
lesser function of resolving disputes in "Controversies."
3. The Case/Controversy Distinction and the Structure of
Article III
The choice of the words "Cases" and "Controversies" reflected
not merely verbal precision but also the underlying structural logic
of Article III. Specifically, the case/controversy distinction signaled
the division of Article III's jurisdictional catalogue into two sepa-
rate categories based on the different essential function the judi-
ciary was expected to perform in each class. First, the initial three
jurisdictional grants all were designated "Cases" and concerned
legal topics of national importance that were entrusted to the
federal judiciary for definitive exposition. Second, the term "Con-
troversies" introduced the final six jurisdictional heads, which were
defined not by legal subject matter but by parties, thereby direct-
ing judicial attention to the resolution of disputes between those
parties.
The presence in Article III of the words "Cases" and "Contro-
versies," standing alone, might be dismissed as insignificant or acci-
dental. However, the repeated use of these terms in exact corre-
spondence with the distinction between subject matter and party-
233 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 400 n.6.
234 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 3. The cumbersome process of appointing
such commissioners, and their lack of enforcement power (see supra note 121) is similar
to that of modem labor arbitrators. See Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute
Resolution, 88 YALE LJ. 916 (1979). The Confederation judge-commissioners failed to
"check the quarrals [sic] between states." 1 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 19 (Randolph);
see also id. at 18 (emphasizing "discord . .. among... many states" and "dissentions
[sic] between members of the Union").
235 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 401; see also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 490
(Wilson) (stressing that judiciary had enforcement power superior to that of Congress).
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defined jurisdictional grants strongly suggests a deliberate decision
to highlight the federal courts' different primary role in each
category. This conclusion is buttressed by analyzing other evidence
from the post-Convention period.
D. The Federalist View of Article III's Two Functional Tiers
Leading Federalists recognized Article III's functional bifurca-
tion. For example, Justice Story explicitly distinguished "all Cases"
from "Controversies:"' He emphasized the "vital importance of
all the cases enumerated in the first class" to America's "national
sovereignty" and international interests,"ss but concluded that the
matters designated "Controversies" had been included for "[n]o
other reason" than to give litigants an impartial tribunal."8 Simi-
larly, John Marshall repeatedly noted that "It]he judicial power of
the United States, as defined in the constitution, is dependent, 1st.
On the nature of the case; and 2d. On the character of the par-
ties. "2a9 Marshall asserted full judicial power over "Cases" in
which he developed federal law expansively,2' whereas he carved
many exceptions into jurisdiction based on "the character of the
236 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333-36, 347-48 (1816). Al-
though Justice Story's main conclusion was that Congress was required to vest in federal
courts jurisdiction over "all" cases but not all "controversies," he also implicitly recognized
that the courts' role was different in the two jurisdictional tiers.
237 Id. at 334-36. See also 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1664, at 531 (noting that "cases,"
such as those in admiralty, involved public law issues, not mere private claims).
238 Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 347.
239 Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85 (1809). See also
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393 (1821) (In the second tier, "the jurisdic-
tion of the Court is founded entirely on the character of the parties; and the nature of
the controversy is not contemplated by the constitution . . . . In the other description of
cases, the jurisdiction is founded entirely on the character of the case, and the parties
are not contemplated by the constitution. In these, the nature of the case is every thing,
the character of the parties nothing."); id. at 378 (same); Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 809, 812, 818-19 (1824) (same); John Marshall, A Friend
of the Constitution IX in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 155, 212-
14 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter MARSHALL'S DEFENSE] (same).
240 See, e.g., Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 378 ("This clause extends the jurisdiction
of the Court to all the cases described, without making in its terms any exception what-
ever .... ."); Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 821-22 (concluding that first group of cases is
"most important class").
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parties."241 The differing judicial roles in "Cases" and "Controver-
sies" will now be examined.2
1. Cases
The federal judiciary's principal function in "Cases" was expo-
sition of federal law. The early Supreme Court consistently defined
"case" as a cause of action, brought in familiar judicial form, that
raised a legal question under one of the Article III jurisdictional
grants based on substantive law.243  "Cases" presented questions
241 See infra Part II.D.2. (discussing narrow construction of "Controversies," such as
complete diversity requirement). Federalists sometimes referred to Article III "Controver-
sies" as "Cases." See, e.g., Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 378, 383-84, 390, 393, 398, 405-06;
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 88, 90; Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 330-31, 333. None-
theless, the terms were not interchangeable because Article Ill "Cases" were almost never
called "Controversies." The explanation for this seeming anomaly is that "case" was a
broader term than "controversy" in two procedural senses. First, both matters were origi-
nally submitted as a "cause of action"-often shortened to "cause" or "case." See generally
supra notes 134 and 183; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (introducing each jurisdictional category as a "cause"). Sec-
ond, on appeal a matter was always known as a "case." See supra note 134. Compare Judi-
ciary Act of 1789. ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (granting district court jurisdiction over
"all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction") (emphasis added) with id. § 13
(Supreme Court has "appellate jurisdiction . . . in the cases herein after specifically pro-
vided for . . - .") (emphasis added). See also Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 409-11 (An
appeal to review a "case" is not a "suit" because no claim is asserted.); Martin, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) at 333 ("[J]udicial power" extends to "cases" in any form, original or appellate.).
242 The ratification debates reveal some awareness that subjects designated "Cases"
were categorically different from party-defined "Controversies." See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT, supra
note 109, at 156-58 (Davie) (distinguishing grants labeled "all Cases" from those designat-
ed "Controversies"). While Federalists were unyielding in their defense of "Cases," they
admitted that inclusion of "Controversies" was more a policy preference. See, e.g., 3 id. at
532-35 (Madison). Of course, in the partisan atmosphere of the ratification debates, preci-
sion in expression was often absent. See supra note 108. Indeed, even Hamilton used
"Cases" and "Controversies" carelessly, except where he quoted directly from Article III.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton's sloppy terminology might
also reflect reliance on his own Convention judiciary plan, which used various terms like
"cases," "causes," "questions," and "controversies." See 3 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 625-
27. See also 3 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 532 (Madison) (collapsing "Cases" and "Contro-
versies").
For a good summary of the ratification debates, see Clinton, supra note 190, at 797-
840.
243 See, e.g., Osbom, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819 ("This clause enables the judicial de-
partment to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the
judicial power is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the
subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.
It then becomes a case . .. ."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74
(1803) (to similar effect); 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1640, at 507 (endorsing form-based
definition of case); WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 190 ("The common law furnishes
him with forms to suit . . . every case that has been brought before a court of justice.").
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crucial to the national interest2---either internally (those arising
under the Constitution or federal law) 2" or internationally (cases
involving admiralty, treaties, or foreign ministers) 2 -- that could
be answered with finality only by an independent national
court247  with special expertise in federal and international
law.248
Admittedly, the form of a "case" appropriate for judicial decision often involved a "con-
troversy" between parties. See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 606 (1800) (Marshall). Such a
dispute, however, was not a necessary element of a "case." See supra notes 166-79 and
accompanying text; infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
244 See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 334-35 (emphasizing "vital importance of all the
cases enumerated in the first class to the national sovereignty" and their effect on "na-
tional policy" and "national rights").
245 See, e.g., Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 391 (identifying purpose of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction as "the preservation of the constitution and laws of the United States, so
far as they can be preserved by judicial authority").
246 See generaly supra note 237; infra notes 248, 271, 276, 280 and accompanying text.
247 During ratification, Federalists defended federal court independence as imperative
to ensure proper determination of cases of national importance, and they protested en-
trusting final decisionmaking power to state courts. See, e.g., THE FEDERAUST No. 81, at
546-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (State courts are "improper
channels" to decide Article mH cases.); id. at 544 (Federal judges were insulated from leg-
islative influence lest "the pestilential breath of faction . . . poison the fountains of jus-
tice."); THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 531-33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (same); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 480 (Wilson) (noting "servile dependence of
[state] judges"); 4 id. at 139-40, 172 (Maclaine) (emphasizing financial dependence of
state judges); id. .at 141-42 (Johnston); 3 id. at 553-54 (Marshall); id. at 548 (Pendleton).
This theme recurred during debates over the Judiciary Act. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 844 (1789) (Madison) (delegating execution of federal laws to state courts would
revive "embarrassments" of Articles of Confederation); id. at 831-32 (William Smith) (urg-
ing assignment of judicial power to federal rather than state courts because of former's
tenure and salary guarantees); id. at 853 (Vining) (same). The Act itself ensured Su-
preme Court review of all state court decisions defeating federal rights arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
Early Supreme Court decisions stressed the weakness of state judges. See, e.g., Cohens
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 387 (The Constitution attached such "importance . . . to the inde-
pendence of judges" that it would not have left "constitutional questions to tribunals
where this independence may not exist."); Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 347 (expressing
fear that local prejudices would endanger administration of federal law).
Many scholars have emphasized the parity of all federal judges and their structural
superiority to state judges. See, e.g., Amar, Neo-Fedealis supra note 7, at 221-22, 233-38;
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L REv. 1105 (1977); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Feder-
al Courts, 95 HARv. L REv. 17, 45-68 (1981). For an opposing view, see Martin H.'
Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article 11, 138 U. PA. L
REV. 1633, 1643-47 (1990).
248 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 73-74 (Ellsworth) (Federal courts "will pos-
sess a systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws . . . . The law of Nations also will
frequently come into question. Of this the Judges alone will have competent informa-
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Such important legal questions could be decided even where
the dispute between the parties was trivial or nonexistent.2 0 For
example, the Court decided "Cases" in traditional public law ac-
tions brought by informers" ° and by petitioners for prerogative
writs, 251 despite the lack of any individualized injury. The judicial
focus on legal subject matter becomes clear when each type of
Article III "Case" is examined.
(a) Federal Question.-Federal question jurisdiction "stood first
in the mind of the framers."25 2 A national judiciary was needed
tion."); Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 335 (pointing out that admiralty and foreign min-
ister cases involved questions arising under "law of nations"). Article M's general lan-
guage conferred broad "judicial power" in the first tier to decide "all Cases" in categories
both specific (Admiralty and Ambassador) and general ("arising under"). See DUPONCEAU,
supra note 90, at 1-2. Indeed, even Antifederalists recognized the need for federal judicial
power over federal question, admiralty, and foreign minister cases. See Essays of Brutus
X1, in ANTI-FEDERALiST, supra note 72, at 2.9.159-160. This explains why Congress en-
trusted to the federal judiciary final jurisdiction, in original or appellate form, over "all
Cases" listed in Article III; any omissions were incidental and posed no threat to realizing
the goals of Article III. See Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 7, at 260-65. See also id. at 233
("[T]he 'judicial Power' subsumes the substantive power to decide cases flling in certain
defined categories. But the judicial Power of the United States' goes beyond mere subject
matter jurisdiction; it encompasses the power to speak in the name of the nation, to speak
definitively and finally.").
249 See, eg., Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 77, at 1520 (citing Paterson's statement that
even a trivial dispute could "involve a Question of Law of great Importance"); Holt, supra
note 7, at 1515 n.346 (citing Madison's letter describing Senate's refusal "'to concur in
the limitation on the value of appeals to the Supreme Court, which they say . . . might
be embarrassing in questions of national or constitutional importance in their principle,
tho' of small pecuniary amount'"). Moreover, the Court often decided cases where the
"dispute" was the result of collusion. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). The ban on such suits be-
gan only with Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850).
250 See, e.g., Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805).
251 See, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Weston v.
Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829) (allowing writ of prohibition). See generally Win-
ter, supra note 24, at 1405.
252 MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 239, at 204. The Convention and Ratification re-
cords generally support Marshall's view of the primacy of such jurisdiction. Nonetheless, a
contrary inference might be drawn from the Judiciary Act of 1789, which has always been
interpreted as not conferring general federal question jurisdiction. This conventional
wisdom has been challenged by Professor Engdahl, who has shown that the Act did pro-
vide for all cases that could have been contemplated as within such jurisdiction. See Da-
vid E. Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789 Judiciary Ac 14 OKLA. Criy U.
L. REv. 521 (1989) [hereinafter Engdahl, Federal Question]; see also Rrrz, supra note 77, at
58-60 (The Act does not deny federal question jurisdiction, and it is nearly inconceivable
that Congress would have withheld this one basis of jurisdiction that everyone expected
federal courts to have.). Most importantly, § 25 of the Act provided for Supreme Court
review of any state court judgment deciding a federal question adversely. See Engdahl,
Federal Question, supra, at 529-32. This scheme ensured that the Court would retain final
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to adjudicate "all Cases... arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties"-horizontally, to preserve
uniformity in federal law,s and vertically, to ensure federal su-
premacy.M Federal question jurisdiction featured a court's classic
expository function-construing a particular legal text (i.e., the
Constitution, a statute, or a treaty).
First, constitutional law declaration was critical."s In Marbuiy
v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall rejected as absurd the assertion
"[t]hat a case arising under the constitution should be decided
without examining the instrument under which it arises." " In
holding section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitution-
al, 7 he reasoned that because "written constitutions . . . form[]
the fundamental and paramount law," s "a legislative act con-
expository authority over federal law. See Amar, Neo-Federalis supra note 7, at 259-64.
Moreover, the Act gave federal courts original jurisdiction over cases arising under federal
patent, revenue, and commercial laws, and over private claims based on federal statutes
providing for penalties and forfeitures. See Engdahl, Federal Question, supra, at 532-34 (cit-
ing sources); see also id. at 530.32 (describing jurisdiction over federal law claims against
government officials through mandamus writs and habeas corpus proceedings).
253 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 416 (1821) ("[T]he necessity
of uniformity, as well as correctness in expounding the constitution and laws of the Unit-
ed States, would itself suggest the propriety of vesting in some single tribunal the power
of deciding, in the last resort, all cases in which they are involved."); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) (emphasizing "necessity of uniformity of
decisions throughout the whole United States" on federal questions); WILSON'S WORKS,
supra note 75, at 495-96 (explaining that pyramidical judicial structure with final Supreme
Court authority "preserves a uniformity of decision").
254 See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534-35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (assigning top priority to cases arising under Constitution and federal laws because
of "necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws" and need for feder-
al supremacy); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (same).
255 See, e.g., 1 STORY, supra note 91, § 387, at 360 ("[T]he judicial department of the
United States is . . . the final expositor of the constitution, as to all questions of a judi-
cial nature."); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 156 (Davie) ("Without a judiciary, the injunc-
tions of the Constitution may be disobeyed, and the positive regulations neglected or
contravened.").
256 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). See also id. at 179-80
("[T]he framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the gov-
ernment of courts . .. ").
257 The Court first ruled that Secretary of State Madison had violated Marbury's vest-
ed legal right to his commission as a justice of the peace, and declared that ordinarily
mandamus would have been the appropriate remedy to compel Madison to deliver the
commission. Id. at 162-73. The Court held, however, that § 13 of the Act, which granted
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, violated Article III's
provision limiting such original jurisdiction to foreign minister cases and interstate contro-
versies. Id. at 173-76.
258 Id. at 177; see also id. (The Constitution is "superior paramount law."); id. at 176
19941
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
trary to the constitution is not law." 9 Echoing the Convention
delegates,2" Marshall treated judicial review as part of the
Court's expository function in deciding a "case" pursuant to a writ-
ten constitution:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws con-
flict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation
of each ....
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature;
the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply.
28
'
Marshall's extensive (and perhaps unnecessary) 22  discussion of
judicial review as part of the Court's law declaration function in
"cases" undercuts the popular notion that he viewed constitutional
exposition as incidental to dispute resolution.6  Indeed, the
Court conceded that the matter at issue was "trivial,"2 4 never
(The Constitution is the "supreme" authority, establishing "principles... deemed fun-
damental.").
259 Id. at 177; see also id. ("[Ain act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution
is void."); id. at 180 (same).
260 See supra notes 224-25.
261 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78 (emphasis added). See also id. ("[I]f a law
be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a
particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law,
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of
the very essence of judicial duty.").
262 The Court could have avoided constitutional questions by construing § 13 as
conferring authority to issue writs of mandamus only when the Court already had juris-
diction. See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbuiy, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court, 56 U. CI. L. REV. 443, 456-59 (1989).
263 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971) (citing Marbury for proposition
that "[t]he power and duty of the judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional is .. .de-
rived from its responsibility for resolving concrete disputes"); Chayes. Roe supra note 62,
at 1285 (Marbury illustrates that constitutional law was "an outgrowth of the judicial duty
to decide . . . private disputes."). Professor Spann persuasively challenges the prevailing
view. See Spann, supra note 66, at 589-92.
264 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 152 ("This cause may seem trivial at first
view . . . ."). There was technically a "dispute" in that Marbury claimed Madison had vio-
lated his right to the commission-a legal "injury" requiring a judicial remedy. See id. at
163-66, 171. But because the office of justice of the peace was "a sorry little thing," the
claimants "acknowledged that if not for principle, they would hardly be interested in the
job." See James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 241-42 (1992). In short, the
Court viewed its primary function not as resolving the dispute, but rather as declaring
important principles of federal law. Nor did Marshall seem concerned with concrete dis-
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mentioned the words "dispute" or "controversy," and did not dis-
miss for lack of an adverse, sharply-presented controversy even
though Madison refused to appear."s Furthermore, Marbuy in-
volved mandamus, a public law action requiring no dispute.2" In
short, Marluy illustrates the Court's expository role in- constitu-
tional "Cases."26
Another vital function of federal courts was interpreting fed-
eral statutes."6 Indeed, the Federalists' axiom that judicial power
must be commensurate with that of the political branches 69
putes elsewhere. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377 (1821) ("These
abstract propositions are to be determined .... ).
265 See O'Fallon, supra note 264, at 242-44 (noting that Madison did not appear ei-
ther personally or through counsel).
266 See supra note 172 (discussing English prerogative writ practice). See also Winter,
supra note 24, at 1416 (arguing that Marbury focused on key public rights issue-judicial
power to require executive compliance with the law through mandamus-not private
rights); O'Fallon, supra note 264, at 249 (to similar effect).
267 Professor Engdahl's novel reinterpretation of Marrury conflicts with my analysis
and conclusion. See Engdahl, John Marsha, supra note 7. Engdahl contends that Marshall
articulated a "Jeffersonian" concept of judicial review, whereby the Supreme Court's inde-
pendent determination of a constitutional "question" in a particular judicial "case" gov-
erned that case alone and bound only the immediate parties-not the coordinate govern-
ment branches, which had the right to decide, any constitutional question (including one
already resolved by federal courts) that arose in the course of their work. See id. at 279-
82, 824-33. Thus, Engdahl challenges the orthodoxy that Marbury endorsed the Federalist
"judicial supremacy' theory of judicial review, which held that because of the Supreme
Court's unique competence in constitutional interpretation, its decisions on constitutional
questions were -generally authoritative and binding. Id.
Although Professor Engdahl's ingenious argument has given me pause, I have none-
theless concluded that Marshall in Marbuwy did not intend simply to resolve a legal ques-
tion in a way that bound only the parties to the dispute, but rather consciously estab-
lished general constitutional principles. Furthermore, even assuming Engdahl were correct,
he carefully limits his arguments to Marshall's views from around 1800 to 1803. See id. at
280, 304-33; see also id. at 331 n.171 (conceding that Marshall later may have adopted
Federalist "judicial supremacy" position). Engdahl acknowledges that the Federalist con-
ception dominated in the late 1780s and the early 1790s, and he suggests that Marshall
during this period shared that view. See id. at 282-97 (describing general Federalist posi-
tion); 'id. at 284 n.10 (citing Marshall's arguments about judicial review during ratifica-
tion). It is the time closest to the Framing that is most critical in pinpointing, the
meaning of "Cases" and "Controversies" in Article III.
268 Indeed, jurisdiction over "all cases arising under the Natl. laws" was the only head
of jurisdiction specified by the Convention in its resolution given to the Committee of
Detail. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 46.
269 See, e.g., 1 id. at 147 (Wilson) ("[Tihe Judicial, Legislative, and Executive depart-
ments ought to be commensurate."); id. at 237 n.18 (Wilson's notation appearipg oppo-
site Committee of the Whole's resolution on federal jurisdiction) ("N.B. the Judicial
should be commensurate to the legislative and executive Authority."); id. at 124 (Madi-
son) ("An effective Judiciary establishment commerisurate to the legislative authority, was
essential. A Government without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk
of a body without arms or legs to act or move."); Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
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makes no sense unless they viewed federal courts as final exposi-
tors of federal law, not mere dispute resolvers.7 Finally, only
federal judges had the competence to interpret treaties definitively
in light of the law of nationsY'
(b) Admiralty/Maritime.-As admiralty had been one of the few
areas of national judicial concern during colonial, revolutionary,
and Confederation times,272 Article III's extension of judicial
power to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" gener-
ated virtually no opposition.2 ' Federal courts have always con-
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 809 (1824) (The aim of the judiciary article in extending juris-
diction over all cases was to "make it co-extensive with the power of legislation . . . not
to limit and restrain."); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 384 (1821) ("[T]he
judicial power . . . must be co-extensive with the legislative, and must be capable of de-
ciding every judicial question which grows out of the constitution and laws."). See also
Amar, Neo-Federalis supra note 7, at 231-34, 251-52 (discussing coextensiveness principle).
Numerous members of the First Congress endorsed this principle in debates over the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789. See Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 77, at 1563-64 (citing sources).
270 Marshall's broad vision of judicial power over statutory federal question cases was
illustrated in Osborn, which upheld "arising under" jurisdiction where federal law could
"form[] an ingredient of the original cause" because federal power to execute contracts
might become an issue, even though the case actually involved only state contract law. 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 983-84 (Osborn,
while perhaps necessary at the time to vindicate federal authority, should be sharply re-
stricted because it involves federal courts in purely state law questions.).
271 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (maintaining that America's international honor demands "uniformity" in ju-
dicial interpretation of treaties); WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 166 (emphasizing
that treaties must be honored along with rest of law of nations). See also Owings v.
Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348 (1809) (Marshall, CJ.) (defining "all cases
arising under treaties" to mean those cases growing out of assertion of treaty rights con-
ferred on citizens of two nations); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (Wilson,
J.) (holding that treaty .was supreme law and prevailed over contrary state law).
Indeed, creating federal jurisdiction over treaty cases was a major goal of the Fram-
ers. See supra note 198; see also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 490 (Wilson) (Treaty jurisdic-
tion "show[s] the world that we make the faith of treaties a constitutional part of the
character of the United States; that we secure its performance no longer nominally, for
the judges of the United States will be enabled to carry it into effect .. ").
"Cases" arising under treaties, which primarily involved law declaration, must be
distinguished from "Controversies" concerning foreign countries or citizens, which covered
ordinary state law actions that happened to involve foreigners-for example, British mer-
chants bringing contract actions. See infra notes 291-95. Absent such a distinction, treaty
jurisdiction (which invariably involves a foreign party) would have been redundant.
272 See supra notes 115, 119-20 and accompanying text.
273 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 186 (reprinting Committee of Detail's re-
port including plenary admiralty/maritime jurisdiction, which was left unchanged in final
judiciary article); THE FEDERALIST No: 80, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) ("The most bigotted [sic] idolizers of State authority have not. . . shewn [sic]
a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes."). Even
Antifederalists acknowledged this need and sought to limit inferior court jurisdiction to
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strued this broad jurisdictional grant as authority to develop sub-
stantive admiralty law." A uniform judicial approach 275 was es-
pecially critical because admiralty was considered a branch of the
law of nations" -- a subject within the competence of federal
rather than state courts.2
7
(c) Foreign Minister.-The Convention unanimously approved
judicial power over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
admiralty. See, e.g., Letter from George Mason to Samuel Griffin (Sept. 8, 1789), in 3
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1170 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970); Holt, supra note 7, at
1490-91 (citing proposal to Senate modeled on Mason's idea); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 791-92
(1789); id. at 807 (noting defeat of Tucker's motions to limit lower court jurisdiction to
admiralty); id. at 827-28 (Livermore) (same). See generally Meltzer, supra note 69, at 1578
(describing consensus that federal courts must have admiralty jurisdiction).
274 See DAVID CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 334, 364 (4th ed. 1990). See also id. at 213-14
(citing DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776), as foundation of
federal admiralty law). In DeLovio, Justice Story declared: "The advantages resulting to the
commerce and navigation of the United States, from a uniformity of rules and decisions
in all maritime questions, authorize us to believe that national policy, as well as juridical
logic, require the clause of the constitution to be so construed, as to ... embrace all
those causes, which originally and inherently belonged to the admiralty, before any statut-
able restriction." Id. at 443. See also American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,
545 (1828) ("These cases are as old as navigation itself; and the law admiralty and mari-
time, as it existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise."). See gen-
erally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 892 (summarizing scholarship on development
of admiralty law).
275 See 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1664, at, 532 (stressing need to entrust admiralty
cases "to the national tribunals; since they will be more likely to be there decided upon
large and comprehensive principles, and to receive a more uniform adjudication"); 3
ELUOT, supra note 109, at 532 (Madison); id. at 571 (Randolph). See generally CURRIE,
supra note 274, at 211-12 (summarizing federal interest in uniform admiralty law).
276 See Luke v. Lyde, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617 (1759) (Mansfield, LJ.) ("[M]aritime law
is not the law of a particular country, but the general law of nations."); 12
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 102, at 626-27 (English law considers admiralty as raising issues
of international law.); THE FEDERAUiST No. 80, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) ("[M]aritime causes . . . generally depend upon the laws of nations.");
WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 75, at 279 ("Another branch of the law of nations, which
has also become peculiarly important by the extension of commerce, is the law mari-
time."); 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1664, at 531 (Admiralty cases "raise many questions of
international law. . . ."); id. § 1666 (stressing that admiralty jurisdiction was given to
federal courts because it relates to law of nations and affects diplomacy and foreign com-
merce); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 752, 1076 (Admiralty was considered "a
distinct body of law, quasi-international in character," therefore, it required uniform de-
velopment by federal courts.).
277 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 124 (Wilson) ("[A]dmiralty jurisdiction ought to
be given wholly to the national Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdic-
tion of particular states."). The First Congress granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
in admiralty cases. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77. See also
DUPONCEAU, supra note 90, at 9-12 (claiming that Article III created self-executing federal
admiralty jurisdiction).
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Ministers and Consuls."' 8 This jurisdiction was defined by subject
matter: Any case "affecting" a foreign minister was covered, regard-
less of whether that minister was a party,2 9 because such cases
raised issues of international law20 so delicate that their determi-
nation could be entrusted only to the Supreme Court.2 '
2. Controversies
Federalists understood that federal jurisdiction over Article III
"Controversies" turned solely on the presence of one of six party
configurations listed, regardless of the law involved.2  Indeed,
such controversies were usually governed by state law. For example,
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that "the laws of
the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or stat-
278 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 106, at 186 (Committee of Detail); id. at 431 (citing
Convention's approval of such jurisdiction). See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 490
(Wilson) (Foreign minister jurisdiction was "proper and unexceptionable.").
279 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 855 (1824)
("This court can take Cognizance of all cases 'affecting' foreign ministers; and, therefore,
jurisdiction does not depend on the party named in the record .... In the case of
foreign ministers, it was intended, for reasons which all comprehend, to give the national
Courts jurisdiction over all cases by which they were in any manner affected."); cf. United
States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 467, 469 (1826) (ruling that threat of violence
against foreign minister was not case "affecting" minister, because only defendant and
United States had interest in prosecution and costs of suit). Indeed, unless this jurisdic-
tional grant was inserted because of its important subject matter, it would have been
unnecessary since Article III also provided for jurisdiction where foreigners were parties.
280 English law recognized diplomatic immunity based on international law, which was
part of the law of England. See, e.g., Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 937-38 (1764)
(Mansfield, UJ.); Heathfield v. Chilton, 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 50-51 (1767) (Mansfield, LJ.).
See also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *253 (describing ambassadorial immunity); 4 id.
at *67 (noting that English law adopted law of nations); 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
102, at 368-72 (tracing development of diplomatic immunity in international law).
281 See, e.g., 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1652, at 521 (The rights of foreign dignitaries
are determined by the "law of nations" and involve delicate questions of diplomacy and
peace that would be "unsafe" to submit "to any other, than the highest judicature of the
nation."); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81 (granting Supreme Court
exclusive jurisdiction over all "suits and proceedings" against Ambassadors "not inconsis-
tent with the law of nations").
282 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) ("In the second
class, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties. In this are com-
prehended 'controversies between two or more States,' 'between a State and citizens of
another State,' and 'between a State and foreign states, citizens or subjects.' If these be
the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy. Be it what
it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the Union.");
Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 8, 9 (1799) ("In the second section of the
third article, the constitution contemplates the parties to the controversy, as alone raising
the question of jurisdiction."); id. at 11 (ruling that where federal jurisdiction depends
on alienage or parties' citizenship, it must be set forth in record).
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utes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision .... "11 This scheme promoted
federalism by protecting state power over its law against federal
judicial interference.
Thus, the federal courts' primary role in "Controversies" could
not have been legal exposition (indeed, its determinations on state
law did not bind state courts), but rather was to serve as an inde-
pendent umpire in resolving a dispute.' To ensure that the
quarrel was substantial enough to warrant federal judicial interven-
tion, "controversy" jurisdiction was restricted. For example, Con-
gress imposed minimum dollar thresholds."s Likewise, courts cre-
283 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (commonly known as the Rules
of Decision Act). Section 34 was not limited by its terms to diversity jurisdiction, but
rather seemed to mandate application of state law whenever federal law did not "other-
wise require or provide." See REDISH. supra note 200, at 121; see also id. at 121-22 (argu-
ing that substantive federal common law violates the Act). In certain "Controversies,"
however, the Act may have permitted recourse to non-state law in appropriate circum-
stances. See infra note 305 (describing application of either federal or state law in inter-
state controversies, depending on whether a public or private right was at issue); infra
notes 293-94 (summarizing scholarly debate over whether § 34 always required application
of state law in diversity).
284 See, e.g., Randolph's Repot4 supra note 77, at 130 (characterizing federal judiciary as
"common arbiter" of disputes involving state defendants). As Justice Story explained: "The
constitution has presumed.. . that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies,
and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or
control, the regular administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between States;
between citizens of different States; between citizens claiming grants under different
States; between a State and its citizens, or foreigners, and between citizens and for-
eigners, it enables the parties, under the authority of congress, to have the controversies
heard, tried, and determined before the national tribunals." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816). See also Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383-84 (In state-
party controversies, "the framers of our constitution thought it necessary, for the purpos-
es of justice, to provide a tribunal as superior to influence as possible, in which that
claim might be decided.").
The Constitution's guarantees of independence, which were essential for proper law
declaration, also ensured impartiality in deciding "Controversies." Nonetheless, this goal
could have been achieved by other means-for example, by authorizing Congress to ap-
point prominent legal figures (e.g., former Presidents or Cabinet members) for a certain
term to resolve controversies, except those in which the jurist had a personal interest.
For instance, assuming Madison had served in such capacity in the 1820s, he would have
been permitted to resolve a border dispute between Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
but not between Virginia and Maryland. Such non-Article III arbitrators could have neu-
trally resolved the controversies listed; any declaration of (state) law would have been
incidental and not binding on state courts anyway.
285 For instance, a $500 jurisdictional minimum was set for diversity disputes, which
could only be prosecuted by or against citizens of the state where the suit was brought
and which could be concurrently adjudicated by state courts (with no appeal to the fed-
eral judiciary). See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 11-12, 1 Stat. 73, 78-80. The lack of
an appeal reflects that federal trial courts have the same independence as the Supreme
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ated special qualifications (e.g., the requirement of "complete
diversity")286  and applied a standing-like analysis to certain
"Controversies."287 The limitations placed on all Article III "Con-
troversies" illustrate the secondary importance attached to resolv-
ing these disputes.
(a) United States-Party.-Jurisdiction over "Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party" clarified that the nation-
al government could sue in its own courts in actions governed by
state law,"s thereby assuring an independent forum.289 Such ju-
risdiction was construed narrowly to exclude disputes in which the
United States was a party-defendant." °
(b) Diversity and Alienage.-Jurisdiction over Controversies "be-
tween Citizens of different States" (diversity) and "between a State,
Court and thus can resolve the dispute just as well. See also Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at
336 (Congress distinguished between "first class of cases, [wherein] the jurisdiction is not
limited except by the subject matter" and the second tier, which was "made materially to
depend upon the value in controversy.").
286 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). No similar limitations
were carved into "Cases" jurisdiction until over a century later. See Louisville & Nashville
RE. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (establishing "well-pleaded complaint" rule for feder-
al question jurisdiction).
287 See Winter, supra note 24, at 1420. Winter cites Livingston v. Story, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 351, 414 (1837) (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (referring to "plaintiff's standing" in dis-
senting from dismissal based on plaintiff's failure to plead parties' citizenship to establish
diversity jurisdiction), and Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 73-74 (1867), which
construed Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), as ruling that an Indi-
an tribe was not a "foreign nation" within the jurisdictional statute and that "therefore,
they had no standing in court."
288 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (giving federal district
courts jurisdiction over "suits at common law" [ie., state law] wherein the United States
"shall sue"); id. § 11 (granting circuit courts jurisdiction over "all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity, where . . . the United States are plaintiffs"); RAWt.E, supra
note 87, at 200-04, 254. See also 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1668, at 537 (The United
States as plaintiff can enforce its rights, powers, and contracts in its sovereign capacity,
matters that cannot be left "at the mercy of the states."); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at
490 (Wilson) (Any nation "unavoidably must have" power to sue in its own courts.).
Many scholars have recognized that this grant enabled the United States to sue in federal
court over state law matters. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 274, at 359; Meltzer, supra note
69, at 1583-84 n.49; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 863. Indeed, such jurisdiction
could not have been intended to trigger application of federal law, or else jurisdiction in
"Cases arising under" federal laws would have been superfluous.
289 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) ("Controversies between the nation and its members or citizens, can only be
properly referred to the national tribunals.").
290 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336 (1816).
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or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects"
(alienage) ensured that an impartial federal court-rather than a
dependent, possibly biased state court-would resolve disputes
involving out-of-state or foreign parties," particularly
creditors. 2 In these Controversies, federal courts were to apply
state law, 3 with a few possible exceptions.1 4 The relative unim-
291 See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809)
("However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as
impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that
the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established nation-
al tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between
citizens of different states."); Charles Warren, New Light on the Hist"y of the Federal Judicia-
ty Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 83 (1923) (concluding that sole reason for diversity
was to provide impartial tribunal for non-citizens and foreigners).
292 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 491 (Wilson) ("[Is it not necessary, if we mean to
restore either public or private credit, that foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just
and impartial tribunal to which they may resort?"); 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1685, at
564 (stressing "the value, in promoting credit, of the belief of there being a prompt,
efficient, and impartial administration of justice . . ."); 3 ELuOT, supra note 109, at 533-
35 (Madison) (emphasizing that diversity jurisdiction in impartial national tribunal secures
commercial transactions against "local prejudices"). Of particular concern was the unfair
treatment of foreign (especially British) creditors in state courts. See, e.g., id. at 583 (Mad-
ison) ("[F]oreigners cannot get justice done them in [American] courts, and this has
prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us."). See generally
Holt, supra note 7, at 1473-75 (summarizing goal of diversity and alienage to protect
creditors); John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 22 (1948).
293 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (Rules of decision are "the
laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the Unit-
ed States shall otherwise require or provide . . . ."); see also 3 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at
556-57 (Marshall) (stating that federal courts in diversity must apply only state contract
law). Professor Warren's pathbreaking historical study concluded that § 34 required feder-
al courts sitting in diversity to apply state statutory and common law. See Warren, supra
note 291, at 81-88; see also id. at 88-89 n.85 (citing Brown v. Van Bramm, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 344, 352-56 (1797) (applying Rhode Island law on judgment interest in diversity)
and Sims's Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 456-57 (1799) (applying Pennsylvania
real property law in diversity)). The Supreme Court adopted Warren's view in Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938), and has followed it ever since.
The Act apparently directed application of state law regardless of whether the con-
troversy involved an American or foreign party, unless a treaty provided otherwise. Thus,
an ordinary "controversy" governed by state law that happened to involve a foreigner
must be distinguished from a "case" arising under a treaty that would entail application
of federal or international law. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 478 (Randolph)
("The British debts, which are withheld contrary to treaty, ought to be paid. Not only
the law of nations, but justice and honor, require that they be punctually discharged.").
As a practical matter, however, an unjust sentence under state law against a foreigner
might implicate international law or treaty rights, so Article III took the safest course by
entrusting all actions involving foreigners to the national tribunals. See THF FEDERAJST
No. 80, at 535-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The Act reflected
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portance of such jurisdiction is reflected in the Framers' tepid
defense of it295 and the many judicial restrictions placed on it."6
the same conservative approach.
294 See, e.g., supra note 293 (Controversies involving foreign parties might implicate
international law.). Indeed, a few scholars have questioned the Warren/Eie historical
account. For example, Professor Fletcher acknowledges that § 34 directed federal courts
to apply state ("local") law in certain cases (e.g., real property) and federal law where it
so required or provided, but he argues that § 34 did not bar application of a third type
of law-a "general" common law shared by all the states and developed by both the state
and federal courts-where appropriate, particularly in commercial matters. See William A.
Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1514-25, 1527-29, 1531-38 (1984). See also Patrick
J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, The Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New
World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 86-115 (1993) (Because one aim of diver-
sity jurisdiction was to protect against discriminatory state laws, federal courts had power
to substitute substantive rules in general areas like commercial law.). Professor Ritz goes
much further. He contends that § 34's phrase "laws of the several states" referred to the
states collectively rather than individually and was probably intended to allow federal
courts to apply an American (as opposed to English) common law of crimes until Con-
gress had time to enact a criminal code. See RITZ, supra note 77, at 10-11, 25, 78-79, 126-
48.
This scholarship indicates that, at least in certain diversity controversies (such as
those involving commercial transactions), federal courts had some law declaration role.
Nonetheless, it still seems that their primary purpose was neutral dispute resolution. See
supra notes 291-92. For example, in defending diversity and alienage jurisdiction, James
Wilson first emphasized that such controversies could be brought in state court (presum-
ably under state law), but gave parties the option of choosing a federal court where nec-
essary to ensure a "just and impartial tribunal." 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 491. Next,
anticipating § 34's language that state law would not apply where federal law so required
or provided, Wilson noted that the new Constitution would prohibit many state debtor
relief laws. Id. at 491-92. (Presumably, he was referring to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1) and the Contracts Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10, cl. 1)). Finally, Wilson implied that federal courts could decline to apply state laws
that were unfair but not unconstitutional. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 492.
On balance, the evidence suggests that in diversity controversies federal courts
would act principally as neutral dispute resolvers and would apply state law as determined
by state courts, but with some discretion to fashion federal rules in commercial matters.
295 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 491 (Wilson) ("This part of the jurisdiction
[i.e., diversity and alienage], I presume, will occasion more doubt than any other
part . . . ."); id. at 533 (Madison) ("As to its cognizance of disputes between citizens of
different states, I will not say it is a matter of much importance."); id. at 549
(Pendleton) ("[J]urisdiction . . . in disputes between citizens of different states ...
might be left to the state tribunals . . . ."); 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1684, at 561
("[T]he necessity of this power may not stand upon grounds quite as strong" as other
bases of jurisdiction.).
Furthermore, the provision allowing foreign states to be parties in "Controversies"
was construed narrowly as allowing them to sue in federal court, but not to be sued as
defendants absent their consent. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 533 (Madison); id.
at 557 (Marshall); 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1693, at 570.
296 For limitations on diversity, see Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806) (holding that diversity of citizenship must be "complete"); Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85-86 (1809) (A bank corporation chartered by
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(c) State and Citizens of Another State.-This jurisdictional grant
appeared to be an afterthought.. and was inserted to protect
states from bias by courts of other states." s Such "Controversies"
Congress was not a "citizen" entitled to sue in diversity.); Shedden v. Custis, 21 F. Cas.
1218 (C.C.D. Va. 1793) (No. 12,736) (Jay, CJ.) (The Court lacked jurisdiction "on ac-
count of the disability of the person" because plaintiff failed to plead that he was a citi-
zen of a different state.). For restrictions on alienage jurisdiction, see Hodgson v.
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809) (ruling that alienage provision does not in-
clude jurisdiction based solely on foreign status of one party); Mossman v. Higginson, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) ("Neither the constitution, nor the act of congress, regard,
on this point [i.e., "alienage jurisdiction], the subject of the suit, but the parties. A de-
scription of the parties is therefore indispensable to the exercise of jurisdiction. There is
here no such description . . . "; therefore, the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.).
These judicial restrictions on diversity and alienage jurisdiction, coupled with the
Federalists' weak defense of it during Ratification, undercut Professor, Holt's argument
that contemporary figures considered these two heads of jurisdiction to be the most im-
portant. See Holt, supra note 7, at 1425-26, 1458. Although Holt's exhaustive research es-
tablishes that diversity and alienage were more significant in 1789 than they are today, it
does not necessarily follow that the Framers regarded such jurisdiction as more critical
than all the other types listed in Article M. As a textual matter, the judiciary article
places diversity and alienage at the end of its jurisdictional catalogue, and it extends
jurisdiction only to some of these "Controversies'--as opposed to "all" federal question,
admiralty, and foreign minister "Cases." Furthermore, the Convention records do not
indicate the primacy of these two grants. For example, diversity jurisdiction was men-
tioned in Randolph's Plan alone, and only incompletely, see 1 FARRAND, supra note 106.
at 22, and neither diversity nor alienage were major topics of debate, except insofar as
they related to the more general discussion of state court bias. Moreover, Congress con-
templated deleting such jurisdiction by constitutional amendment. See Warren, supra note
291, at 119-20. Finally, none of the major early Supreme Court jurisdictional deci-
sions-Chisholm, Marbury, Cohens, Martin, or Osborn-dealt with diversity or alienage, and
the Court nowhere else indicated that they were of special importance.
Admittedly, a contrary conclusion might be drawn from the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which seemingly vested federal courts with general diversity jurisdiction but not plenary
federal question jurisdiction. See Holt, supra note 7, at 1423. Recent scholarship, however,
suggests that the statute did in fact confer the latter jurisdiction. See Engdahl, Federal
Question, supra note 252. Moreover, as described above, the Act placed pecuniary limits
on diversity and alienage controversies, 'but not on federal question "Cases," thereby sug-
gesting the lesser importance of the former. In any event, as Professor Holt concedes
(indeed, emphasizes), the Act did not faithfully track Article In's language, so it may not
have accurately reflected the Framers' design. See generally supra note 77 (citing Holt and
other sources).
Finally, my thesis ultimately does not depend on the relative importance of the
individual bases of jurisdiction in Article III. Rather, it rests on the premise that the pri-
mary federal judicial fu'nction in "Cases" was different from that in "Controversies."
297 No Convention plan mentioned this jurisdiction. Randolph referred to "cases in
which . . . citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested." See 1
FARRAND, supra note 106, at 22. That provision, however, did not include suits brought
by states as plaintiffs. This category was first mentioned in the Randolph/Rutledge draft
in the Committee of Detail. See 2 id. at 147.
298 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419, 475-76 (1793) (Jay, C.J.).
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required neutral dispute resolution,2" not federal law exposition,
because they primarily involved state law issues. For example,
Chisholm v. Georgia"  upheld federal jurisdiction over a state con-
tract law suit by South Carolina citizens against Georgia on the
ground that Article III applied to the controversy because it was
"between a State and Citizens of another State."3"' Although the
Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm by barring such suits
where states were defendants (yet another limitation on "Contro-
versies" jurisdiction),"02 it left unchanged the federal courts' key
role as neutral umpires in claims brought by states.
299 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 491 (Wilson) ("Impartiality is the leading
feature in this Constitution .... When a citizen has a controversy with another state,
there ought to be a tribunal where both parties may stand on a just and equal foot-
ing."); 3 STORY, supra note 91, § 1690, at 567 (Neutrality explains "designating the feder-
al courts, as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies between different
states and their citizens.").
300 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
301 Id. at 466 (Wilson, J.) (ruling that jurisdiction rested on "explicit declaration of
the Constitution"); see also id. at 466-67 (Cushing, J.); id. at 450 (Blair, J.). See also 3
ELLIOT, supra note 109, at 573 (Randolph) (same).
302 The Eleventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[tihe Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State . .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Professor Amar's reading of Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment reinforces my
theme that "Controversies" principally involved state law matters. Amar argues that the
key issue in Chisholm was not Georgia's amenability to suit in a jurisdictional sense, but
rather the substantive law applicable in a controversy "between a State and Citizens of
another State" that arose entirely under state contract law. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sover-
eignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1467-73 (1987). According to Amar, the Chisholm
majority held that the jurisdictional grant over state-citizen controversies implied the pow-
er to develop a federal common law of contracts, and the Court fashioned a rule of
assumpsit liability against states. Id. at 1469-71. In contrast, Justice Iredell's dissent reflect-
ed his conviction that the Court should have applied Georgia's substantive common law,
which included state immunity from contract actions. Id. at 1471-73.
Amar further contends that the Eleventh Amendment -simply eliminated from Article
III's jurisdictional menu "Controversies" between non-citizen (and foreign) plaintiffs and
state defendants; the presence of such a party alignment, however, would not deprive a
federal court of jurisdiction based on an independent Article III grant (e.g., federal ques-
tion jurisdiction). Id. at 1474-75. Perhaps the most direct support for Amar's view is
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383-84,
406 (1821). Nonetheless, the Court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) and its
progeny has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as establishing absolute state sovereign
immunity in federal courts, a position that has become increasingly indefensible as a
textual and historical matter. See, e.g., Amar, supra, at 1473-81 (criticizing Hans line of
cases); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to
Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1261, 1262 and nn.7-9 (1989) (citing voluminous recent schol-
arship rejecting traditional view of Eleventh Amendment). Professor Fletcher succinctly
summarizes the current debate over the Eleventh Amendment, which I do not purport to
enter here.
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(d) State v. State and Land Grant.-Controversies "between two
or more States" and "between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States" involved little significant
judicial exposition, as evidenced by the Framers' near-decision to
entrust these two jurisdictional areas to legislative resolution."0 3
Jurisdiction was eventually vested in federal courts because their
independence ensured the most neutral arbitration."0 4 Both juris-
dictional grants apparently contemplated that federal courts would
apply state law to some disputes and federal law to others."0 5
In sum, jurisdiction over "Controversies" potentially existed
whenever the parties fit one of the six configurations listed in Arti-
cle III. Nonetheless, such jurisdiction was restricted by every con-
ceivable means-statute, judicial interpretation, and constitutional
amendment-thereby suggesting its secondary importance. Federal
courts also served a less significant function in "Controversies" as
impartial umpires, with a very limited (and often nonexistent) role
as expositors of federal law.
303 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
304 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. Land grant jurisdiction was "intended
to secure an impartial tribunal for the decision of causes arising from the grants of dif-
ferent states; and it supposed, that a state tribunal might not stand indifferent in a con-
troversy where the claims of its own sovereign were in conflict with those of another
sovereign." Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 322 (1815); see also 3 STO-
RY, supra note 91, § 1690, at 567-68 (same). Inclusion of interstate controversies ensured
that "the decision will be impartially made according to the principles of justice, and all
the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality, by confid-
ing it to the highest judicial tribunal." See id. § 1675, at 545 (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
39 (James Madison)); cf. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 639 (1892) ("At the time
of the adoption of the Constitution, there existed . . . controversies between eleven
States .... [This situation resulted in] [t]he necessity for the creation of some tribunal
for the settlement of these and like controversies that might arise . . ").
305 See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 737 (1838) (Federal
courts have the power to act according to "national or municipal jurisprudence" in inter-
state and land grant c6ntroversies.). Interstate controversies often involve private law is-
sues governed by state contract, tort, and estate law. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 37, at 318. Nonetheless, in public law actions (e.g., water law under interstate com-
pacts), federal courts have developed federal common law out of state common law,
federal law, and international law. See id. at 318-22, 884.
Professor Pfander argues that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction includes all
federal question "Cases" to which a state is a party. Pfander, supra note 69; see also infra
note 334 (examining this thesis in detail). If so, then an interstate dispute involving a
federal question is really an Article III "Case" in which federal judicial exposition is unex-
ceptionable.
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E. What "Cases" and "Controversies" Did Not Mean:
The Federalist Approach to 'justiciability"
The foregoing analysis of eighteenth and nineteenth century
sources reveals that "case" and "controversy" had different mean-
ings related to judicial functions. Interestingly, no contemporary
American legal figure ever suggested that Article III's reference to
"Cases" and "Controversies" was intended as a constitutional limi-
tation on federal jurisdiction. Most importantly, the early Supreme
Court never interpreted Article III's language that way in its dis-
cussions of 'justiciability" concepts.
Although the Court broadly construed its 'Judicial Power" to
declare and enforce national law in "all Cases,""°6 it recognized
that certain legal questions were inappropriate for judicial resolu-
tion. This determination was not, however, a threshold Article III
jurisdictional inquiry dictated by the words "Cases" and "Contro-
versies." Rather, the Court could decline to exercise jurisdiction it
admittedly possessed if, after examining the merits, it concluded
that rendering a decision would not be a proper exercise of "judi-
cial" power in a system of separated powers because doing so
would encroach upon the constitutional rights and duties of the
legislative and/or executive branches. This prudential balancing of
competing constitutional considerations characterized the Court's
treatment of political questions and advisory opinions, the two
original justiciability doctrines.
The bar against deciding political questions, first articulated in
Marbury v. Madison,"' has always rested squarely on separation of
306 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, CJ.)
("We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitu-
tion."); MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 239, at 210 ("On a judicial question, then, the
judicial department is the government, and can alone exercise the judicial power of the
United States.").
307 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions in their nature political ... can
never be made in this court."). Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the Court could
not investigate the President's exercise of political powers committed to his sole discre-
tion by the Constitution. Id.; see also id. at 165-66. While Marshall recognized the "dif-
ficulty" in distinguishing such political questions from judicially examinable matters involv-
ing ministerial executive functions, he asserted that a judicial remedy was always available
to a person whose rights had been violated by an executive official's refusal to perform a
duty directed by the legislature. Id. at 164-65.
Although full analysis of the vision of separation of powers held by Marshall and
other Federalists would be impossible here, a few basic points are helpful. The Constitu-
tional Convention shifted the introduction in Article III, sections 1 and 2 from "the Juris-
[Vol. 69:3
ARTICLE III'S CASE/CONTROVERSY DISTINCTION
powers."' 5 Of greater immediate significance, however, are the
Jay Court's "advisory opinion" decisions, which Justice Frankfurter
seized upon as the primary historical basis for the constitutional
"case or controversy" requirement."° Contrary to current under-
standing, the early Supreme Court never decisively rejected the
prevailing eighteenth century view that "Cases" included advisory
opinions-i.e., answers to legal questions submitted to the Court
by the government in a non-adversarial setting2 I° Rather, the Jus-
diction of the Supreme Court" to "the Judicial Power of the United States." 2 FARRAND,
supra note 106, at 425. This change meant that, like the "Legislative Power" (U.S. CONsT.
art. 1, § 1) and the "Executive Power" (id. art. 2, § 1), the "judicial Power" came directly
from the Constitution and was commensurate with political branch power. In Hamilton's
classic description, the legislature "prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of
every citizen are to be regulated;" the president is "the sword of the community," while
the judiciary "from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution, because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or
injure them . . . . The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the
purse .. .and can take no active resolution whatever.. . and must ultimately depend
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." See THE FED-
ERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (restricting each branch to area of functional special-
ization prevents any department from amassing excessive power). The Framers envisioned
.a law declaring role for federal courts, but warned against a potentially "oppressive" judi-
ciary exercising legislative and executive functions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
326 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
As total separation was impossible, however, the Framers' goal was to give each
branch the constitutional independence, tools, and motives to prevent encroachments. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 36, 46 (James Madison), No. 50 (James Madison or Alexander
Hamilton). The constitutional system of checks and balances presupposed certain sharing
of functions and depicted federal courts as mediators between the people and the politi-
cal branches. See generally Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 681-706 (1978).
308 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a po-
litical question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."). Although Baker
greatly expanded Marbujy's political question doctrine, it retained the idea that political
questions were not a threshold jurisdictional barrier, but rather a basis for federal courts
to decline to exercise jurisdiction -they otherwise had if they determined that a legal issue
should be resolved by the political branches. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at
293-94 (arguing that political question doctrine gives Court discretion to avoid issues
within its jurisdiction).
Unfortunately, the "Cases" and "Controversies" language has gradually crept in,
thereby clouding analysis. See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415,
1424-26 (1992). Since 1962, the Court has shown a greater inclination to resolve seeming-
ly "political" questions if necessary to fulfill its role as the ultimate constitutional inter-
preter. See, e.g., id. at 1425 (holding that federal statute apportioning congressional repre-
sentatives is not a "political question"); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385
(1990); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
309 See Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent,
1988 Wis. L REv. 527, 541-46.
310 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
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tices merely clarified that a 'Judicial" opinion in a "case" had to
be both final (i.e., non-reviewable by the political branches) and
public.
The finality requirement was established in Haybum's Case,"
which involved an Act of Congress that required federal circuit
court judges to serve as commissioners in determining veterans'
pension applications and permitted the Secretary of War and Con-
gress to revise such decisions."' Five Justices, sitting on three dif-
ferent circuit courts, informed President Washington 3 " that the
statute offended separation of powers314 by subjecting federal
court decisions to political branch revision, thereby violating Arti-
cle III's limitation that such courts must independently exercise
'judiciaf" power-the essence of which was the authority to render
final judgments."5 Nonetheless, two circuit courts suggested that
they could act as "commissioners" rather than "judges.""6 Howev-
311 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
312 See Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243. By. passing this statute, Congress
and President Washington manifested their understanding that federal courts could consti-
tutionally serve in such an advisory capacity. See Rrrz, supra note 77, at 90-91.
313 The judges' letters to Washington were reprinted in footnote (a) to the Court's
opinion. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.(a).
314 All three opinions were based explicitly on separation of powers. The United
States Circuit Court for the District of New York, consisting of Chief Justice Jay, Justice
Cushing, and District Judge Duane, began its opinion by emphasizing "[t]hat by the
constitution of the United States, the government thereof is divided into three distinct
and independent branches, and that it is the duty of each to abstain from, and to op-
pose, encroachments on either." Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.(a). Similarly,
the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina, composed of Justice Iredell and Dis-
trict Judge Sitgreaves, initially observed "[t]hat the legislative, executive and judicial de-
partments are each formed in a separate and independent manner, and that the ultimate
basis of each is the constitution only, within the limits of which each department can
alone justify any act of authority."). Id. at 412 n.(a). Finally, the Pennsylvania circuit
court, consisting of Justices Wilson and Blair and District Judge Peters, stressed that "the
judicial should be distinct from, and independent of, the legislative department." Id. at
411 n.(a).
315 The Pennsylvania circuit court, emphasizing that Article III granted only "judicial
power" and vested that power solely in federal "courts," concluded that the statute un-
constitutionally required nonjudicial activities; the court rejected political branch "revision
and control" of its judgments as "radically inconsistent with the independence of that
judicial power which is vested in the courts." Id. at 411 n.(a). Likewise, the North Caroli-
na circuit court found that the act was contrary to Article III's grant of "judicial power"
because "the decision of the court [was] not made final." Id. at 412-13 n.(a). See also id.
at 410 n.(a) (opinion of New York circuit court) (The Act assigns courts nonjudicial
duties because it subjects their decisions to political branch revision.).
316 Justice Iredell expressed "some doubts as to the propriety of giving an opinion in
a case which has not yet come regularly and judicially before us," but was willing to make
"an exception to the general rule" because of possible hardship to veterans. Id. at 414
n.(a) (emphasis added); see also id. at 410 n.(a) (opinion of New York circuit court) (to
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er, the Pennsylvania circuit court, which included Justice James
Wilson, refused to proceed as either judges or commissioners on
the pension application of Hayburn, a veteran.317
Attorney General Randolph thereupon petitioned the Su-
preme Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Pennsyl-
vania court to act.315 Mandamus was denied because the Court
deadlocked three to three on the narrow procedural issue of
whether, as Randolph asserted, he had the right to file the peti-
tion ex officio (i.e., in his capacity as Attorney General) without the
President's specific approval. 19  If Washington had given
Randolph such express authorization, the Court apparently would
have allowed Randolph to go forward, even though he had no
personal interest in the case, either as an individual or as a repre-
sentative of the United States (which was not a party),320 Instead
of seeking such approval, however, Randolph immediately changed
his approach and asserted he was proceeding on behalf of
Hayburn. 21  Rather than dismissing Randolph's action as
nonjusticiable,11 however, the Court considered "the merits of
the case," then held it "under advisement, until the next
term."s" The Court never issued a decision because Congress
swiftly passed a new veterans' pension act that did not require
federal court determinations. 24
In short, the Court indicated that an Article III "Case" could
include a legal question raised by the Attorney General on behalf
of either the government (with presidential approval) or a third
similar effect). Such willingness to serve as commissioners demonstrated a broad concep-
tion of the possible functions that judges could perform. That these two circuit courts
wrote opinion letters before receiving any veterans' petitions also shows a flexible view of
appropriate contexts for rendering opinions. See Marcus & Teir, supra note 309, at 534.
But see Engdahl, John Marshall supra note 7, at 288 n.18 (noting that Supreme Court, in
unpublished 1794 decisions, reversed judgments of circuit courts sitting as commissioners).
317 See Marcus & Teir, supra note 309, at 533.
318 Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409.
319 See id. Based on their examination of voluminous (and often overlooked) histori-
cal evidence, Marcus and Teir have argued persuasively that this was the sole issue actual-
ly decided. See Marcus & Teir, supra note 309, at 534-39.
320 Id. at 540; see also id. at 544 (The Court "seemed willing to hear cases in which
there were not two well-defined adverse parties, so long as the President wanted the
Court to decide an issue.").
321 Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 409.
322 See Winter, supra note 24, at 1400-01.
323 Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409.
324 Id. at 409-10. See Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324. See genera!y Marcus &
Teir, supra note 309, at 539.
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party (Hayburn), despite Randolph's lack of an individualized
injury and the absence of a dispute between adverse parties.
Randolph's remarkably flexible understanding of what constituted
a "case" is especially critical because he was a key draftsman of
Article III." Properly understood, Hayburn's Case contradicts
rather than supports the modern Supreme Court's "case or con-
troversy" requirement.326
Equally misguided is the frequent citation of Hayburn's Case as
banning advisory opinions, because all the Justices rendered such
opinions in their purest form-advice on a legal issue (the consti-
tutionality of a federal statute) in private letters to the Presi-
dent." 7 Nonetheless, this early practice 28 was soon abandoned.
In 1793, the Court decided against privately advising the President
on legal questions related to a treaty because of the
lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three
departments of the government. These being in certain re-
spects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a
court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong
arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding
the questions alluded to, especially as the power given by the
Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of de-
partments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as
expressly united to the executive departments."
In other words, under the Constitution's allocation of governmen-
tal power, the Court could not issue a decision on legal questions
"extra-judicially" (i.e., in the form of a private opinion letter to the
President);3. only the executive branch "heads of departments"
could give such private advice. The Court was limited to 'judicial"
determinations on legal issues: The expository function could be
325 See supra notes 191 and 202-03 and accompanying text.
326 See Marcus & Teir, supra note 309, at 539-46 (discussing Court's reliance on
Hayburn's Case as historical support for justiciability).
327 See id. at 534.
328 The Court apparently had written such opinion letters before. See HART & WECHS-
LER, supra note 37, at 69 (In 1790, Chief Justice Jay and other Justices advised Washing-
ton in writing that the statute requiring the Justices to ride circuit was unconstitutional,
although it is unknown if this letter was ever sent.).
329 Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Au-
gust 8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488-89 (Henry
P. Johnston ed., 1890-93). My analysis of this Letter reflects the keen insights of Akhil
Amar.
330 Cf. Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. Cr.
REV. 123, 158 (The Justices' Letter reflects their attempt "to deemphasize the obligatory
extrajudicial service concept, so widely held in the early period.").
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exercised solely in a public judicial proceeding, culminating in a
published opinion."' The Court nowhere indicated any constitu-
tional problem with traditional advisory opinions-judicial declara-
tions made in open court on legal questions submitted by the gov-
ernment even though no private bilateral dispute existed.3 2
In sum, neither Haybum's Case nor the "Letter from the Justic-
es" established a ban on advisory opinions. The limitations on
federal judicial power identified in the early advisory opinion and
political question decisions rested explicitly on separation of pow-
ers grounds, not on any notion that Article III's "Cases" and "Con-
troversies" language imposed a jurisdictional barrier. -3
331 In the words of Francis Bacon: "[Llet the judges give the reasons of their deci-
sion, and that openly and in full court; so that what is free in point of power may yet
be restrained by regard to character and reputation." BACON, supra note 140, at 95. See
also 12 HoLDswORTH, supra note 102, at 250 (requiring judges to state reasons for de-
cisions publicly ensures judicial honesty).
332 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. This interpretation is strengthened
by the fact that in Hayburn's Case, "not one of the justices doubted the executive
branch's power to bring before the Court a question of concern to the government." See
Marcus & Teir, supra note 309, at 545 n.114. Therefore, the questions about the treaty
provisions might have been decided if Washington had docketed the case in the Su-
preme Court. Such a filing might have made the matter a "case," especially if accompa-
nied by notice to interested parties and opportunities for competing legal arguments to
be made. Alternatively, however, the Justices' reference to "our being judges of a court
in the last resort" might be construed as an attempt to strengthen the expository func-
tion by prohibiting federal courts from interpreting a law or treaty that might later come
before them. Indeed, this is precisely why the Convention (whose delegates included
most of the original Justices) had rejected a proposed Council of Revision. See supra
notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
333 The longevity of the Court's traditional approach is illustrated by two aspects of
Justice Brandeis' jurisprudence. First, he endorsed John Marshall's definition of "case" as
a legal question presented in proper form. See, e.g., Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568,
577 (1926). See generally Winter, supra note 24, at 1395 (citing Supreme Court cases to
similar effect from 1887, 1911, and 1923). See also supra notes 134-35 and accompanying
text. Second, Brandeis characterized justiciability as a matter of judicial prudence in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).
The Court historically viewed its primary function in "Cases" as exposition of federal
law, and it often adjudicated cases involving no individualized dispute. For example, from
the beginning Congress has enacted many "informer" statutes, which the Court has rou-
tinely upheld without mentioning any jurisdictional problem. See Winter, supra note 24, at
1407-09. Similarly, citizens who had suffered no private injury could enforce public duties
through mandamus. See id. at 1404-05.
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III. THE CASE/CONTROVERSY DISTINCTION AND THE DUAL
FUNCTIONS OF FEDERAL COURTS: A BIFURCATED
APPROACH TO JUSTICIABILITY
Although the case/controversy distinction has many possible
implications for federal jurisdiction," the most important is that
334 For example, the case/controversy distinction may affect pendent jurisdiction and
abstention. I hope to analyze such issues in future essays.
Nonetheless, I feel obligated to address here certain ramifications of the distinction
for the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Article III, section 2, clause 2 (the so-called "dis-
tribution" clause) provides:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
At first glance, this provision appears to reflect a careless omission of any mention of the
"Controversies" listed in section 2, clause 1 (the jurisdictional catalogue). See Redish, supra
note 247, at 1640 n.28. Assuming such linguistic imprecision exists, the meaning of clause
1 would have to be determined by analyzing its language and structure (especially its
specific and repeated distinction between "Cases" and "Controversies"), which cannot be
ignored because of an inconsistent cross-reference in the distribution clause. Closer analy-
sis, however, reveals that the two provisions may be reconciled.
Under a strict application of my theory, the first sentence of the distribution clause
would mean that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over foreign minister "Cas-
es" and "those [Controversies] in which a State shall be a party." Indeed, that is precisely
how many Federalists, the first Congress, the early Court, and nearly all succeeding jurists
and scholars have interpreted the original jurisdiction clause, limiting its scope to those
state-party "Controversies" listed in the previous jurisdictional menu. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT,
supra note 109, at 549 (Pendleton) (The Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction over
.controversies to which a state shall be a party."); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1
Stat. 73, 80 (providing that "the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party," with certain exceptions); Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.); HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 37, at 303-04 (describing orthodox view).
This traditional construction, however, appears to conflict with the most natural
grammatical reading of the clause, which is that "those" refers to the antecedent noun
"Cases." This linguistic puzzle is neatly explained by Professor Pfander, who argues that
the Framers used the word "Cases" deliberately to encompass those matters so designated
in the jurisdictional menu-federal question and admiralty "Cases." See Pfander, supra
note 69, ch. V. This textual argument supports Pfander's theme that the Framers intend-
ed to confer on the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over all federal question and
admiralty "Cases" in which a state was a party-defendant to assure state compliance with
federal law. Pfander also contends that the original jurisdiction clause included clause I
"Controversies" in which a state was a party. He maintains that "Cases" was used as short-
hand for both "Cases" and "Controversies" because the word "Cases" was more inclusive
than "Controversies," which was limited to civil matters. See id. ch. V.B.1.; see generally
supra note 69 and accompanying text. Another possible explanation for the broader
meaning of "Cases" is that, in the 18th century, both "Cases" and "Controversies were
brought originally in a "cause of action," a phrase sometimes shortened to "cause" or
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it suggests the need for a fresh, two-tiered approach to justiciabili-
ty." The phrase "Cases and Controversies" provides little consti-
tutional support for the justiciability doctrines as currently formu-
lated. The Court's basic problem lies in applying these doc-
trines-and their underlying dispute resolution model of adjudica-
tion-exclusively to "Cases" (especially those arising under the
Constitution), which primarily involve federal law declaration.
Conversely, justiciability doctrines are not used where they would
make the most sense: to limit the "Controversies" (i.e., disputes)
federal courts must resolve.
Therefore, as to Article III "Cases," the law of standing, ripe-
ness, and mootness must be radically reoriented to account for
the federal judiciary's expository function. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that justiciability and dispute resolution must be
rejected wholesale as inappropriate for federal judges, as many
critics have urged. 7 Rather, federal courts may legitimately apply
justiciability and related concepts to "Controversies."
A. "Controversies, "Justiciability, and Other Limitations
Article III's extension of judicial power to "Controversies", pro-
vides two textual bases for employing justiciability and other re-
strictive rules. First, because "Controversies" are disputes, federal
courts may appropriately apply to them the justiciability doctrines,
which focus on the existence of a live, concrete dispute requiring
judicial resolution.sss Moreover, as "Controversies" jurisdiction is
based solely on party status, courts can insist that the parties be
truly adverse-a key concern of justiciability. 9 Second, Article III
extends judicial power to "all Cases" but not 0/11 "Controversies."
"case." See supra notes 134, 183, and 241.
As to the appellate jurisdiction clause, Professor Redish has argued that its refer-
ence to "all other Cases before mentioned" is careless in light of the jurisdictional
catalogue's reference to both "Cases" and "Controversies." See Redish, supra note 247, at
1640 n.28. Again, another plausible explanation is that "Cases" was a broader term than
"Controversies," either because of the civil/criminal distinction or because a matter on
appeal was always called a "case." See supra notes 134 and 241.
335 In this Part, my modest purpose is to sketch in broad outline a bifurcated ap-
proach to justiciability. I am fully aware that many of the ideas presented conflict with
much current Supreme Court doctrine and legal scholarship, which would require thou-
sands of pages to summarize and analyze completely.
336 See supra Part IA.l(b).
337 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 3, .29-31, 36-53 and accompanying text.
339 See id. Such concerns also underlie the ban on collusive suits. See supra note 249.
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The Framers' omission of the word "all" to modify "Controversies"
can be read as giving federal judges discretion as to which "Con-
troversies" they will decide."4
Exercise of such discretion must be guided by the recognition
that "Controversies" fundamentally involve umpiring. Justiciability
standards are merely a starting point to determine whether any
tribunal should intervene: If a court ascertains that there is no live
dispute between genuinely adverse parties, the matter should be
dismissed. 1 Even if a real controversy does exist, however, it
may not absolutely require resolution by an Article III court. Rath-
er, a federal judge might conclude that another decisionmaker
would provide the requisite neutrality, at least in the first in-
stance "--for example, a federal magistrate or a court-appointed
arbitrator.3 43
Indeed, for certain "Controversies" that initial alternative fo-
rum might even be a state court,' if the federal court deter-
340 The omission of "all" may also mean that Congress has discretion as to which
"Controversies" it will assign to federal jurisdiction. See generally Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra
note 7. But while such assignment would appear to compel federal adjudication of any
controversy that falls within the specified statutory/Article III party configurations, the
Court has always felt free to decline to exercise fully its jurisdiction over "Controversies"
(e.g., through the requirement of complete diversity). See supra Part II.D.2.
341 Although I am not familiar with any Supreme Court decisions that address the
applicability of justiciability to "Controversies," I assume that lower federal courts
sometimes dismiss such disputes (e.g., those based on diversity jurisdiction) on justiciability
grounds. See supra note 6.
342 Such initial deferral, with federal court retention of jurisdiction to review the
decision and grant a trial de novo in appropriate circumstances, would minimize constitu-
tional problems related to a party's right to an Article III tribunal. Admittedly, few judges
would be bold enough to order such deferral as a matter of inherent discretion over
"Controversies." See supra note 340 and accompanying text (noting that Article III does
not extend to "all" Controversies). Therefore, such a scheme would almost certainly re-
quire Congressional authorization. See infra note 343 (describing legislative movement in
this direction).
343 Although this suggestion may appear radical, the Judicial Improvements and Ac-
cess to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 StaL) 4642 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), permits mandatory court-annexed arbitration
of many claims. While the arbitrator's decision is non-binding, a court may make it final
and non-appealable (or impose other sanctions) against a party who fails to participate in
good faith. See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR- A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169, 2182-83 (1993) (de-
scribing various local court rules). Furthermore, a trial de novo must be requested within
30 days of the arbitration decision or it becomes the final, non-appealable judgment of
the court. Id. at 2183-85 (citations omitted). Finally, requests for trial are discouraged by
the requirement of posting a bond, which is forfeited if the requesting party fails to
improve his position at trial. Id. at 2183-84 (citations omitted).
344 Again, I realize that a federal judge would be unlikely to refer a "Controversy" to
a state court where Congress has given plaintiffs the right to choose a federal forum.
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mines that such deferral would be warranted after evaluating three
factors: the strength of the federal interest; the probable bias of
the state tribunal; and the number of such "Controversies" on the.
docket. The first factor provided the rationale in Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemical Corporation,' which involved a controversy "between a
State and Citizens of another State." The Court held that, al-
though it had jurisdiction over Ohio's tort law suit against out-of-
state citizens, it would decline to exercise this jurisdiction:
[T]he evolution of- this Court's responsibilities in the American
legal system has brought matters to a point where much would
be sacrificed, and little gained, by our exercising... jurisdic-
tion over issues bottomed on local law. This Court's paramount
responsibilities to the national system lie almost without excep-
tion in the domain of federal law. As the impact on the social
structure of federal common, statutory, and constitutional law
has expanded, our attention has necessarily been drawn more
and more to such matters. We have no claim to special compe-
tence in dealing with the numerous conflicts between States
and nonresident individuals that raise no serious issues of fed-
eral law.
6
In no "Controversy" is the federal interest more attenuated than
diversity,"'7 wherein federal courts act as arbitrators whose deci-
sions bind only the immediate parties and whose exposition of
state law has no precedential effect."' The weakness of the fed-
Thus, statutory reform would be the preferable course. See supra note 342. But the con-
clusion that federal courts lack any discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction over
"Controversies" cannot be squared with Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493
(1971), discussed infra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
345 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
346 Id. at 497-98. Similar logic supports many modem proposals to redistribute federal
jurisdiction by "increas[ing] the capacity of the federal judicial system for definitive adju-
dication of issues of national law." See HART & WECHSLEt, suPra note 37, at 43-44; see also
REDISH, supra note 200, at 3 (It is "appropriate to provide federal courts the primary re-
sponsibility for adjudicating federal law, and leave as the primary function of state courts
the defining and expounding of state policies and principles."); Bandes, supra note 66, at
281-82, 297 (to similar effect).
347 Although full consideration of diversity jurisdiction and the impact of Erie would
exceed the scope of this Article, Erie is consistent with my overall thesis: In diversity
"Controversies" raising only state law questions, federal courts should yield to state courts
as the primary law declarers. See Amar, Law Story, supra note 33, at 717-18 (citing unpub-
lished manuscript of this Article). But see supra note 294 (challenging orthodox view that
federal courts must always apply state law in diversity).
348 See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 104; Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562,
567 (2nd Cir. 1942) (A federal court in diversity is a "ventriloquist's dummy to the
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eral stake in diversity jurisdiction supports drastically curtailing it,
as do the "bias" and "numerosity" factors. First, as the danger of
state court prejudice is far less today than it was in 1789,"9 fed-
eral judges may justifiably limit diversity jurisdiction to parties who
can show actual bias by the state tribunal. 5 Second, diversity
comprises a quarter of the federal docket,35 1 a percentage grossly
disproportionate to its federal significance. 52
In contrast to "state v. non-citizen" and diversity jurisdiction,
other "Controversies" should almost always be decided by federal
judges. For example, in "state v. state" and land grant disputes,
the national interest in interstate harmony is great, the danger of
state court prejudice is patent, and the number of such suits is
minimal. 53
courts of some particular state.").
349 Many Framers predicted this development. See Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 77, at
1555 (citing Paterson's insight that need for diversity jurisdiction would decrease as in-
terstate commerce increased and national identity developed).
350 See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 238-39 (1948) ("What is needed is a total reconsideration
of the jurisdiction, guided by the principle that federal judicial energy should be pre-
served for vindication of those interests which . ..have become the subject of the feder-
al substantive law . . . .There is ... a solid case for preservation of the jurisdiction in
any instance where a concrete showing of state prejudice can be established."). Wechsler
pointed out, however, that possible state bias did not require diversity jurisdiction; rather,
state appellate courts could address this problem, with Supreme Court review if a party
claimed denial of due process. Id. at 235-36. See also Finley v. United States, 490 U.S.
545, 577 n.34 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'The continued need for exercise of diver-
sity jurisdiction, at least where a showing of prejudice is not made, has been challenged
by respected authorities.'") (citation omitted). Another possible restriction would be to
limit diversity and alienage jurisdiction to their original intended beneficiaries, out-of-state
and foreign creditors. See supra note 292.
351 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 52 (citing 1986 statistics). Recent statis-
tics show a decline to about 23%. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, Table C, at 32 (1991).
352 The foregoing concerns have led Chief Justices Warren and Burger, among oth-
ers, to recommend abolishing diversity jurisdiction. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at
243 (citing sources); see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive
Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L: REV. 963, 1011 (1979) (arguing
that elimination of diversity would reduce complex problems in federal practice); David
L Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Si-vey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L REV. 317, 348-
50 (1977). The American Law Institute has made many proposals to severely restrict di-
versity jurisdiction, one of which Congress nearly adopted. See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 37, at 43. The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (April 2, 1990), is-
sued pursuant to the Federal Courts Study Act, 28 U.S.C. § 331 note, recommended
limiting diversity to suits involving aliens, complex multistate litigation, and interpleader
actions. Id. at 38.
353 For example, in 1986 there was only one controversy within the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction, which includes disputes involving states. See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 37, at 58. Research has revealed no recent land grant controversies.
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In sum, federal courts have an Article III basis for applying
justiciability and other rules of limitation and deferral to "Contro-
versies." By encouraging or requiring that certain "Controversies"
be resolved in other fora (at least in the first instance), federal
judges can conserve their resources and thereby discharge more
effectively their paramount role of law declaration in "Cases."
B. Judicial Power Over Cases, Exposition, and Justiciability
1. "Judicial Power" Over "All Cases" in a Constitutional System of
Separated Powers
Article III provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to
all Cases" involving federal questions, admiralty, and foreign min-
isters. Although this language seemingly compels federal courts to
decide every such "Case," "S they have always reserved the right
to decline jurisdiction upon concluding that other constitutional
provisions require abstention.s This historical separation of pow-
ers approach, which balanced the judicial duty to declare the law
in Article III "Cases" against competing constitutional consider-
ations, is the true constitutional basis of justiciability.'5 6
"United States-party" Controversies raise unique problems. This jurisdiction was origi-
nally intended to permit the national government to sue in its own courts in state law
matters. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text. State court bias against the feder-
al government has decreased, thereby lessening the need for such protection. Nonethe-
less, if the United States chooses to invoke this jurisdiction, the federal court would seem
to have no discretion to force the federal government to go to state court. In any event,
the number of classic United States-party "Controversies" is relatively small. Today, the
principal reason the United States appears as a party is because federal statutes so pro-
vide. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Table C, at 32-33 (1991). Such matters are not really "Controversies" but rather
are "Cases" arising under federal law that require federal court exposition.
354 See supra note 306.
355 See supra Part II.E. Such abstention is "discretionary" not as a matter of intrinsic
equitable power, but only in the sense that it involves weighing conflicting constitutional
dictates. Cf David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L REv. 543 (1985)
(Reasoned judicial discretion is an inherent aspect of jurisdiction (including federal juris-
diction), and federal courts should exercise their discretion according to principles of
equity, federalism, separation of powers, and sound judicial administration.).
356 This historical approach is a far cry from the modem vision that separation of
powers confines federal courts to dispute resolution and prevents citizens from suing to
remedy political branch violations of federal law. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
112 S. Ct. 2130, 2145 (1992) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170
(1803)) (claiming that Court's role is to decide rights of individual disputants, not to
vindicate public interest in government compliance with the law, which is province of
political branches). In fact, Marbury articulated precisely the opposite view, asserting feder-
al judicial authority to enforce the executive branch's obedience to the law. See supra
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The classic model of justiciability thus focused on the proper
exercise of federal "judicial power, "S57 and the appropriate occa-
sions for legal exposition, in our tripartite governmental sys-
tem.358 The fundamental limitation on federal courts has always
been that they exercise "strictly and exclusively judicial" func-
tions, 0 which demands adherence to three restrictions that are
pertinent here."6 First, exposition must be based on the con-
struction of a specific legal text (e.g., a constitutional, statutory, or
treaty provision) to ensure judicial-rather than legisla-
tive-functioning.6 Second, consistent with the idea of "case" as
a written decision serving as precedent,"2 judicial exposition
must be set forth in an opinion that persuasively justifies the
result6 in light of prior cases or explains convincingly why the
established rule should be modified or discarded.31 Third, al-
note 307; see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (Government powers "are defined
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written."); Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People". John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights,
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52 (1985) (Citizens should
have standing to sue over the government's violation of constitutional rights that are held
collectively.).
357 See Fletcher, Case or Controversy, supra note 69, at 267 (contending that Article III's
phrase "judicial power" imposes justiciability requirements on federal courts more directly
than "Cases" and "Controversies" language).
358 Admittedly, some early Court opinions (e.g., Marbury Osborn) can be read as ex-
ceeding those limits.
359 See, e.g., 3 SToRY, supra note 91, § 1777, at 657.
360 I will simply list three traditional restraints on judicial law declaration in cases,
without attempting to grapple fully with their implications for much modern Supreme
Court jurisprudence and legal commentary.
361 This is especially true in constitutional law. There is a difference between inter-
preting a general provision (e.g., the Equal Protection Clause) and a nonexistent one
(e.g., "penumbral" rights). See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 62, at 11 (As judges move further
away from textually specific constitutional provisions (e.g., free speech), the risk of enact-
ing personal preferences into law grows.). This problem also occurs in other areas, such
as statutory interpretation. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (discussing axi-
om that judges cannot make law through creative statutory construction).
362 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. Stare decisis facilitates principled
and consistent lawmaking. See Spann, supra note 66, at 600, 635-36 (maintaining that fed-
eral judges must render decisions through analysis of statutory or constitutional text ac-
cording to precedent).
363 See supra note 331. See also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Consti-
tutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1959) (emphasizing that essential feature of
"judicial" action is that judges give reasoned explanations); Fuller, supra note 62, at 365-
72 (same).
364 Prior cases that include judicial exposition not based on a specific legal text, or
based on a misunderstanding of the Constitution's text (e.g., the words "Cases" and "Con-
troversies") deserve little respect as precedent. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 145, at 762
(The Court should be open to correcting constitutional mistakes because they are so
hard to rectify through constitutional amendment.).
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though judicial "power" includes remedying the declared violation
of a federal right, that remedy cannot exceed "judicial"
bounds3'
Fidelity to these limits on "judicial power" and to the tradi-
tional separation of powers model of justiciability would be clearer
analytically than the current paradigm," which disguises substan-
tive legal and prudential judgments by characterizing justiciability
as an Article III jurisdictional barrier requiring dismissal of cases
that lack a sufficient dispute. 67 A more candid, useful, and his-
torically based approach would be to reformulate the justiciability
doctrines to focus on judicial exposition rather than dispute reso-
lution.
365 Professor Fiss advocates "structural reform," arguing that federal judges have pow-
er to fashion remedies as radical as necessary to vindicate constitutional rights. Fiss, supra
note 62, at 51-52. Although Fiss acknowledges that broad institutional remedies require
courts to assume extensive executive and legislative duties, he accepts this because the al-
ternative-having judges declare rights and rely on political branch cooperation for en-
forcement-is so slow that it perpetuates constitutional injustice. Id. at 57-58.
But judges cannot, in effectuating constitutional values contained in the Amend-
ments (e.g., equality and liberty), ignore the rest of the Constitution-the Article III duty
to exercise "judicial" power only and the structural principle of separation of powers. In-
stitutional remedies must be implemented primarily by the policymaking branches. There-
fore, decrees that entail judicial exercise of uncontrolled legislative, executive, and ad-
ministrative powers should be regarded as presumptively illegitimate. See, e.g., William A.
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE
UJ. 635, 637-49 (1982); Nagel, supra note 307, at 718-23 (Judges must redress constitu-
tional violations with the least possible encroachment into non-judicial areas by deferring
to the political branches where possible, seeking cooperation from the President and
Congress against recalcitrant states, and limiting the duties of appointed "executive" offi-
cers to correcting the violation in cooperation with true executive branch officials.);
Spann, supra note 66, at 647-60 (arguing that court should avoid decision if textual provi-
sion is so vague as not to justify expansive interpretations with specific remedial conse-
quences or if remedy involves deep intrusions into legislative or executive spheres).
Structural reform also weakens the essential judicial function of exposition. To
achieve realistic remedial goals that will meet less political resistance, federal judges often
define constitutional rights more narrowly than they otherwise would. See, e.g., Fletcher,
supra, at 679-91 (describing illustrative cases).
Remedial self-discipline is needed not just in constitutional law, but in all Article m
"Cases." For example, in a case affecting a foreign minister or arising under a treaty, a
court cannot impose a remedy that encroaches on the political branches' constitutional
control over foreign policy.
366 Cf Winter, supra note 24, at 1511-12 (concluding that traditional political question
and advisory, opinion doctrines would cover same issues inadequately addressed by
standing).
367 See generally supra Part I.A.
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2. Shifting the Justiciability Inquiry from Dispute Resolution to
Legal Exposition
(a) Problems with the Dispute Standard.-All the justiciability
doctrines confine federal courts to the resolution of live, concrete
disputes between adverse parties.' But Article III extends "judi-
cial power" to "Cases," not "Cases involving disputes." Nor is there
persuasive evidence that any such constructive limitation was in-
tended. Although many eighteenth century "cases" did feature
disputes, others-particularly public law "Cases" such as those
listed in Article III-did not require a controversy.m Further-
more, for over a century the Supreme Court never intimated that
a bilateral dispute was a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction, and it
decided many important cases involving no real quarrel (e.g., Dred
Scott) 370
Besides being historically questionable, the dispute standard
has three additional flaws. First, it has been applied erratically.
Federal courts often decide cases involving no live controversy
between adverse parties (e.g., antitrust consent decrees;3 71 Roe v.
Wade 72) or trivial injuries,"3 while denying jurisdiction where a
major dispute seemingly exists. 4 Second, the assumption that a
concrete, personalized dispute between adverse parties assures
368 See supra notes 3, 29-31, 36-53 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
370 "[S]ome of the most famous constitutional decisions have come in what now
seem to have been collusive cases." See WRIGHT, supra note 56, at 56 (citing Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810)). See generally supra note 249 (discussing early collusive suits).
371 See 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, AMINISTRATnVE LAW TREATISE 118-19 (1958) (giving as
other examples bankruptcy cases where all parties agree and criminal guilty pleas);
WRIGHT, supra note 56, at 56 (noting federal jurisdiction to render judgment by default,
or in naturalization case where no one challenges alien's petition).
372 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973) (deciding moot case because it was "capable of repe-
tition, yet evading review"). See also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)
(holding that black plaintiff given false information about housing had standing even
though he was a "tester" with no personal interest in obtaining the housing and there-
fore had no dispute with defendant); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (allowing con-
stitutional attack on Federal Election Campaign Act, which had not yet been directly
applied to harm any plaintiffs).
373 See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) ("We have al-
lowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the
outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote; a $5 fine and costs; and a $1.50 poll
tax.") (citations omitted).
374 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (denying black parents' standing to
challenge IRS exemption for segregated private schools).
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better presentation of legal issues,"5 while often correct, is some-
times demonstrably false. 6 Third, even where a genuine conflict
does exist (e.g., Brown's fight with the Board of Education), set-
fling that dispute is incidental' to the Court's essential role of
expounding federal law."
In-short, the Court should deemphasize the dispute require-
ment, which has little basis in Article III's text, history, or policy,
and instead concentrate directly on exposition."7
(b) Justiciability and Exposition of Federal Law.-Current justicia-
bility doctrines should be reformulated to acknowledge that the
federal courts' primary function in "Cases" is the exposition of
constitutional, statutory, admiralty, and international law. The
original definition of "case""9 provides a useful test for justicia-
bility: Has a legal question been appropriately presented, and does
it require federal court determination in a decision that will serve
as precedent? First, a legal issue must be framed clearly enough to
ensure proper exposition. This requires quality lawyering ° and,
usually, a well-developed factual record." Second, the legal
375 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
376 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 50-51; Bandes, supra note 66, at 249-
50 n.146, 256 n.188. For example, a pro se inmate involved in an individualized dispute
with prison officials is unlikely to present legal issues better than a prisoner without
standing who is represented by Alan Dershowitz.
377 See eg., Spann, supra note 66, at 600 ("The judgment disposes of the case before
the court by resolving the dispute between the parties, but it is the exposition of the
opinion that increases society's understanding of the principles involved."). The expository
function is most obviously exercised by the Supreme Court, whose decisions invariably ex-
plicate thorny issues of federal law. The Framers contemplated this role: Article III re-
quires only one tribunal, the Supreme Court, and its jurisdiction is almost entirely appel-
late. Similarly, federal circuit courts exist primarily to declare federal law. By contrast,
federal district courts probably have at'least as important a role in settling disputes as
they do-in interpreting federal law. Thus, my analysis principally applies to federal appel-
late courts.
378 There is no evidence that discarding the dispute requirement would flood federal
courts with litigation. Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 50 ("[I]n light of the high costs
of litigation, one must wonder how large the burden really would be without the current
standing restrictions."). Even if the number of federal question "Cases" did increase, that
could be offset by decreasing the number of "Controversies" heard, See supra Part III.A.
379 See supra Part II.B.2.(a). One element of the traditional definition of
"case"-whether the question had been presented in proper procedural form-should be
treated as a separate matter under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not as part of
justiciability.
380 Federal courts (particularly the Supreme Court) should encourage all interested
parties to participate (e.g., through arihicus briefs) to assure that the legal issues are clear-
ly and fully presented and that the importance of the questions involved can be
evaluated.
381 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 350 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Dis-
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question should be of sufficient importance that federal judicial
exposition-and the corresponding establishment of precedent-is
warranted. Priority should be given to deciding cases that involve
laws with an especially significant impactss or that raise peculiar-
ly difficult legal problems. This two-part test should be applied to
mootness, ripeness, and standing.s3
(i) Mootness.-In Honig, the Court reaffirmed the consti-
tutional basis of mootness,"4 then held it would decide the ad-
mittedly moot case because it was "capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review."s" Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring, rejected the
premise that mootness was based on Article III's "case or contro-
versy" requirement.s"s He argued that if mootness were a constitu-
tional limit on the exercise of judicial power, then the Court
would lack authority to decide any moot case. Thus, only "prag-
matic considerations" could explain the exceptions allowing adjudi-
cation of certain moot cases (e.g., those "capable of repetition, yet
evading review").sS" The Chief Justice proposed a new exception
where the events mooting the case had occurred after the Court
granted certiorari or noted probable jurisdiction,' based on this
policy rationale:
[T]he roughly 150 or 160 cases which we decide each year on
the merits are less than the number of cases warranting review
by us if we are to remain, as Chief Justice Taft said many years
ago, "the last word on every important issue under the Consti-
tution and the statutes of the United States." But these unique
resources-the time spent preparing to decide the case by
missal for mootness was unjustified where there was a "fully developed factual record with
sharply defined and fully canvassed legal issues."). The nature of the factual dispute be-
tween the parties may be one factor relevant to determining whether the legal question
has been clearly and adequately presented. However, it should not be the sole or disposi-
tive consideration. In certain instances, the state of the record (and the factual dispute)
is unimportant-for example, a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.
382 For example, those that significantly alter the status quo. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at
350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Dismissal was unwarranted because "very important constitu-
tional questions" were presented which "concern[ed] vast numbers of people [and] orga-
nizations" and which would "inevitably return to the federal courts .... ").
383 This test highlights important factors related to legal exposition that federal
courts should consider even in "Cases" where a private dispute exists.
384 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988).
385 Id. at 318-20. This exception originated in Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 515-16 (1911).
386 Honig, 484 U.S. at 330 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
387 Id. at 330-31. Another long-standing exception applies where a defendant has vol-
untarily ceased the objectionable activities. Id. at 331.
388 Id. at 331-32.
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reading briefs, hearing oral argument, and conferring-are
squandered in every case in which it becomes apparent after
the decisional process is underway that we may not reach the
question presented. To me the unique and valuable ability of
this Court to decide a case-we are, at present, the only Art.
III court which can decide a federal. question in such a way as
to bind all other courts-is a sufficient reason either to aban-
don the doctrine of mootness altogether in cases which this
Court has decided to review, or at least to relax the doc-
trine ...
Chief Justice Rehnquist's emphasis on the Court's role as defini-
tive expositor of federal law" and on the presentation of legal
issues is the sort of two-pronged analysis that should be applied to
all the justiciability doctrines. 91
(ii) Ripeness.-Until its constitutionalization in the mid-
seventies,"' ripeness doctrine permitted a discretionary determi-
nation based on the fitness of the issues for judicial disposition
and the hardship to the parties of delaying a decision. 9 As
Dean Nichol argues, the "case or controversy" requirement-a
jurisdictional barrier that avoids examining the merits-Lcannot
meaningfully be applied to ripeness, which demands a prudential
evaluation of the substantive legal claim (for example, whether the
legal issues have matured and the factual record has been fully
developed)."' Federal courts should return to the traditional
389 Id. at 332.
390 Cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 208 (contending that. "capable of rep-
etition" exception developed as way to allow Court to declare federal law on important
national legal questions). Historically, courts apparently had some equitable discretion to
decide moot cases if the legal issues raised were of great public interest. See Diamond,
supra note 170, at 138. Recent commentators have recommended a similar approach. See,
e.g., Bandes, supra note 66, at 308-10 (The Court should adjudicate moot cases to the
extent necessary to fulfill its primary function as constitutional guardian, considering
factors such as whether the issue is likely to recur generally.); Lee, supra note 60, at 655-
57 (suggesting that moot cases should be decided if doing so would give meaning to
public values; determination depends on state of facts and whether lawyers are sophisti-
cated and willing enough to make full presentation of issues).
391 Justice Scalia recognized that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion had implications
for other justiciability doctrines. See Honig; 484 U.S. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There
is no more reason to intuit that mootness is merely a prudential doctrine than to intuit
that initial standing is.").
392 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
393 See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-56 (1967).
394 See Nichol, Ripeness, supra note 46, at 155, 158-62, 167-82. Ripeness serves the poli-
cy of avoiding premature judicial intervention into administrative processes, which inher-
ently requires a discretionary.judicial determination. Id. See also HART & WECHSLER, supra
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approach, 95  evaluating whether the legal question has been
clearly presented and whether immediate judicial exposition is re-
quired.
(iii) Standing.-While standing purports to be a threshold
jurisdictional inquiry required by the "case or controversy" lan-
guage, it inevitably involves examination of a plaintiff's legal claim.
Accordingly, Professor Fletcher has argued that standing should
turn on whether the substantive law (e.g., a constitutional or statu-
tory provision) gives the plaintiff a right to a judicial remedy for
the violation of a legal duty, 96 not on whether the, plaintiff can
show an "injury in fact" as evidence of a real dispute. 9 The per-
sonal injury requirement is especially inappropriate in public law
"Cases," which traditionally could be brought by any citizen; 98 in
such cases, standing should depend on the magnitude of the pub-
lic interest in challenging illegal action by government officials.s9
note 37, at 252 (asserting that ripeness really depends on judge's view of merits;
therefore, judges who have few doubts about merits often decide legal question on ab-
stract record); Amar, Law Story, supra note 33, at 718 n.155 ("[R]ipeness obviously turns
on one's conception not of article III, but of the substantive interests asserted.").
395 See Nichol, Ripeness, supra note 46, at 183.
396 See Fletcher, Structure, supra note 25, at 223-24, 229, 234-39, 249. See also Sunstein,
supra note 38, at 166-67; Winter, supra note 24, at 1392-93, 1470, 1507. Fletcher argues
that standing should depend on careful analysis of the meaning of the particular statuto-
ry or constitutional provision at issue. Fletcher, Structure, supra note 25, at 223-39. If a
legal duty is statutory, courts should look to the statute to determine whether the plain-
tiff has standing to enforce the duty. Id. at 223-24, 251-65. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CoLUM. L REv. 1432, 1461 (1988) (arguing
that standing should focus on whether Congress has created cause of action). If a legal
duty is constitutional, the relevant constitutional provision should be seen as both the
source of the duty and the definition of those entitled to enforce it. Fletcher, Structure,
supra note 25, at 223-24, 251. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciabili-
ty, 22 CONN. L. REv. 677, 697 (1990) (pointing out that justiciability should depend part-
ly on whether claim based on constitutional provision should be enforced judicially).
397 See Fletcher, Structur4 supra note 25, at 229-33. One may suffer an actual injury
that does not invade a legal right; conversely, a person who has experienced no personal
injury may have a legal right to sue, if a law grants that right. Id. at 249; see also Winter,
supra note 24, at 1453-54 (discussing damnum absque injuria-damage without cognizable
injury). Indeed, the Court's "injury in fact" language is historically oxymoronic: "injuria"
means "against legal rights." See HALE, supra note 105, at 75 (Violations of "rights or jura"
are "wrongs or injuriae.").
398 See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
399 See generally Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968).
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C. Summary
Although the idea of justiciability has both a historical lineage
and current utility, its modem incarnation as a jurisdictional test
mandated by Article III's reference to "Cases" and "Controversies"
has created two serious problems. First, the Court has been trying
to fit a square peg-justiciability and dispute resolution-into a
round hole ("Cases") instead of a square one ("Controversies").
Rigorous application of justiciability and other limitations to "Con-
troversies" would reflect the federal courts' core function of um-
piring such disputes. Second, the constitutionalization of justicia-
bility has obscured the Court's proper role in "Cases." The justicia-
bility doctrines should be revised and returned to their former
prudential status, which would sharpen the judicial focus on expo-
sition of important public law principles in "Cases."
IV. CONCLUSION
The justiciability doctrines illustrate Justice Cardozo's observa-
tion that "[t]he repetition of a catchword can hold analysis in
fetters for fifty years or more."' Over half a century has passed
since Justice Frankfurter uttered the magic words "Cases and Con-
troversies" and pulled constitutional justiciability out of his hat.
Since then, the Supreme Court has simply reiterated that catch-
phrase instead of examining the true meaning of "Cases" and
"Controversies."
These words have different connotations that explain their
specific usage in Article III. The federal courts' primary function
in "Cases" is exposition, whereas in "Controversies" it is dispute
resolution. Confusion of these distinct judicial roles has beclouded
justiciability and resulted in irrational allocation of federal judicial
resources: Citizens claiming violations of federal law are denied a
federal forum because of the absence of a dispute, while individu-
als with garden-variety state law claims gain access. Federal judicial
resources should be shifted from "Controversies" (which usually
involve state law issues that can be left to state courts) to "Cases,"
which raise federal law questions that can be answered definitively
only by federal courts.
400 See Engdahl, supra note 165, at 462 n.19 (citing Cardozo).
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The case/controversy distinction is a useful starting point in
clarifying justiciability. More importantly, it sheds new light on the
continuing debate over the proper role of Article III courts in a
constitutional system based on separation of powers and federal-
ism.
